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Jau-Fei Chen, individually and as
the natural guardian of Chi Wei
Zhang, E. Lei Zhang, and E. E. Zhang,
her minor children,
Plaintiff/Appellee,
v.
Jau-Hwa Stewart, E. Excel
International, Inc., a Utah
coproation, and Does I through X,
Defendants/Appellants.

E. Excel International, Inc., a
Utah corporation,
Cross-Claimant,
v.
Jau-Hwa Stewart,
Cross-Defendant,

E. Excel International, Inc., a
Utah corporation,
Third-Party Plaintiff,
v.
Taig Stewart; Beverly Warer; Angela
Barclay; Dale Stewart; Hwan Lan Chen;
Sam Tzu; Richard Hu; Apogee, Inc.,
A Utah corporation; Apogee Essence
International Philippines, Inc., a
Philippine corporation; Excellent
Essentials International Corporation,
a Philippine corporation; USA Apogee,
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Shannon River, Inc., a Utah
corporation; Shannon Heaton; Sheue
Wen Smith; Bryan Hymas; Paul Cooper;
Kiim O'Neill; Byron Murray; and John
Does I through X,
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PAT BARTHOLOMEW
CLERK OF THE COURT
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Jau-Hwa Stewart,
Cross-Claimant,
v.
E. Excel International, Inc. a Utah
corporation; Larry C. Holman; and
Gary Takagi,
Cross-Defendants.

ORDER
The Court dismisses, sua sponte, E. Excel International's
motion to dismiss on the basis that it is not a party to the
criminal contempt proceedings and thus lacks standing. That
dismissal moots E. Excel's motion to dismiss defendant's and
third party defendants' appeals.
The Court denies plaintiff's motion to dismiss defendant Jau
Hwa Stewart's appeal on the basis that her appeal appears at this
juncture to be from a final order holding her in contempt. That
order is either an order of criminal contempt or contains
elements of civil and criminal contempt and will therefore be
treated as a final order for purposes of appeal. Von Hake v.
Thomas, 759 P. 2d 1162, 1168 (Utah 1988).
The Court defers ruling on plaintiff's motion to dismiss
third party defendants Hwan Lan Chen and Taig Stewart's crossappeals until plenary review and invites those two parties to
raise the issue of their standing again in their briefs to this
court.
The court dismisses, sua sponte, defendant Stewart and third
party defendant Taig Stewart's issues dealing with the
appointment of a special master. Those issues arose from the
trial court's interlocutory order after a hearing on motion for
preliminary injunction and are not appealable. The court notes
that the issues have been separately raised in a petition for
interlocutory appeal in case # 20020927.
)
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IN THE UTAH SUPREME COURT
JAU-FEI CHEN, individually and as the natural
guardian of CHI WEI ZHANG,
E. LEI ZHANG, and E. E. ZHANG, her minor
children,
Plaintiff/Appellee,

MOTION TO DISMISS FOR LACK
OF APPELLATE JURISDICTION
AND STANDING

vs.
JAU-HWA STEWART, E. EXCEL
INTERNATIONAL, INC., a Utah
Corporation, and DOES I through X,
CaseNo.20020777-SC
Defendants/Appellants.
E. EXCEL INTERNATIONAL, INC.,
a Utah corporation,
Cross-Claimant,
Trial Court Nos. 010400098 and
010400201

vs.
JAU-HWA STEWART,
Cross-Defendant.

E. EXCEL INTERNATIONAL, INC.,
a Utah corporation,
Third-Party Plaintiff,
vs.
TAIG STEWART; BEVERLY WARNER;
ANGELA BARCLAY; DALE STEWART;
HWAN LAN CHEN; SAM TZU; RICHARD
HU; APOGEE, INC., a Utah corporation;
APOGEE ESSENCE INTERNATIONAL
PHILIPPINES, INC., a Philippine corporation;
EXCELLENT ESSENTIALS
INTERNATIONAL CORPORATION, a
Philippine corporation; USA APOGEE, LTD.,
a Hong Kong corporation; SHANNON RIVER,
INC., a Utah corporation; SHANNON
HEATON; SHEUE WEN SMITH; BRYAN
HYMAS; PAUL COOPER; KIM O'NEILL;
BYRON MURRAY; and JOHN DOES I
THROUGH X,
Third-Party Defendants.

JAU-HWA STEWART,
Cross-Claimant,
vs.
E. EXCEL INTERNATIONAL, INC., a Utah
corporation; LARRY C. HOLMAN; and GARY
TAKAGI,
Cross-Defendants.

Dr. Jau-Fei Chen moves the Court pursuant to Rule 10, Utah Rules of Appellate
Procedure, to dismiss the appeals herein on the grounds that (1) the Court lacks appellate
jurisdiction, and (2) the third-party defendants lack standing to appeal. This Motion is supported
by an accompanying Memorandum and Exhibits thereto.
DATED this 2£_ <&y of October, 2002.
SNOW, CHRISTENSEN & MARTINEAU

lichael ljrCarisE
Richard A. Van Wagoner
David L. Pinkston
Attorneys for Appellee
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I hereby certify that on this 23rd day of October, 2002,1 caused a true and correct copy of
the foregoing MOTION TO DISMISS FOR LACK OF APPELLATE JURISDICTION to
be served on the following:
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Via First Class Mail:

Clark W. Sessions
Matthew A. Steward
CLYDE, SNOW, SESSIONS & SWENSEN

Shannon Heaton
3312 Antigua Drive
Eugene, OR 97408

201 S. Main Suite 1300
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111

H. Thomas Stevenson
STEVENSON & SMITH

Mark A. Larsen
Jerome H. Mooney
David S. Hill
Jon K. Stewart

3986 Washington Blvd.
Ogden,UT 84403
Raymond Scott Berry
9 Exchange Place, #900
Salt Lake City, UT 84111

LARSEN &GRUBER

50 West Broadway, Suite 100
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101

Bryan Ray Hymas
115 West 300 South.
Provo, Utah 84601

Daniel L. Berman
Samuel O. Gaufm
Eric K. Schnibbe
BERMAN, GAUFIN, TOMSIC & SAVAGE

Constandinos G. Himonas

50 South Main Street, Suite 1250
Salt Lake City, UT 84144

JONES, WALDO, HOLBROOK & MCDONOUGH

170 South Main Street, #1500
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101
Patrick Hoog
E. EXCEL INTERNATIONAL, INC.

1198 N. Spring Creek PL
Springville, UT
84663
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IN THE UTAH SUPREME COURT

JAU-FEI CHEN, individually and as the natural
guardian of CHI WEI ZHANG,
E. LEI ZHANG, and E. E. ZHANG, her minor
children,
Plaintiff/Appellee,

MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF
MOTION TO DISMISS FOR LACK
OF APPELLATE JURISDICTION
AND STANDING

vs.
JAU-HWA STEWART, E. EXCEL
INTERNATIONAL, INC., a Utah
Corporation, and DOES I through X,
Defendants/Appellants.

Case No. 20020777-SC

E. EXCEL INTERNATIONAL, INC.,
a Utah corporation,
Cross-Claimant,
vs.

Trial Court Nos. 010400098 and
010400201

JAU-HWA STEWART,
Cross-Defendant.

E. EXCEL INTERNATIONAL, INC.,
a Utah corporation,
Third-Party Plaintiff,
vs.
TAIG STEWART; BEVERLY WARNER;
ANGELA BARCLAY; DALE STEWART;
HWAN LAN CHEN; SAM TZU; RICHARD
HU; APOGEE, INC., a Utah corporation;
APOGEE ESSENCE INTERNATIONAL
PHILIPPINES, INC., a Philippine corporation;
EXCELLENT ESSENTIALS
INTERNATIONAL CORPORATION, a
Philippine corporation; USA APOGEE, LTD.,
a Hong Kong corporation; SHANNON RIVER,
INC., a Utah corporation; SHANNON
HEATON; SHEUE WEN SMITH; BRYAN
HYMAS; PAUL COOPER; KIM O'NEILL;
BYRON MURRAY; and JOHN DOES I
THROUGH X,
Third-Party Defendants.

JAU-HWA STEWART,
Cross-Claimant,
vs.
E. EXCEL INTERNATIONAL, INC., a Utah
corporation; LARRY C. HOLMAN; and GARY
TAKAGI,
Cross-Defendants.

I. INTRODUCTION
Dr. Jau-Fei Chen ("Dr. Chen'*) moves the Court to dismiss the appeals on two grounds.
First, the order of contempt entered solely against Jau-Hwa Stewart ("Ms. Stewart") is not final
because the trial court has yet to finalize the order of sanctions against Ms. Stewart, which is an
integral part of the contempt citation. Second, the other appellants have no standing to appeal the
order against Ms. Stewart Dr. Chen has made no claim against them and the Court has
entertained no contempt motions against them. The appeal should therefore be summarily
dismissed.
Dr. Chen sued Ms. Stewart and E. Excel International, Inc. ("Excel USA") ("the Original
Action"). Excel USA brought a Cross-Claim against Ms. Stewart and a Third-Party Complaint
against Hwan Lan Chen, Taig Stewart, Beverly Warner, Angela Barclay, Dale Stewart, Sheue
Wen Smith, Apogee, Inc., and others in the Original Action. Dr. Chen has not sued any of the
third-party defendants. Nor has she sought relief in any form against any of the third-party
defendants. In a separate action that has been consolidated herein ("Separate Action"), Ms.
Stewart sued Dr. Chen and others.
Dr. Chen later brought a Motion for Order to Show Cause Why Ms. Stewart Should Not
Be Held in Criminal and Civil Contempt Of Court and a Motion for Order Summarily Holding
Ms. Stewart in Criminal Contempt of Court (collectively "Motions for OSC"). As part of the
Motions for OSC and as a sanction for Ms. Stewart's contumacious conduct, Dr. Chen moved
the trial court to strike Ms. Stewart's pleadings, enter a judgment against Ms. Stewart and have
an evidentiary hearing on damages. After extensive evidentiary hearings on the Motions for
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OSC, the trial court entered its Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, holding Ms. Stewart in
criminal and civil contempt of court. The trial court struck Ms. Stewart's Answer and
Affirmative Defenses in the original action and Affirmative Claims in the Separate Action as a
sanction for her criminal and civil contempt and reserved for further proceedings the issue of
damages. Pursuant to a motion by Excel USA, and as a sanction for Ms. Stewart's discovery
abuses, obstruction ofjustice and spoliation of evidence, the trial court struck Ms. Stewart's
Answer to the Cross Claim and has reserved the issue of damages. The issues as between Excel
USA and the third-party defendants also remain unresolved.
In an effort to delay the ongoing proceedings in the trial court, Ms. Stewart and several
other third-party defendants (collectively "Appellants") filed notices of appeal. These Appellants
seek to appeal from the orders of the trial court holding Ms. Stewart in civil and criminal
contempt, even though the trial court has, to date, found only Ms. Stewart in contempt, and has
yet to rule on the damages issues as a sanction.
First, the orders are not appealable until the trial court has finally imposed sanctions for
the contempt. The trial court has yet to fully and finally determine the sanction to be imposed
upon Ms. Stewart for her contumacious acts. Second, the orders are appealable by only the
contemnor, not by other litigants as against whom Dr. Chen has made no claims and as to whom
the trial court has not even entertained Motions for OSC. The trial court has not held any of the
other Appellants in contempt of court, and there are otherwise no final orders for them to appeal.

4

IL RELEVANT FACTS
Dr. Chen is married to Mr. Rui Kang Zhang (or "Mr. Zhang")- Together they are the
natural parents and Dr. Chen is the legal guardian of their three minor children, Chi Wei Zhang,
E. Lei Zhang, and E. E. Zhang (or the "Zhang Children"). Contempt Findings (Exhibit A), fl 34. At all relevant times, the Zhang Children together owned 75% (or "control shares") of Excel
USA, a closely held Utah corporation with four shareholders. Order Granting Plaintiffs Motion
For Partial Summary Judgment (Exhibit B).
Excel USA was incorporated on July 20,1987. Exhibit A, f 5. Excel USA manufactured
health-related products and sold them through a multi-level network marketing system. Id. K 6.
Excel USA grew to become a successful business. Excel USA sold its products exclusively to
multi-level distributors known as "Territorial Owners" that were located in countries such as
Korea, Taiwan, The Phillippines, Hong Kong, Malaysia, Singapore, U.S.A. and France. Excel
USA also marketed its products in Canada through a wholly-owned affiliate. Id. f 10,13-22.
Prior to the events that form the basis of this litigation, Excel USA was run by Dr. Chen
as president, Ms. Stewart as vice-president and Mr. Zhang as secretary. Dr. Chen, her husband
Mr. Zhang and Ms. Stewart also comprised Excel USA's board of directors. Given that Dr. Chen
spent large amounts of time in Asia promoting Excel USAVs products, Ms. Stewart became
responsible for the day-to-day operations of Excel USA. Id.ffif7-8; Injunction Findings (Exhibit

C M 2.
Dr. Chen enjoyed a good relationship with her mother Hwan Lan Chen ("Madame Chen")
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and her sister Ms. Stewart, until the spring of 2000, when the relationship began to change as a
result of private family matters. Ms. Stewart and Madame Chen attempted to force Dr. Chen to
divorce Mr. Zhang and leave Excel USA. Dr. Chen stayed with her husband rather than follow
the demands of her mother and sister. Exhibit A, Hf 37-38
To punish Dr. Chen for disobeying Madame Chen's and Ms. Stewart's demands to
terminate her marriage and cease being involved in Excel USA, beginning no later than
September 1,2000 Ms. Stewart embarked upon a scheme to eliminate Dr. Chen as the leader of
Excel USA, to unilaterally terminate the exclusive contractual relationships and long-term
courses of dealing and performance with Territorial Owners who were loyal to Excel USA and
Dr. Chen, and to establish new rogue distributors in violation of the exclusive contracts Excel
USA had with Territorial Owners. Id. % 39.
On September 1,2000, while Dr. Chen and her husband were out of the United States,
Ms. Stewart, claiming to exercise ownership control over her own shares and the control shares
owned by the Zhang children (100% of the shares), through "Action by Written Consent,"
purported to remove Dr. Chen as a director of Excel USA, and Dr. Chen's husband Mr. Zhang as
a director. Ms. Stewart purported to appoint her husband Taig Stewart and her mother Madame
Chen as new directors (or, collectively "rogue board of directors"). Id. % 40. On September 1,
2000, the rogue board of directors, through "Action by Written Consent," purported to remove
Dr. Chen as president and her husband Mr. Zhang as secretary, and replace them with Ms.
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Stewart as president and Ms. Stewart's husband Taig Stewart as secretary of Excel USA. Id. \

41.1
Having seized control of Excel USA, Ms. Stewart then proceeded to attack Excel USA's
Territorial Owners in Asia. The attack consisted of two parts. First, Ms. Stewart, acting as
president of Excel USA, cut off the flow of product to certain Territorial Owners. Exhibit A, fK
49-57. Second, Ms. Stewart arranged for the transfer of millions of dollars to Asia to establish
new rogue distribution networks. Id. Yi 58,62,64-67.
On January 10,2001, Dr. Chen filed a Verified Complaint in the Original Case against
Ms. Stewart. Also on that date, she filed a Motion for Temporary Restraining Order (or "TRO")
which the Court granted as follows:
The Defendant Stewart, her agents, servants, representatives, and any persons in active
concert or participation with her are enjoined and restrained: (1) from acting as a trustee
of The Chi Wei Zhang Trust, The E. Lei Zhang Trust, or The E.E. Zhang Trust, or any of
them; (2) from directly or indirectly causing the Company to violate any of its exclusive
contracts with territorial owners or to compete with territorial owners in violation of such
contracts; and (3) from acting as the Company president and otherwise as a spokesperson
for the company. The Court also enjoins and directs Stewart immediately to fill,
complete and ship all pending orders for products receivedfromTerritorial Owners
where such Territorial Owners have complied with the terms of the exclusive contracts.

Id.\lA?
As a result of this TRO and other events, Ms. Stewart knew there was a strong possibility
she would be removed as president of Excel USA. Ms. Stewart therefore decided to destroy
Excel USA, rather than let it revert to Dr. Chen's control, and also to replace it with Apogee,

*The district court later held that Ms. Stewart had norightto vote the stock of the 75%
shareholders. Exhibit B.
2

Dr. Chen later amended the Verified Complaint to add Excel USA as a defendant.
7

Inc., a new nutritional supplement manufacturing company controlled by Ms. Stewart. Exhibit
0,134.
Over the next few weeks, as the trial court held several days of hearing in order to
determine whether the January 10,2001 TRO should be converted into a preliminary injunction,
Ms. Stewart and those in active concert and participation with her engaged in a course of activity
designed to cripple and destroy Excel USA. After disabling the surveillance system at Excel
USA's premises, Exhibit A, 1 112; Exhibit C, 1 53, Ms. Stewart and others proceeded to take
and/or destroy large quantities of Excel USA's product, Exhibit A, fl 81-84,101-07,112;
Exhibit C, fl[ 36,37-38,61-62,63-67; take and/or destroy E. Excel's business documents and
computer files, Exhibit A, f 112; Exhibit C,fflf48-49, 87-90,98-104,110-14,118; and to take
and/or destroy Excel's equipment, Exhibit A, f 112; Exhibit C, f | 86,112,114-15.
Many of these activities were in direct violation of the TRO entered on January 10,2001.
During the period the TRO was in effect, Ms. Stewart intentionally failed to fill confirmed orders
from certain Territorial Owners despite knowing what was required, and having the ability to fill
such orders. Exhibit A, at 120, Tff 7-8. In addition, Ms. Stewart intentionally caused and allowed
shipments of Excel USA product within her control to be shipped to new, rogue distributors loyal
to her (Messrs. Hu and Tzu), despite knowing what was required and having the ability not to
ship such product. Id. at 120-21,ffl[8-11.
While thefirstPreliminary Injunction hearing was under way in the Original Case, on or
about January 23,2001, Ms. Stewart and Messrs. Hu and Tzu privately convened a conference
telephone call. At the time the call took place, Mr. Hu was in Taiwan, and Ms. Stewart and Mr.
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Tzu were in Utah in Ms. Stewart's office at Excel USA in Springville, Utah. During the
telephone conversation the three of them discussed and agreed, among other things, what their
testimony would be in the Preliminary Injunction proceeding then ongoing before the Court,
They agreed to testify falsely concerning a number of material matters. The three of them also
agreed that if they were asked questions they did not wish to answer they would say, "I cannot
remember now," but agreed they could choose to thereafter "remember" whenever they wanted if
it served their purposes. Exhibit A, H 88.
During February 2001, a tape recording of the foregoing telephone conversation was
anonymously delivered to Dr. Chen's residence in Singapore. Dr. Chen's counsel received the
tape recording on February 13,2001. Initially, Dr. Chen and her counsel were unable to obtain
any information concerning who had recorded the conversation, how the recording had occurred,
or where the recording had occurred. Messrs. Hu and Tzu were scheduled to testify on the same
day the tape was to arrive via express mail from Singapore (February 13,2001). Based upon the
contents of the tape, Dr. Chen and her counsel believed Ms. Stewart and her witnesses likely had
carried out and would further carry out a plan to commit perjury and obstruct justice. Exhibit A,
H89.
Ms. Stewart called Mr. Hu as a witness for Ms. Stewart and Excel USA in the
Preliminary Injunction hearing on February 13,2001. Mr. Hu's testimony adhered to the
conspiratorial agreement he, Ms. Stewart and Mr. Tzu had reached to testify falsify. In
accordance with the agreements reached in the telephone conversation, after acknowledging he
was under oath, was obliged to tell the truth and there could be harmful consequences if he did

9

not tell the truth, Mr. Hu testified: he denied he had a current business relationship with Ms.
Stewart, which was false; he denied he had any association with Excellent Essentials
International Corp. (the new entity in The Philippines), which was false; he denied knowing
whether Paris Uy had any association with Excellent Essentials International Corp., which was
false; he admitted having loaned money to Mr. Uy, but denied knowing what was the purpose of
the loan, which was false; he claimed he had borrowed the moneyfrom"Mother Chen," and
claimed that Ms. Stewart had played no part in his securing the loanfromher mother, which was
false; he denied having ever discussed with Ms. Stewart and Mr. Tzu what he would say if he
were asked if he had obtained funds from Ms. Stewart and Madame Chen to give to Mr. Uy,
which was false; he denied having had a conversation with Ms. Stewart concerning whether
people would find out that Ms. Stewart had arranged money for him to put into a new company,
which was false; he denied Ms. Stewart had told him that the money he was to receive to put into
a new company was comingfromMs. Stewart's aunt, which was false; he denied that Mr. Uy
wasfrontinghim, and that the new company was really his, which was false; he denied having
discussed and agreed with Ms. Stewart and Mr. Tzu that if they were asked about this money, he
would simply say the money was loaned betweenfriendsfromMr. Hu to Mr. Uy for unknown
purposes, which was false; he denied having discussed with Ms. Stewart and Mr. Tzu what
testimony he would offer if he were called as a witness in this proceeding, which was false; he
denied having discussed with Ms. Stewart and Mr. Tzu what was said in meetings at the Marriott
Hotel on October 19,2000, between a Mr. Tjandra and Dr. Chen, which was false; and, he
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denied having discussed with Ms. Stewart and Mr. Tzu whether someone should go to jail, which
was false. Exhibit A, fl 88-90.
Thereafter, Dr. Chen's counsel presented Mr. Hu with a translation of the abovereferenced tape recording. Mr. Hu then admitted having had a conversation with Ms. Stewart
He denied recalling whether Mr. Tzu participated in the conversation, so counsel, with the
court's permission, played a portion of the tape recording. Mr Hu thereafter admitted that Mr.
Tzu was a participant in the conversation. At that point, at the suggestion of counsel for Dr.
Chen, the court provided instruction to Mr. Hu concerning constitutionalrights,including the
Fifth Amendmentrightagainst self-incrimination. The court then appointed an attorneyfromthe
Legal Defenders Association to provide assistance to Mr. Hu concerning all aspects of his
remaining testimony. Id. \9\.
Following a recess during which Mr. Hu consulted with his counsel, cross examination
resumed. In response to further questions put by Dr. Chen's counsel, Mr. Hu declined to answer,
and he stated he would continue to decline to answer the questions concerning the telephone
conversation on Fifth Amendment grounds. Id. \ 92. Mr. Hu nonetheless answered further
questionsfromMs. Stewart's and Excel USA's counsel, and admitted he had been in Taiwan
when the conversation took place, but said he could not remember what day or time of day it had
occurred, or who had placed the call.3 Id. \ 93; Order of July 5,2001 (Exhibit D).
3

In connection with the telephone conversation, Ms. Stewart filed a motion to strike, to
suppress and for sanctions against counsel and against Dr. Chen. The court denied Ms. Stewart's
motion after briefing and oral argument. The court also denied the motion for sanctions on the
grounds that the tape recording appeared to constitute evidence of subornation of perjury and a
conspiracy to obstruct justice and defraud the court in the very case and in the proceeding in
which such exhibits were used. The court explained that the issue of potential obstruction of
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On February 21,2001, the trial court entered an Interim Order to which the parties had
stipulated. The Interim Order provided a mechanism for the Court to appoint a Special Master to
serve as CEO of Excel USA until further Order of the Court. The Interim Order included the
following:
12. Jau Hwa Stewart shall not tortuously interfere directly or indirectly with any contract
determined by the Court at any time to exist between the Company and any distributor or
any third party.
13. Jau Hwa Stewart will immediately return to the Company's headquarters any
corporate assets in her custody or control including but not limited to all corporate
records.
Exhibit A, 1116.
After the issuance of the Interim Order, Ms. Stewart and her husband began preparations
to vacate their offices in compliance with the court's Order. However, "the removal of Mr. and
Mrs. Stewart's 'personal property' became little more than a euphemism for the wholesale
conversion of critical documents and other business property at the E. Excel premises." Exhibit
C, T[ 109. The Stewarts removed paper files, computer files, intellectual property, and equipment,
along with the "entire contents of the surveillance room." Id. ff 110-15. In addition, Ms.
Stewart continued to ship product to the new distributors in violation of the Interim Order; now,

justice and the peculiarity of the tape's contents as they related to the very proceeding were such
that Dr. Chen's attorneys had an obligation to advise the court concerning the tape's existence
and contents. Under these circumstances, no sanctions would have been issued even if the Coxirt
had not ruled that the use of the tape and the transcripts was proper for impeachment purposes.
The use and disclosure of the tape and the transcript by plaintiffs attorneys were consistent and
in compliance with counsel's duties under Rules 3.3 and 3.4, Rules of Professional Conduct. In
Exhibit D, the court admitted the audiotape into evidence. The court also issued a referral
concerning the contents of the audiotape to the Utah County District Attorney's office. In
subsequent proceedings, Ms. Stewart has offered, and the court has received, her own translation
of the tape recording.
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however, she did so through a separatefrontcompany, Shannon River, Inc., in order to conceal
her activities from Dr. Chen and the court. Exhibit C,Uf 123-29. Ms. Stewart's assistant Angela
Barclay "removed all of the records relating to the Shannon River shipments from the premises
of E. Excel and delivered them to Jau-Hwa Stewart." Id. % 126. Thereafter, Ms. Barclay erased
all remaining computer files pertaining to Shannon River. Id. See also Exhibit A, UK 99-108,
111-114.
After the issuance of the Interim Order, Ms. Stewart's preparations to compete with E.
Excel through a separate entity-Apogee—continued, even though Ms. Stewart had been ordered
not to interfere with any contract of Excel USA and even though Ms. Stewart remained a director
(although not an officer) of Excel USA. Ms. Stewart and her mother arranged for the purchase of
land for a building for the new entity, id. %^ 142-44, hired a contractor to build the building, id.
Tfl[ 145-49, purchased machinery and equipment for the new company, id.ffi[166-69, and
registered their new entity with the Utah Division of Corporations, id. ff 172-75. See also
Exhibit A, Uf 99,124-186 (concerning tortious interference and competition).
Later in the year, in June 2001, Ms. Stewart openly announced her intention, formulated
months earlier, to compete with Excel USA. Exhibit C, *§ 186. Contemporaneously with that
announcement, Ms. Stewart resigned as a director of Excel USA. Id.
On June 22,2001, Dr. Chen filed a Motion for Order to Show Cause Why Ms. Stewart
Should Not Be Held In Civil And Criminal Contempt Of Court For Her Violation Of Court
Orders. (See Exhibit E.) On August 2,2001, Dr. Chen Filed a Motion For Order Summarily
Holding Ms. Stewart In Criminal Contempt Of Court. (See Exhibit F.) The Motion filed in June

13

2001 referenced two Orders of the Court, the TRO dated January 10,2001 that the Court had
extended without objection on January 24,2001, and the Interim Order dated February 21,2001.
The latter Motion dealt with evidence established in part by the telephone conversation among
Ms. Stewart and Messrs. Hu and Tzu, which demonstrated that Ms. Stewart had obstructed
justice, suborned perjury and perjured herself during and in connection with the Preliminary
Injunction hearing that began January 19,2001, and which concluded with the entry of the
Interim Order on February 21,2001. Dr. Chen sought in the alternative an Order to Show Cause
Why Ms. Stewart Should not be Held in Criminal Contempt of Court for obstructing justice and
suborning perjury. Dr. Chen sought leave to address this latter Motion at the Order to Show
Cause hearing. The court granted leave and such evidence was presented. Exhibit A, p. 3.
The Motions for OSC and Motion for Order Summarily Holding Ms. Stewart in
Contempt of Court came before the Court for evidentiary hearing and argument commencing
October 25,2001, and were also heard on October 26,2001; November 27 and 28, 2001;
December 10,11,12, and 13,2001; February 21 and 22,2002; March 13,15,18 and 19,2002;
April 17,2002 (telephonic conference with the Court and counsel); May 7, 8,10 and 31,2002;
and June 4, 5, 7,25 and 26,2002. Id. at 4.
As a remedy for Ms. Stewart's contumacious conduct, Dr. Chen specifically asked the
district court to (1) Strike Ms. Stewart's pleadings, (2) find that Dr. Chen has established the
substantive allegations set forth in her verified complaint against Ms. Stewart, and (3) hold a
hearing to award damages and attorneys' fees and costs. {See Exhibits E and F.)
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During the summer of 2001, however, Ms. Stewart continued to advance her competing
enterprise. She caused promotional materials to be prepared and circulated throughout Asia that
included pictures belonging to Excel USA. Exhibit C, f 189. She also caused her enterprise to
develop a line of products to be sold through her new distribution networks. Id. <| 204; Exhibit
A,1fl80.
As it turned out, the new distributors were ready to sell product before the new
enterprise's products were ready for market. To solve this problem, Ms. Stewart caused the new
distributors, on behalf of the new enterprise, simply to sell stolen Excel USA product, at a
discount, in the Asian markets. Exhibit C, Yli 204-05. This scheme had the added advantage of
allowing Ms. Stewart and her new enterprise to appropriate some of Excel USA's goodwill in the
marketplace. Id. % 206. See also Exhibit A, <{1178-79,186.
In the fall of 2001, Excel USA filed its Cross Claim against Ms. Stewart, and Third-Party
Complaints against several other third-party defendants, including the Appellants here. Excel
USA sought a preliminary and permanent injunction against Ms. Stewart to prevent her from
competing with Excel USA. Excel USA also moved for a preliminary injunction against those
acting in active concert or participation with Ms. Stewart. Amended Answer, Crossclaim, and
Third-Party Complaint (Exhibit G); Memorandum in Support of Motion for Preliminary
Injunction (Exhibit H).
The trial court combined the hearing on Dr. Chen's Motions for OSC with the hearing on
Excel USA's motion for a preliminary injunction. The trial court set thefirsthearing dates in
late October 2001. Exhibit A, p. 4.
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In the meantime, Excel USA proceeded to conduct discovery of its own, both written and
testimonial. Excel USA deposed Ms. Stewart in early October 2001, and served subpoenas on
several other potential witnesses, including the contractor Ms. Stewart had hired to build the
building for the competing enterprise. Exhibit C, ^ 216. Approximately two weeks after the
contractor received the subpoena, Ms. Stewart sent an email to him instructing him to "please
delete my emails to youfromnow on once you read it." Id.
On October 31,2001, at Excel USA's request and after several days of hearing and
argument, the court entered a temporary restraining order prohibiting Ms. Stewart from
competing with Excel USA. Despite this prohibition, immediately after the entry of the TRO,
Ms. Stewart sent an email to the Asian distributors loyal to her, instructing them to "carry forth"
with the Apogee enterprise until she could join them again. One week later, Ms. Stewart sent an
email to the contractor for Apogee, requesting a meeting with him and again instructing him to
keep their communications "confidential." Id. % 219.
On December 14,2001, again upon Excel USA's motion, the court entered a new
temporary restraining order against both Apogee (Ms. Stewart's new company) and Ms. Stewart,
enjoining them from competing with Excel USA. Despite these orders, Ms. Stewart and her new
enterprise, Apogee, shipped product to Asia on December 10,2001. Id. at *$ 221.
Starting with the three hearing days in October 2001, and continuing through the winter
and spring of 2002, the trial court heard some 24 days of combined testimony and argument on
Dr. Chen's Motions for OSC and Excel USA's motion for preliminary injunction. On August
20,2002, at the conclusion of the hearing, the trial court issued two separate sets of lengthy and
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comprehensive Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law. Thefirstset, Exhibit A, concerned Dr.
Chen's Motions for OSC, wherein the trial court found that Ms. Stewart had indeed disobeyed
the court's Orders and had suborned and committed perjury and should be held in criminal and
civil contempt. The trial court granted Dr. Chen's prayer for relief, striking Ms. Stewart's
pleadings vis-a-vis Dr. Chen, entering judgment on Dr. Chen's claims, and stated that it would
set a hearing on damages and attorneys' fees. Id. at 126-27. The damages hearing has not yet
been held (or even set), and therefore the complete sanction against Ms. Stewart has not yet been
imposed
The second set, Exhibit C, concerned Excel USA's motion for preliminary injunction,
wherein the trial court held that Excel USA had met its burden of proving an entitlement to the
preliminary injunction against Ms. Stewart and against most of the Third-Party Defendants,
including Appellants here.
Ms. Stewart and the other Appellants now attempt to appeal from the Contempt Findings
in which the trial court found only Ms. Stewart in contempt in the original case.
Toward the end of the hearing, Excel USA moved separately for sanctions against Ms.
Stewart, asking the trial court to use its inherent power to sanction Ms. Stewart for her egregious
behavior throughout the case, including perjury, subornation of perjury, spoliation of evidence,
discovery abuses and obstruction of justice. Memorandum in Support of Motion for Sanctions
(Exhibit I). In late August 2002, the trial court granted Excel USA's motion,findingthat Ms.
Stewart had destroyed evidence, and had committed and suborned perjury. The trial court
sanctioned Ms. Stewart by striking her pleadings vis-a-vis Excel USA, and entering default in
favor of Excel USA on all of Excel USA's claims against Ms. Stewart. The trial court stated it
17

would hold a hearing at a later date to determine Excel USA's damages and attorneys* fees.
Ruling and Order Re: E. ExceFs Motion for Sanctions Against Jau-Hwa Stewart (Exhibit J).
Since the trial court's findings were entered, Excel USA has filed a motion asking the
trial court to hold some of the other third-party defendants, including the Appellants here, in civil
contempt of court along with Ms. Stewart. Motion for Sanctions and For Order to Show Cause
Why Certain Third-Party Defendants Should Not Be Held in Civil Contempt (Exhibit K). Excel
USA has not asked the court to hold the third-party defendants in criminal contempt. Id. The
motion is pending, and is set for hearing in 2003.
Finally, even though Ms. Stewart claims the Notice of Appeal divested the trial court of
jurisdiction, Ms. Stewart, Madame Chen and other third party defendants are proceeding in the
trial court. For example, counsel for a number of third party defendants recently moved for an
enlargement of time "to file a Motion under Rule 52 of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure to
Amend the Findings and/or make additionalfindingsrelative to the Third-Party Defendants."
Motion for Enlargement of Time (Exhibit L). Madame Chen has served Dr. Chen and her
husband with subpoenas for deposition and production of documents (Exhibit M). And, Ms.
Stewart has moved to set aside a stipulation concerning consolidation (Exhibit N).
III. ARGUMENT
A.

MS. STEWART'S APPEAL IS PREMATURE

The orders are not yet appealable because the trial court is notfinishedimposing sanction
upon Ms. Stewart. An order of criminal contempt is not appealable until the district court has
completed the process of imposing sanctions upon the contemnor. That process has not been
completed in this case, and therefore Ms. Stewart's appeal is premature.
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The rule is that even orders of criminal contempt are not appealable "if the question of
sanctions is postponed." 15B Charles Alan Wright et al., Federal Practice and Procedure §
3917, at 377-78 (2d ed. 1992). Finality, in the context of contempt orders, "requires
determination of both liability and sanction, just as with ordinary civil and criminal proceedings.**
Id. at 379; see also Forschner Group, Inc. v. Arrow Trading Co., Inc., 124 F.3d 402,410 (2d Cir.
1997); In re U.S. Abatement Corp, 39 F.3d 563,567 (5th Cir. 1994).
In this case, the trial court made afindingof contempt, but has not yet finally entered
sanctions against Ms. Stewart. By way of sanction, the trial court has stricken Ms. Stewart's
pleadings, and has stated that it will award Dr. Chen (1) damages on her substantive claims
against Ms. Stewart, and (2) attorneys* fees. However, the trial court has not yet held (or even
set) a hearing to determine the amount of damages and/or attorneys* fees to be awarded, and
therefore has not yet completed its process of punishing Ms. Stewart.
This Court should also be aware of the current situation in this litigation, and of the
possible reasons why Ms. Stewart is attempting to immediately appeal from the trial court's order
without waiting for the damages hearing. The trial court found that Ms. Stewart was the
ringleader of a criminal racketeering enterprise formed for the purpose of destroying Excel USA.
See Exhibit C. That criminal racketeering enterprise has continued in existence, and has
continued to further its objectives subsequent to the trial court's findings and subsequent to the
filing of the Notice of Appeal. Recently, for example, Excel USA discovered that Apogee-Ms.
Stewart's and Madame Chen's company--and its affiliates were still marketing products in Excel
USA's Asian markets, in defiance of the trial court's orders, and Excel USA successfully
obtained relief against one of the entities involved. Order Holding Hamida in Contempt of Court
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(Exhibit O). In addition, Dr. Chen has taken action to attach certain of Ms. Stewart's assets, to
prevent Ms. Stewartfromdisposing of those assets prior to the damages hearing.
The court has held Ms. Stewart in contempt, imposed sanctions, granted Excel USA and
Dr. Chen relief against the criminal racketeering enterprise, and stated that it will hold a damages
hearing to award Dr. Chen and Excel USA damages in the near future. Ms. Stewart seeks to
place the trial court proceedings on hold and to prevent the trial courtfromtaking additional
action against her. Dr. Chen believes it is precisely to avoid the ongoing proceedings before the
trial court that Ms. Stewart has attempted to file this premature appeal.4 Indeed, Ms. Stewart has
noted in a letter to counsel that it is her belief that this appeal directs the trial court ofjurisdiction
to take any additional action against her. Letter dated September 30,2002 (Exhibit P).
Allowing Ms. Stewart to prosecute this appeal would effect a manifest injustice. It would
allow a party held in contempt of court for violating that court's orders, and found to be the
ringleader of a criminal racketeering enterprise, to be able to avoid the actual sanction of the
district court and to continue (without district court oversight) the criminal activities that got her
into trouble in the first place. It would put Ms. Stewart in a better position than someone who
had not been held in contempt, because that person would still be subject to a damages hearing
and to continuing trial court oversight. It would also be harmful to Dr. Chen because Dr. Chen
would not be permitted to seek relief from the trial court in the event that Ms. Stewart engages in
further contumacious conduct.

4

Dr. Chen also notes that if Ms. Stewart waited until after the damages hearing to appeal the trial
court's findings, Ms. Stewart would then be faced with a damages judgment against her, and
would have to seek a stay of execution of that award pending the appeal, and to post a bond. By
filing this appeal, Ms. Stewart may be hoping to avoid those requirements.
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In sum, Ms. Stewart's appeal is premature. This Court is without jurisdiction to consider
it, and allowing it to proceed would work a manifest injustice. Ms. Stewart's appeal should be
dismissed.
B.

ONLY THE CONTEMNOR MAY APPEAL AN ORDER OF CRIMINAL
CONTEMPT

The other Appellants-Madame Chen, Taig Stewart, Beverly Warner, Angela Barclay,
Dale Stewart, Sheue Wen Smith, and Apogee, Inc.--lack standing to appealfromthe trial court's
contempt findings against Ms. Stewart, even if thosefindingsconstituted a final and appealable
order. It is the rule that criminal contempt proceedings are considered wholly separatefromthe
underlying case-in-chief. See 15B Charles Alan Wright et al., Federal Practice and Procedure §
3917, at 381-82 (2d ed. 1992). Those "separate" proceedings involved only Dr. Chen, the party
seeking contempt sanctions, and Ms. Stewart, the party against whom those sanctions were
sought. The other Appellants were not a part of that "separate" proceeding, and therefore have
no standing to appeal the contempt findings.
Moreover, only the contemnor has standing to appeal afindingof contempt, because only
the contemnor is technically a party to the separate proceeding, and because only the contemnor
is aggrieved by the contemptfindings.See, e.g., Second Injury Fund v.J&S Trucking, 30
S.W.3d 112 (Ark. Ct. App. 2000); Becker v. Becker, 347 A.2d 911 (Md. Ct. App. 1975); Boone
v. Boone, 218 S.E.2d 221 (N.C. Ct. App. 1975); cf. State ex rel HJ. v. State, 1999 UT App 238,
\\1,986 P.2d 115 (stating that "an appellant generally must show both that he or she was a party
or privy to the action below and that he or she is aggrieved by that court's judgment"). The only
contemnor is Ms. Stewart, and therefore the only person entitled to appeal from the trial court's
contemptfindings(once the order isfinal)is Ms. Stewart.
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IV. CONCLUSION
The appeal should be summarily dismissed. First, the order of contempt entered solely
against Jau-Hwa Stewart ("Ms. Stewart") is not final because the trial court has yet to finalize the
order of sanctions against Ms. Stewart, which is an integral part of the contempt citation.
Second, the other appellants have no standing to appeal the order against Ms. Stewart Dr. Chen
has made no claim against them and the Court has entertained no contempt motions against them.
DATED this 23rd day of October, 2002.
SNOW, CHRISTENSEN & MARTINEAU

Michael R.
Richard A. Van Wagoner
David L. Pinkston
Attorneys for Appellee
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Attorneys for Defendant E. Excel International, Inc.
IN THE UTAH SUPREME COURT

JAU-FEI CHEN, et al,
Plaintiffs,

:

Vs.

:
:

JAU-HWA STEWART, et al.,

:

Defendants.

MOTION TO DISMISS FOR LACK
OF APPELLATE JURISDICTION
Case No. 20020777-SC

:

E. Excel International, Inc. ("E. Excel"), by and through its undersigned counsel of
record, and pursuant to Utah R. App. P. 10(a)(1), hereby files this Motion to Dismiss for Lack of
Appellate Jurisdiction.
In an effort to halt ongoing proceedings in the district court—proceedings that have not,
to this point, gone at all well for them—Jau-Hwa Stewart ("Ms. Stewart") and several other
Third-Party Defendants (collectively, "Appellants") have filed premature and improper notices
of appeal. These Appellants are ostensibly appealing from an order of the district court holding
Jau-Hwa Stewart in civil and criminal contempt of the district court's orders. Despite the order's
label, however, the district court's order had the effect of holding Ms. Stewart in civil contempt
only. Orders of civil contempt are not immediately appealable.

Moreover, even if the order were one of criminal contempt, such orders are in any event
not appealable before the district court has had an opportunity to finally impose sanctions for the
contempt. And such orders are only appealable by the contemnor, not by the other litigants in
the underlying case. In this case, the district court has not had opportunity to fully determine the
sanction to be imposed upon Jau-Hwa Stewart for her contemptuous acts. And the district court
has not yet held any of the other Appellants in contempt of court,
For these reasons, the appeals filed by Jau-Hwa Stewart, Hwan Lan Chen, Taig Stewart,
Beverly Warner, Angela Barclay, Dale Stewart, Sheue Wen Smith, and Apogee, Inc.
("Appellants") are premature and should be summarily dismissed for lack of appellate
jurisdiction.
The grounds for this motion are more fully set forth in a memorandum in support of this
Motion to Dismiss for Lack of Appellate Jurisdiction.
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Attorneys for Defendant E. Excel International, Inc.
IN THE UTAH SUPREME COURT

JAU-FEI CHEN, et aL

:

Plaintiffs,
Vs.
JAU-HWA STEWART, et al.,
Defendants.

:
:
:

MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF
MOTION TO DISMISS FOR LACK
OF APPELLATE JURISDICTION
Case No. 20020777-SC

:

E. Excel International, Inc. ("E. Excel"), by and through its undersigned counsel of
record, and pursuant to Utah R. App. P. 10(a)(1), hereby files this memorandum in support of its
Motion to Dismiss for Lack of Appellate Jurisdiction.
INTRODUCTION
In an effort to halt ongoing proceedings in the district court—proceedings that have not,
to this point, gone at all well for them—Jau-Hwa Stewart ("Ms. Stewart") and several other
Third-Party Defendants (collectively, "Appellants") havefiledpremature and improper notices
of appeal. These Appellants are ostensibly appealing from an order of the district court holding
Jau-Hwa Stewart in civil and criminal contempt of the district court's orders. Despite the order's
label, however, the district court's order had the effect of holding Ms. Stewart in civil contempt
only. Orders of civil contempt are not immediately appealable.

Moreover, even if the order were one of criminal contempt, such orders are in any event
not appealable before the district court has had an opportunity to finally impose sanctions for the
contempt. And such orders are only appealable by the contemnor, not by the other litigants in
the underlying case. In this case, the district court has not had opportunity to fully determine the
sanction to be imposed upon Jau-Hwa Stewart for her contemptuous acts. And the district court
has not yet held any of the other Appellants in contempt of court.
For these reasons, and as more fully discussed below, the appeals filed by Jau-Hwa
Stewart, Hwan Lan Chen, Taig Stewart, Beverly Warner, Angela Barclay, Dale Stewart, Sheue
Wen Smith, and Apogee, Inc. ("Appellants") are premature and should be summarily dismissed
for lack of appellate jurisdiction.
FACTUAL BACKGROUND
1.

E. Excel International, Inc., is a manufacturer of nutritional supplements and skin

care products that are sold through multi-level marketing networks. E. Excel sells its own
products directly to multi-level marketers in the United States and Canada, but in Asia sells its
products to a single territorial owner in each national market, who then sells the products through
a multi-level marketing network. See Injunction Findings (attached hereto as Exhibit A), at f 1.
2.

Prior to the events that form the basis of the present litigation, E. Excel was run by

Jau-Fei Chen ("Dr. Chen"), as president, and Jau-Hwa Stewart, as vice-president. Given,
however, that Dr. Chen spent large amounts of time in Asia promoting E. Excel's products, Ms.
Stewart was herself responsible for all aspects of the day-to-day operations of the company. Id.
at H 2.
3.

Beginning sometime in 2000, Jau-Hwa Stewart and her mother, Hwan Lan Chen,

came to believe that Jau-Fei Chen's husband, Rui-Kang Zhang, had been keeping a mistress.

Because of this belief, Ms. Stewart and her mother determined to take revenge upon Rui-Kang
Zhang, and, when Jau-Fei Chen objected, upon Dr. Chen herself. Id. at ^ 10.
4.

As part of this scheme of revenge, Jau-Hwa Stewart and her mother determined to

take over E. Excel and remove Jau-Fei Chen and Rui-Kang Zhang from their positions with the
company. Towards this end, Ms. Stewart purported to vote the stock of the 75% shareholders,
Jau-Fei Chen's three children, which, she alleged, had been placed with her in trust. Id. at f 11.
The district court later held that Ms. Stewart had no right to vote the stock of the 75%
shareholders, and that her actions in taking control of the company were void from the outset.
See Order Granting Plaintiffs Motion for Partial Summary Judgment With Respect to Stock
Ownership (attached hereto as Exhibit B).
5.

Using her purported power over the children's shares, Ms. Stewart first replaced Dr.

Chen and Mr. Zhang on the board of directors with Mr. Taig Stewart and Hwan Lan Chen. The
new board then exercised its powers to discharge Dr. Chen and Mr. Zhang as officers of the
corporation and replace them with Ms. Stewart as president and Mr. Stewart as corporate
secretary. See Injunction Findings (Exhibit A), at f 12.
6.

Having seized control of E. Excel, Ms. Stewart and Hwan Lan Chen then proceeded

to attack E. Excel's historical distributors in Asia. The attack consisted of two parts. First, Ms.
Stewart, acting as president of E. Excel, cut off the flow of product to the company's historical
distributors. Second, Hwan Lan Chen and Jau-Hwa Stewart arranged for the transfer of millions
of dollars to Asia to pay for new distributors loyal to them to establish new distribution
networks. Id. at 1f 15. Ms. Stewart and Hwan Lan Chen took these actions without a legitimate
business justification. Id. at ^f 21.
7.

Soon thereafter, Dr. Chen filed the underlying action in the district court. On

January 10, 2001, based upon Dr. Chen's prima facie showing that Ms. Stewart intended to cause

E. Excel to violate its exclusive contracts with the historical distributors, this Court restrained
Jau-Hwa Stewart from "directly or indirectly causing [E. Excel] to violate any of its exclusive
contracts with [the historical distributors] or to compete with the [historical distributors] in
violation of such contracts." This Court also directed Ms. Stewart to "fill, complete, and ship all
pending orders for products received from [the historical distributors]." See id. at f 33 (quoting
from a Temporary Restraining Order entered on January 10, 2001).
8.

As a result of this order and other events, Jau-Hwa Stewart and her co-conspirators

knew that there was a strong possibility that Ms. Stewart would be removed as president of the
company. Faced with this likely loss of control, Jau-Hwa Stewart and Hwan Lan Chen, soon
joined by Taig Stewart and others, determined both to destroy E. Excel, rather than let it revert to
Jau-Fei Chen's control, and also to replace it with Apogee, a new nutritional supplements
manufacturing company controlled by Ms. Stewart and Hwan Lan Chen alone. Id. at ^f 34.
9.

Over the next few weeks, as the district court held several days of hearing in order

to determine whether the January TRO should be converted into a preliminary injunction, JauHwa Stewart and those in active concert and participation with her engaged in a course of
activity designed to cripple and destroy E. Excel. After disabling the surveillance system at E.
Excel's premises, id. at ^[ 53, Ms. Stewart and others proceeded to take and/or destroy large
quantities of E. Excel's product, id- atffif36, 37-38, 61-62, 63-67; take and/or destroy E. Excel's
business documents and computer files, id. atffif48-49, 87-90, 98-104, 110-14, 118; and to take
and/or destroy E. Excel's equipment, id. atffif86, 112, 114-15.
10. At one point, in an effort to cover up their activities and provide cover for the
conversion of property from E. Excel's warehouse, the conspirators purchased mice at a pet store
and placed the mice in the warehouse, and then claimed that it was necessary to remove the
products from the warehouse because of the presence of rodents. See id. atfflj71-79.

11.

Some of these activities were directly contrary to the TRO entered on January 10,

2001. During this interim period, Jau-Hwa Stewart intentionally failed to fill confirmed orders
from the historical distributors despite knowing what was required, and having the ability to fill
such orders. See Contempt Findings (attached hereto as Exhibit C), at 120ffif7-8. In addition,
Ms. Stewart intentionally caused and allowed shipments of E. Excel product within her control to
be shipped to new distributors loyal to her, despite knowing what was required and having the
ability not to ship such product. Id. at 120-21, ^ 8-9.
12.

Moreover, during the extended preliminary injunction hearing then occurring, more

problems arose for Jau-Hwa Stewart. On February 13, 2001, a tape recording was anonymously
delivered to Dr. Chen and her counsel. The tape contained a recording of a conversation, which
occurred on or about January 23, 2001, between Jau-Hwa Stewart and two of the new
distributors loyal to her—Sam Tzu and Richard Hu. On the tape, Ms. Stewart, Mr. Hu, and Mr.
Tzu can be heard discussing the following:
a.

that they would testify falsely that Dr. Chen wanted to forge documents;

b.

that they would testify falsely concerning statements Dr. Chen had
purportedly made during prior meetings;

c.

that Mr. Hu would falsely deny any involvement or ownership in the new
distribution networks;

d.

that they would falsely blame Dr. Chen for things that were not her fault;

e.

that suing Dr. Chen was not enough, that they must take additional actions
against her in order to consume her resources; and

f.

that if they were ever asked questions in a court proceeding that they did
not want to answer, they would say "I cannot remember now" and justify
giving a misleading answer with the explanation that they could choose to
"remember" whenever they wanted to after that.

See id. at 57188.

13. That same day (February 13), Mr. Hu was scheduled to testify at the ongoing
preliminary injunction hearing. His testimony adhered to the conspiratorial agreement he, Ms.
Stewart, and Mr. Tzu had reached to testify falsely. Id. at 58 ^f 90.
14. After Mr. Hu had testified falsely, counsel for Dr. Chen presented Mr. Hu with a
translation of the tape recording. Thereafter, Mr. Hu admitted to having had the conversation
with Ms. Stewart and Mr. Tzu. At this point, at the suggestion of Dr. Chen's counsel, the Court
provided instruction to Mr. Hu concerning constitutional rights, including the right against selfincrimination. The Court then appointed an attorney from the Legal Defenders Association to
provide assistance to Mr. Hu during the remainder of his testimony. Id. at 60 f 91.
15. Mr. Hu declined to answer a substantial number of questions, stating that he elected
to exercise his Fifth Amendment rights. Id. at 60 ^ 92.
16. On February 21, 2001, after several days of testimony and argument, the Court
signed the Interim Order removing Jau-Hwa Stewart as president of E. Excel and requiring that
"Jau-Hwa Stewart shall not tortiously interfere directly or indirectly with any contract
determined by the Court at any time to exist between the Company and any distributor or any
Third-Party." See Injunction Findings (Exhibit A), at ^j 121 (quoting from the Interim Order). In
addition, the Interim Order commanded Ms. Stewart to "immediately return to the Company's
headquarters any corporate assets in her custody or control including but not limited to all
corporate records." See Contempt Findings (Exhibit C), at 123, If 15.
17. After the issuance of the Interim Order, Jau-Hwa Stewart and her husband began
preparations to vacate their offices in compliance with the district court's order. However, as it
was actually conducted, "the removal of Mr. and Mrs. Stewart's 'personal property' became little
more than a euphemism for the wholesale conversion of critical documents and other business
property at the E. Excel premises." Id. at ^ 109.

18. The Stewarts removed paper files, computer files, intellectual property, and
equipment, along with the "entire contents of the surveillance room." Id. at ^ 110-15.
19. In addition, Ms. Stewart continued to ship product to the new distributors; now,
however, she did so through a separate front company, Shannon River, Inc., so as to conceal her
activities from Dr. Chen and the district court. See Injunction Findings (Exhibit A), atffi[12329. Making matters worse, Ms. Stewart's assistant Angela Barclay "removed all of the records
relating to the Shannon River shipments from the premises of E. Excel and delivered them to
Jau-Hwa Stewart." Id. at f 126. Thereafter, Ms. Barclay erased all remaining computer files
pertaining to Shannon River. Id.
20.

After the issuance of the Interim Order, Ms. Stewart's preparations to compete with

E. Excel through a separate entity—Apogee—continued apace, even though Ms. Stewart had
been ordered not to interfere with any contract of E. Excel and even though Ms. Stewart
remained a director (although not an officer) of E. Excel. Ms. Stewart and her mother arranged
for the purchase of land for a building for the new entity, id. atfflf142-44, hired a contractor to
build the building, id. atfflf145-49, wired funds to the new distributors loyal to them, id. at ffif
162-63, purchased machinery and equipment for the new company, id. atffif166-69, and
registered their new entity with the Utah Division of Corporations, id. atfflf172-75.
21.

Later in the year, in June 2001, Ms. Stewart openly announced her intention,

formulated months earlier, to compete with E. Excel. See id. at 1186. Contemporaneously with
that announcement, Ms. Stewart resigned her post as a director of E. Excel. Id.
22.

On June 22, 2001, in response to Ms. Stewart's activities, Dr. Chen returned to the

district court and filed a Motion for Order to Show Cause Why Jau-Hwa Stewart Should Not Be
Held in Civil and Criminal Contempt of Court. Dr. Chen argued that Jau-Hwa Stewart's
activities since January and February of 2001 had been violations of the January 10, 2001 TRO

and the February 21, 2001 Interim Order. See June 22, 2001 Memorandum in Support of Motion
for Contempt (attached hereto as Exhibit D).
23.

As a remedy, Dr. Chen asked the district court to (1) strike Jau-Hwa Stewart's

pleadings, (2) find that Dr. Chen has established the substantive allegations set forth in her
complaint against Ms. Stewart, and (3) hold a hearing to award damages and attorneys' fees and
costs. Id.
24.

A few weeks later, on August 2, 2001, Dr. Chen filed a second motion for

contempt, this time arguing that Jau-Hwa Stewart should be held in contempt of court for the
additional reason that Ms. Stewart had suborned and committed perjury and obstructed justice in
the preliminary injunction hearing in order to deceive the district court. See August 2, 2001
Memorandum in Support of Motion for Order Summarily Finding Ms. Stewart in Criminal
Contempt of Court (attached hereto as Exhibit E).
25.

During the summer of 2001, however, Ms. Stewart continued to advance her and

her mother's competing enterprise. She caused promotional materials to be prepared and
circulated throughout Asia that included pictures belonging to E. Excel. See Injunction Findings
(Exhibit A), at Tf 189. She also caused her enterprise to develop a line of products to be sold
through her new distribution networks. Id. at ^f 204.
26.

As it turned out, the new distributors were ready to sell product before the new

enterprise's products were ready for market. To solve this problem, Ms. Stewart caused the new
distributors, on behalf of the new enterprise, to simply sell stolen E. Excel product, at a discount,
in the Asian markets. Id. atffif204-05. This scheme had the added advantage of allowing Ms.
Stewart and her new enterprise to appropriate some of E. Excel's goodwill in the marketplace.
Id. at 1f 206.

27.

In the fall of 2001, E. Excel, on its own behalf and with counsel separate from

either Jau-Fei Chen's counsel or Jau-Hwa Stewart's counsel, filed a cross-claim against Jau-Hwa
Stewart, and third-party complaints against several other third-party defendants, including the
Appellants here. E. Excel sought, inter alia, a preliminary and permanent injunction against JauHwa Stewart preventing her from competing with E. Excel in the marketplace. E. Excel also
moved for a preliminary injunction against Jau-Hwa Stewart and those acting in active concert or
participation with her. See Amended Answer, Crossclaim, and Third-Party Complaint (Exhibit
F); see also Memorandum in Support of Motion for Preliminary Injunction (Exhibit G).
28.

The district court combined the hearing on Dr. Chen's contempt motions with the

hearing on E. Excel's motion for a preliminary injunction. The district court set the first hearing
dates in late October 2001. See Ruling (Exhibit H).
29.

In the meantime, E. Excel proceeded to conduct discovery of its own, both written

and testimonial. E. Excel deposed Jau-Hwa Stewart in early October, and then served subpoenas
on several other potential witnesses, including the contractor Ms. Stewart hired to build the
building for the new enterprise. See Injunction Findings (Exhibit A), at ^ 216.
30.

Approximately two weeks after the contractor received the subpoena, Ms. Stewart

sent an email to the contractor instructing him to "please delete my emails to you from now on
once you read it." Id.
31.

On October 31, 2001, at E. Excel's behest and after three days of hearing and

argument, this Court entered a temporary restraining order prohibiting Jau-Hwa Stewart from
competing with E. Excel. Despite this prohibition, immediately after the entry of the TRO, Ms.
Stewart sent an email to the Asian distributors loyal to her, instructing them to "carry forth" with
the Apogee enterprise until she could join them again. One week later, Ms. Stewart sent an

email to the contractor for Apogee, requesting a meeting with him and again instructing him to
keep their communications "confidential." Id. at ^ 219.
32.

On December 14, 2001, again at E. Excel's behest, the Court entered a new

temporary restraining order against both Apogee (Ms. Stewart's new company) and against Ms.
Stewart, enjoining them both from competing with E. Excel. Despite these orders, Ms. Stewart
and her new enterprise, Apogee, shipped product to Asia on December 10, 2001. Id. at f 221.
33.

Starting with the three hearing days in October 2001, and continuing through the

winter and spring of 2002, the district court heard some 24 days of combined testimony and
argument on Dr. Chen's contempt motions and E. Excel's motion for preliminary injunction. On
August 20, 2002, at the conclusion of the hearing, the district court issued two separate sets of
lengthy and comprehensive findings of fact and conclusions of law.1 The first set (attached
hereto as Exhibit C) concerned Dr. Chen's contempt motions, wherein the district court found
that Ms. Stewart had indeed disobeyed the court's orders and had suborned and committed
perjury and should be held in contempt. See Contempt Findings (Exhibit C).
34.

The district court granted Dr. Chen's prayer for relief, striking Ms. Stewart's

pleadings vis-a-vis Dr. Chen, entering judgment on Dr. Chen's claims, and stated that it would,
at a later date, set a hearing on damages and attorneys' fees. Id. at 126-27. The damages hearing
has not yet been held (or even set), and therefore the complete sanction against Ms. Stewart has
not yet been imposed.
1

Ms Stewart has stated in her Docketing Statement that she intends to argue, if allowed to proceed with her appeal,
that the district court simply signed the proposed findings prepared by E. Excel and Dr. Chen, and did not actually
make the findings itself This argument is meritless, and insulting to the district court. The district court heard more
than 40 days of live testimony and argument. The district court gave "studious consideration" over two months'
time to all of the proposed findings, including Ms. Stewart's. See Ruling (Exhibit H). Clearly, the district court put
substantial time and effort into its resolution of the case, and Ms. Stewart's suggestion to the contrary is uncalled
for. The district court's efforts are well demonstrated by its recent Order of Preliminary Injunction and its
accompanying Ruling Re: Objections (attached hereto as Exhibits I and J), where the district court reviewed the
proposed form of injunction, carefully considered numerous specific objections, made certain modifications to the
proposed form, and entered the order.

35.

The second set (attached hereto as Exhibit A) concerned E. Excel's motion for

preliminary injunction, wherein the district court held that E. Excel had met its burden of proving
an entitlement to the preliminary injunction against Ms. Stewart and against most of the ThirdParty Defendants, including Appellants here. See Injunction Findings (Exhibit A).
36.

A few weeks later, the district court issued an Order of Preliminary Injunction,

granting (with several notable modifications) E. Excel's proposed form of preliminary
injunction. See Order of Preliminary Injunction (attached hereto as Exhibit I). The district court
overruled numerous specific objections to the form of order lodged by Jau-Hwa Stewart, Taig
Stewart, and the other Third-Party Defendants (Appellants here). See Ruling Re: Defendant and
Third-Party Defendants' Objections to E. Excel's Order of Preliminary Injunction (attached
hereto as Exhibit J).
37.

Jau-Hwa Stewart and the other Appellants are now attempting to appeal from the

Contempt Findings.
38.

Toward the end of the injunction/contempt hearing, E. Excel made a separate

motion for sanctions against Jau-Hwa Stewart, asking the district court to use its inherent power
to sanction Jau-Hwa Stewart for her egregious behavior throughout the case, including perjury,
subornation of perjury, spoliation of evidence, and obstruction of justice. Specifically, E. Excel
asked the district court to sanction Ms. Stewart for:
destroying, either herself or through her agents, email communications
and computer files at E. Excel in February 2001;
instructing a material witness, during the course of this litigation, to "delete my
emails to you from now on";
•

destroying invoices from Apogee's equipment vendors;
destroying email communications in her possession that E. Excel later
discovered from third parties, including Mr. Stan Houghton (the contractor
for Apogee), Mr. Charlie Ung (a representative from Best Formulations,

the company Apogee hired to manufacture its products), and Mr. Clement
Tang (E. Excel's former Hong Kong counsel);
•

failing to timely respond to document requests;

•

withholding documents from production on the ground that the documents
are "personal" and/or "irrelevant," when in fact the documents are central
to the case before this Court;

•

providing false and inaccurate answers to interrogatories, requests for
admission, and other discovery requests;

•

offering false (and, apparently, perjured) testimony in depositions, written
discovery, and hearing testimony;
using documents at depositions taken by her counsel that, although
relevant and responsive, have not yet been produced to E. Excel;
suborning perjury; and
obstructing E. Excel5s discovery efforts by instructing third-party
witnesses and other parties to ignore pleadings and process and/or not to
communicate with E. Excel.

•

See Memorandum in Support of Motion for Sanctions (attached hereto as Fxhibit K).
39.

In late August 2002, the district court granted E. Excel's motion, finding that Ms.

Stewart had destroyed evidence, and had committed and suborned perjury. The district court
sanctioned Jau-Hwa Stewart by striking her pleadings vis-a-vis E. Excel, and entering default in
favor of E. Excel on all of E. Excel's claims against Ms. Stewart. The district court stated that it
would hold a hearing at a later date to determine E. Excel's damages and attorneys' fees. See
Ruling and Order Re: E. Excel's Motion for Sanctions Against Jau-Hwa Stewart (attached hereto
as Exhibit L).
40.

Since the district court's findings were entered, E. Excel has filed a motion asking

the district court to hold some of the other third-party defendants, including the Appellants here,
in civil (but not criminal) contempt of court along with Ms. Stewart. See Motion for Sanctions

and For Order to Show Cause Why Certain Third-Party Defendants Should Not Be Held in Civil
Contempt (attached hereto as Exhibit M). E. Excel has not asked the Court to hold the thirdparty defendants in criminal contempt. Id. The motion is pending, and is set for hearing in
January or February 2003.
41.

E. Excel has also learned additional facts related to possible new contemptuous

actions taken recently by Ms. Stewart. For instance, E. Excel has learned that Apogee—Ms.
Stewart's and Hwan Lan Chen's company—and its affiliates have been marketing nutritional
supplement products in Asia, despite the district court's orders prohibiting Ms. Stewart or
Apogee from competing with E. Excel. And E. Excel has learned of a concerted media
campaign in Asia intended to disparage E. Excel, using original E. Excel company records which
were stolen and never returned to the company despite the district court's direct orders to Ms.
Stewart. Because of these and other factors, E. Excel is preparing an additional motion for
sanctions against Ms. Stewart.
ARGUMENT
Jau-Hwa Stewart and the other Appellants now attempt to appeal from the district court's
contempt findings. These appeals are, for various reasons, premature, and this Court is without
jurisdiction to entertain them at this point. The appeals should be dismissed.
I.

JAU-HWA STEWART'S APPEAL SHOULD BE DISMISSED
Jau-Hwa Stewart's appeal should be dismissed for several independent reasons. First, the

order of contempt issued against her is, despite its label, an order of civil (not criminal)
contempt, and civil contempt orders are not immediately appealable. Second, even if the
contempt order is ultimately treated as a criminal contempt order, which would eventually be
appealable, Ms. Stewart's appeal is premature because the district court is not finished imposing
sanction upon Ms. Stewart for her contemptuous actions. Even criminal contempt orders are not

appealable until the district court has completely imposed sanctions upon the contemnor. Under
the circumstances of this case, a manifest injustice would result if Ms. Stewart were allowed to
appeal this contempt order at this time. For all of these reasons, Ms. Stewart's appeal is
improper and should be dismissed.
A.

The District Court's Order Is, Despite Its Label, an Order of Civil Contempt
and Is Not Immediately Appealable

The general rule governing appealability of contempt orders is that criminal contempt
orders are immediately appealable, despite the existence of ongoing proceedings before the
district court, but that civil contempt orders are not appealable until the conclusion of the
underlying case. The leading Utah case on the subject is Von Hake v. Thomas, 759 P.2d 1162
(Utah 1988). In that case, this Court held that "an order finding one guilty of criminal contempt
is generally considered to be a final order separate from any ongoing proceedings and appealable
as a matter of right." Id. at 1167. On the other hand, "an order finding one to have committed a
civil contempt is considered interlocutory and not appealable as a matter of right." Id.
In Von Hake, this Court adopted the approach taken by the U.S. Supreme Court in
determining whether a particular contempt order is civil or criminal. Id. at 1168 n.5. Under the
U.S. Supreme Court's approach, the substance of particular contempt proceedings determines
whether they are civil or criminal, regardless of the label attached by the court conducting the
proceeding. See Hicks ex rel. Feiock v. Feiock, 485 U.S. 624, 631 (1988); id. at 646 (O'Connor,
J., dissenting); Shillitani v. United States, 384 U.S. 364, 369-70 (1966). The Court stated that
if it is for civil contempt the punishment is remedial, and for the benefit of the
complainant. But if it is for criminal contempt the sentence is punitive, to
vindicate the authority of the court.
Feiock, 485 U.S. at 631. The Court also noted that "if the relief provided is a fine, it is remedial
when paid to the complainant, and punitive when it is paid to the court." Id. at 632. This aspect

of the federal approach was explicitly adopted by this Court. See Von Hake, 759 P.2d at 1168
n.5 (stating that "a contempt order is civil if the order is to pay a fine to the other party rather
than to the court").
An examination of the proceedings below leads to the inescapable conclusion that the
order entered against Jau-Hwa Stewart is an order of civil contempt, and not immediately
appealable. First, although the order purports to be one of civil and criminal contempt, even the
caption of the order points to the opposite conclusion. The Contempt Findings (Exhibit C) have
the same case number as the Injunction Findings (Exhibit A). There was never a separate
criminal matter initiated; at all times the district court kept the contempt proceedings combined
with the underlying case. This Court has noted this as a relevant factor. See Von Hake, 759
P.2d at 1168 n.4 (stating that "the caption should indicate whether the proceeding is a
continuation of the underlying civil action or an independent criminal action"). In fact, the
district court consolidated the contempt hearing with the hearing on E. Excel's motion for a
preliminary injunction in the underlying case—not only did the contempt proceedings not
receive an independent criminal case number, the contempt proceedings did not even receive an
independent hearing.2
More substantively, however, the remedy imposed (and which will be imposed in the
near future) by the district court against Jau-Hwa Stewart clearly indicates that, whatever the
label on the order, the district court held Ms. Stewart only in civil contempt. All remedies

2

The rationale for treating criminal contempt orders differently from civil contempt orders with respect to
appealability is that "[c]riminal contempt judgments are immediately appealable . .. because they result from a
separate and independent proceeding to vindicate the authority of the court." See Marrese v. American Academy of
Orthopedic Surgeons, 470 U.S. 373, 379 (1985); see also Carbon Fuel Co. v. United Mine Workers of America. 517
F.2d 1348, 1349 (4th Cir. 1975) (cited approvingly by this Court in Von Hake) (stating that "criminal contempt
proceedings are independent of the main action"). Where, as here, the proceeding was not separate, the rationale for
immediate appealability is not present. In reality, the district court proceedings were civil contempt proceedings,
and Ms. Stewart cannot now appeal therefrom.

imposed by the district court for Ms. Stewart's contempt run to the benefit of Dr. Chen, not to
the district court. The relief provided was not a definite term of imprisonment, or a fine ordered
to be paid into the court—remedies typically associated with criminal contempt. See Feiock, 485
U.S. at 632; Von Hake, 759 P.2d at 1168 n.5. Rather, the relief provided was judgment entered
in favor of Dr. Chen on her substantive claims, and (eventually) an award of damages and
attorneys' fees paid by Ms. Stewart directly to Dr. Chen (and not to the court). See Contempt
Findings (Exhibit B), at 126-27. This is a quintessential order of civil contempt, and must be
treated as such despite the fact that the district court gave it a different label.
As noted above, it is beyond dispute that orders of civil contempt are not appealable until
the conclusion of the underlying case. In this case, the district court's order is one of civil
contempt, and therefore Ms. Stewart cannot appeal therefrom until the underlying case is
completed.
B.

Even If the District Court's Order Is Treated as an Order of Criminal
Contempt, Ms, Stewart's Appeal Is Premature

Moreover, even if the district court's order can be treated as an order of criminal
contempt, the order is not yet appealable in any event because the district court is not finished
imposing sanction upon Jau-Hwa Stewart. Under Utah law, an order of criminal contempt may
be appealed before the conclusion of the underlying case, but such an order is not appealable
until the district court has completed the process of imposing sanction upon the contemnor. That
process has not been completed in this case, and therefore Ms. Stewart's appeal is premature.
The rule is that even orders of criminal contempt are not appealable "if the question of
sanctions is postponed." See 15B Charles Alan Wright et al., Federal Practice and Procedure §
3917, at 377-78 (2d ed. 1992). Finality, in the context of contempt orders, "requires
determination of both liability and sanction, just as with ordinary civil and criminal

proceedings." Id. at 379; see also Forschner Group, Inc. v. Arrow Trading Co., Inc., 124 F.3d
402, 410 (2d Cir. 1997); In re U.S. Abatement Corp, 39 F.3d 563, 567 (5th Cir. 1994).
In this case, the district court made a finding of contempt, but has not yet finally entered
sanction against Jau-Hwa Stewart. By way of sanction, the district court has stricken Ms.
Stewart's pleadings, and has stated that it will award Dr. Chen (1) damages on her substantive
claims against Ms. Stewart, and (2) attorneys' fees. However, the district court has not yet held
(or even set) a hearing to determine the amount of damages and/or attorneys' fees to be awarded,
and therefore has not yet completed its process of punishing Ms. Stewart.
In reality, what the district court did here is more akin to entering partial summary
judgment as to liability in favor of Dr. Chen and against Ms. Stewart, with a hearing on damages
to come later. The district court is not finished with Ms. Stewart, and Ms. Stewart's argument to
the contrary is disingenuous. Courts faced with this exact situation have recognized this, and
have held that a district court's "contempt" order imposing default sanctions is actually in the
nature of a partial summary judgment, and have refused to allow immediate appeals, stating that
the sanction of dismissing defendant's answer and declaring [the defendant] to be
in default on the issue of liability did not constitute contempt and until damages
were assessed the judgment of the court was not appealable.
See People ex rel. Hawthorne v. Hamilton. 292 N.E.2d 563, 564-65 (111. Ct. App. 1973) (citations
omitted); see also Camp v. East Fork Ditch Co., Ltd.. 2002 Ida. LEXIS 145, Docket No. 26139
(Idaho Sept. 11, 2002) (attached hereto as Exhibit N) (stating that some penalties, even though
unconditional, are considered civil penalties rather than criminal penalties, including "striking
pleadings" and "entering default judgments"). Litigants in Ms. Stewart's shoes must wait until
the district court has held a damages hearing and has awarded some amount of damages to the
plaintiff before they can properly appeal from the district court's contempt findings.

The Court should also be aware of the current situation in this litigation, and of the
reasons why Ms. Stewart is attempting to mount an immediate appeal from the district court's
order without waiting for the damages hearing. The district court found that Jau-Hwa Stewart
was the ringleader of a criminal racketeering enterprise formed for the purpose of destroying E.
Excel. See Injunction Findings (Exhibit A). Unfortunately, that criminal racketeering enterprise
has continued in existence, and has continued to further its objectives subsequent to the district
court's findings and subsequent to the filing of the notice of appeal. Recently, E. Excel
discovered that Apogee—Ms. Stewart's and Hwan Lan Chen's company—and its affiliates were
still marketing products in E. Excel's Asian markets, in defiance of the district court's orders,
and E. Excel successfully obtained relief against one of the entities involved. See Order Holding
Hamida in Contempt of Court (attached hereto as Exhibit O). In addition, Dr. Chen has taken
action to attach certain of Ms. Stewart's assets, to prevent Ms. Stewart from disposing of those
assets prior to the damages hearing to be held in the district court. And, as noted above, E. Excel
has learned of additional actions being taken by Ms. Stewart and is currently contemplating an
additional motion for sanctions and/or contempt against Ms. Stewart.
In short, then, the situation appears rather bleak for Ms. Stewart in the district court. The
court has held her in contempt, imposed sanctions, has granted E. Excel and Dr. Chen relief
against the criminal racketeering enterprise, and has stated that it will hold a damages hearing to
award E. Excel and Dr. Chen damages in the near future. Jau-Hwa Stewart is trying to do
everything she can to place the district court proceedings on hold and to prevent the district court
from taking additional action against her. E. Excel believes that it is precisely to avoid the
ongoing proceedings before the district court that Ms. Stewart has attempted to file this

premature appeal.3 Indeed, Ms. Stewart has noted in a letter to counsel that it is her belief that
this appeal deprives the district court of any jurisdiction to take any additional action against her.
See Letter dated September 30,2002 (attached hereto as Exhibit P).
Allowing Ms. Stewart to prosecute this appeal would effect a manifest injustice. It would
allow a party held in contempt of court for violating that court's orders, and found to be the
ringleader of a criminal racketeering enterprise, to be able to avoid the actual sanction of the
district court and to continue (without district court oversight) the criminal activities that got her
into trouble in the first place. It would, in effect, put Ms. Stewart in a better position than
someone who had not been held in contempt, because that person would still be subject to a
damages hearing and to continuing district court oversight. It would also be harmful to E. Excel,
because E. Excel wrould not be permitted to seek relief from the district court in the event that
Ms. Stewart takes additional contemptuous actions.
In sum, Ms. Stewart's appeal is premature. This Court is without jurisdiction to consider
it, and would work a manifest injustice by allowing it to proceed. Ms. Stewart's appeal should
be dismissed.
II.

THE THIRD-PARTY DEFENDANTS9 APPEALS: ONLY A CONTEMNOR MAY
APPEAL AN ORDER OF CRIMINAL CONTEMPT
The other Appellants—Hwan Lan Chen, Taig Stewart, Beverly Warner, Angela Barclay,

Dale Stewart, Sheue Wen Smith, and Apogee, Inc.—are without standing to appeal from the
district court's contempt findings against Jau-Hwa Stewart, even if those findings constituted a

3

E, Excel also notes that, if Ms. Stewart followed the law and waited until after the damages hearing to appeal the
district court's findings, Ms. Stewart would then be faced with a large damages judgment against her, and would (1)
have to seek a stay of execution of that award pending the appeal, and (2) would have to post a bond. By filing this
premature appeal, Ms. Stewart is hoping to avoid those requirements.

final and appealable order of criminal contempt.4 If Appellants were somehow able to convince
this Court that the district court's order was one of criminal contempt, then Appellants must live
with the consequences of that tactic. It is the rule—however fictional that rule may be, see 15B
Charles Alan Wright et al., Federal Practice and Procedure § 3917, at 381-82 (2d ed. 1992)—that
criminal contempt proceedings are considered wholly separate from the underlying case-inchief.5 See supra note 2. Those "separate" proceedings involved only Dr. Chen, the party
seeking contempt sanctions, and Ms. Stewart, the party against whom those sanctions were
sought. The other Appellants were not technically a part of that "separate" proceeding, and
therefore have no standing to appeal the contempt findings.
Moreover, courts have sensibly held that only the contemnor has standing to appeal a
finding of contempt, because only the contemnor is technically a party to the separate
proceeding, and because only the contemnor is aggrieved by the contempt findings. See, e.g.,
Second Injury Fund v. J & S Trucking, 30 S.W.3d 112 (Ark. Ct. App. 2000); Becker v. Becker,
347 A.2d 911 (Md. Ct. App. 1975); Boone v. Boone, 218 S.E.2d 221 (N.C. Ct. App. 1975); cf
State ex rel. H.J, v. State, 1999 UT App 238, f 17, 986 P.2d 115 (stating that "an appellant
generally must show both that he or she was a party or privy to the action below and that he or
she is aggrieved by that court's judgment"). The only contemnor—so far—is Jau-Hwa Stewart,
and therefore the only person entitled to appeal from the district court's contempt findings
(assuming that the findings were final) is Jau-Hwa Stewart.

4

All of the arguments posited with respect to Jau-Hwa Stewart's appeal—that the appeal is improper because it is
from a civil (not a criminal) contempt order, and is premature in any event—also apply to the other Appellants'
appeals.

5

Appellants cannot have it both ways—either the contempt proceeding is separate, in which case the Third-Party
Defendants have no standing to appeal, or the contempt proceeding is not separate, in which case the district court's
contempt order would be a civil contempt order and would be interlocutory and not immediately appealable by
anyone.

There may come a time when the other Appellants may have standing to appeal from the
district court's contempt findings. As noted above, E. Excel has asked the district court to enter
an order holding the other Appellants in contempt of court along with Ms. Stewart, for largely
the same reasons, and the district court has set that matter for hearing in several weeks. If and
when the district court grants that motion, and extends the contempt findings to the other
Appellants, Appellants may have a different argument. But until that point, they are without
standing to appeal the district court's determination that Jau-Hwa Stewart should be held in
contempt of court.
CONCLUSION
For all the foregoing reasons, the appeals filed by Jau-Hwa Stewart and the Third-Party
Defendants should be summarily dismissed for lack of appellate jurisdiction.
DATED this £3>*day of October, 2002.

JONES WALDO HOLBROOK & MCDONOUGH
By

K

Cl-CAsX^

'\^&0<^<-~-

Deno ("K Himonas
Adam B: Price
Ryan M. Harris
Attorneys for E. Excel International, Inc.

6

Again, E. Excel notes its belief that it is in an effort to short-circuit those proceedings that the other Appellants
havefiledtheir appeals.
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Hwan Lan Chen, petitioner herein and thud pjily dcI'Mid^i'1 »• "
couil f l l ^ a i i L,

"
oeal Pursi

i1

Petition loi

J uiau .xuie of Appellate Procedure 5, with

regard to a Preliminary Injunction entered by the Honorable Fred P Howard on
October 16, 2002, against Petitioner and others (the
INTROuui i ION
This Petition seeks appellate review of significant issues arising from the
„.u.

s improper issuance of the Preliminary Injunction based upon the

unlawful powers and action;-. u( the luul umil

111.- A I • I'uK nt i ivil I'Ynrvdnif M

i1 "I 'iil< 'v!"i SPHI H I Mnster.
The proceeding.,.,..
Irial court's Rule 53 Specie'

rise to this Petition are utterly unprecedented: the
-+~r

'"ho was appointed pendente lite

law a suuorditi

ithnri7f

/

rie mc

am i., ti.e underlying action, filed as a party litigant the claims
•:\ Petitioner and others giv;*
Motion 1

~ *~ *u= :• t--.-

mriaiy

against Petitioner based

A
• Preliminary Injunction

.n uie Rule 53 Special Master's reports,

.w«^,...nendations and testimony and the trial court's adoption verbatim of

1

The Preliminary Injunction is attached as "L. xliibil A."
2

almost 100...i.
judge,

'

'"'---1

Master - n o t as a

Rule 53 reference L^i u« a party litigant.
i dndamentally, this Petitior

- -ts the contention that d • . -

ster is a subordinate judiuo ».:.,.

:-<
!r

.

•. lunleiTHl hy l l i - i Mini

ial

.-••- ind acts cannot exceed

,i |ihl<|ii's lawful powers, and c ^

ceed a judge's powers pendente

}

lite.
A Ku..

.

K l

'thorized tr,

^ .. .. -.

..».

and an:

-

U.al courts Rule 53 Special

Master was authorized to exercise and exercised, particularly the power to
become the dominant litigant

.,

-.

1

obUiiii d pieliniii'iary iii|iin< h"ii in 11 >• |»» M i.iinq nrtinn Just as the trial court below
could not have asserted claims in the action pending before it, filed the motion
for the Preliminary Injunction, and participated as a party litigant in obtaining the
I'rtJin " ' . " „ ' • •

i

.linn iiijilln i i i mil I llii

In ih inn!

IJ111 r > 'Vt Special M?v- tci

ion further presents for appellate review issues regarding

whether the Preliminary injunction against re*;tioner Hwar ' i ~ ^ h<™ resulted in

^'i

' a i I U vmn_» io H I '

owner of the corporation that is the subject of the trial court action, E. Excel
International, Inc. ("E. Excel USA"). The Preliminary Injunction against
3

fundamentally denies IKJI ilnc piocess because lhrj I'icliiiiin.iiy lii|unction was
based n|M >ii :in days of evidentiary hearings conducted before Petitioner
appeared in the actio.: ad during which she had no notice of the motion for
Preliminary Injunction and did i.v/. h)articipau
trial couil':, l\uli''i3 Sf • • . . . -

~ •

•-

«

ex parte

communications with the plaintiff and plaintiffs counsel and even used plaintiffs
epresent : *
+~ ^w« n t,3,K

.,

z- even bothered in the course of Iir, III'JI

i i ilion

simpiy -.

* '->r appellate review the issue of whether the
Prelimmw.., injunction against Petitioner was the result of a fair and impartial
adjudication by a court whon- 111 HIM in >i

« Hule bJ bpui.wl MJSIUI WM
injunction,

••-v- \

vvuncoo ni the Preliminary Injunction proceeding, and (2; tne trial court deferred
to and made findings based upon its Rule 53 Special Master's reports and
lony offered in hit, lulu as d pdily 1111«.|«.-Jiif, .is ildimnsluleiJ lintli by III'1 trial
i null's verbatim

5 of findings

53 Special Master in support of the Pi
verbatim quotations

Rule

" function, and by the extensive

..... t>3 Special Maste.

materially affect the final decision, particularly

. .^

Hidings.

^ . reliminary Injunction

findings and evidence may be considered in II n' final decision (or, if the Rule 53
4

Special Master's anient inolmn lm i ciiilcnipi ri<j,nnsl Pctilmnor is ruunted, the
I'l-i'limmarv lii|iiiii linn finrlmns become the final decision,. ... addition, a
determination of the correctness of the Preliminary Injunction will better serve
administration and interests of ju si ^t
impacted Petitionei'b bubst.mli

ine ;:<di vdnalreadv I us .idwisi'iv

!•, liy issuing the

n

-

/ Injunction

based upon tho wronqful actions and role of its Rule 53 Special Master and the
fundamental denial of Petitioner's due process rights. Moreover, the trial court's
Rule 53 Special Master continues to exercise I...
nrocess rights.
The proceedings before II ie lnal cuurt are permeated and infected by the
unlawful powers and actions of the trial cou;: „•> <ule t>3 sp«

.. ,:

ih MI n ni l riitiunei s ui> piiII ( v., inihi

-*-

II

miiiilii i nntrarv

'< -•

* " to Dostoone appellate review of the patent unlawfulness ot the actions
:e )t the --.ai court's Rule 53 Special Master and the resuitmy ^e-> <*• vf
due process to the final condui»mn u| IIm ldinlei.1 pnn..wt.'di

5

I

PETITION
I.

STATEMENT OF FACTS MATERIAL TO A CONSIDERATION OF THE
ISSUES PRESENTED AND THE ORDER SOUGHT TO BE REVIEWED
A.

The Preliminary Injunction Was The Product Of And Based
Upon The Rule 53 Special Master Being Empowered With And
Exercising Patently Unlawful Powers And Was Not The Result
Of A Fair And Impartial Adjudication
Preliminary Iniunction was the product of and was based upon the

unlawful empowerment and exercise of patently unlawful powers by the trial
court's Rule 53 Special Master. Moreover, JUU iu lU' p.-iiiiutj.iii
• •• i 3 -

I liu iihii

i • ii ii ('. i Infprpnm to its Rule 53 Special Master in

issuing the Preliminary injunction, the Preliminary Injunction proceeding was not
a fair and impartial proceeding.
1.

T

he Rule 53 Special Master Was Appointee
Notice To Or The Participation Of Petitione

In March 2001, at the request of plaintiff Jau-Fei Chen the * a
pointed Larry C. Holma- i ~ it? Rule 53 Special Master.

cmccu wr, i eoiuar> 21, March 13, and May 11, 2001.
"' 'he time these O- I-??- /.'ere entered the o-'v - . i - * : " x action commence*
defendant

. ......

v>~.c

- -"* -

e underlying
and

•' —

iiiiyation asserted claims i:.\.wi>.ing E. Lx_d ^l.-\, ~ closely

6

xu

based,;

;

..

^*

i~-->cc*..|
- * - . ^uDplements and ww^,,.v.
%

sales . ustc

muiLr

.:.« vast majority of its

made in Asia, through foreign distributors.

Petitioner Hwan Lan Chen did not beccn.c .
niilii i miMiy iiiu,

iVlit

i\

'

oDointment

and authorization of the Rule 53 Special Master. Petitioner never stipulated or
consented to a special mablr' !.-• *'- - ippointment cf' ~—•
oo Special Master
Master, i

}
v 'sons undertaken oy ino u.ai CGU;;~ .»~.

Special Master. Petitioner did not stipulate to the powers conferred upon the
Rule 53 Special Master, and neither did any otlu. i p.uly
2.

iie »rial Court CoM , , irr i f "', ''-Jr f>^ Special Master With
'nlawful Powers

The powers conferred by the trial court upon id. Rule 53 Special Master
and exercised by the Rule 53 Special Master were unlawful .-unl iiiipieotdeiited.
I iinL 'i ii if I . IH M -ny 'I mil IWI in 11 n

.MWI I i n rjr^'^ rim P| Me ^^ Specia*

Master was appointed as "special master, appointed by the Court, and chief
executive officer o f E. Excel USA. Pursuant to the February 21 and March I .V
Indeed, within the 10 day period of Utah Rule of Civil Procedure 52 to
object to findings, Petitioner filed a motion to vacate and set aside the trial
court's orders with regard to its Rule 53 Special Master and the Rule 53 Special
Master's actions, including the findings entered in support of the Preliminary
Injunction, pursuant to which Petitioner challenged the lawfulness of those
orders and actions.
7

'in11 i IUII'I1.., mi i mi. JVS Special Maslei was rinthrwp.d to exercise "full
-if E. Excel USA and was "given complete executive
authority in his 1018 as chief e>.

e officer and special master."

Under the May 11, 2001 Orripr *,V Kuic ^ special n.-&^

.

i

and has full executive autnoru
stuiic i.ii «ill it ••

imnanv •> interests in all business

relationships, assets, disputes or lawsuits."
Moreover, under these Orders, the Rule 53 Special Master i.
rnmnvod hy E. L xcel Ut»A's Board oi i mi'Ui n: i u n.-ih 'IntHler'-. inn I;I mid
exei

rther order of this Court."
Under these Orders, the trial court's Rule 53 Special Master, whose lawful

i "

limited to exercising judicial functions as a subordinate

i" o ° autnonzeil to exercise all ul IIn \ <>• i

il< IPHUU

II

I xcel USA,

Excel or of the trial court. In effect, the
trial courts Rule 53 Special

wo F r x , ^l USA -. -.1 - v ~ -!—--«

beyond the CC~!T>I eve" ~f :t? owners

t

action.
to ber"""-

ts Rule 53 Special Master
•

litigant n. ihe action pending before *: r •

3

jrt, to file

See Utah Rules of Civil Procedure Rule 53; Plumb v. State. 809 P.2d
734, 742-43 (Utah 1990); Webster Eisenlohr. Inc. v. Kalodner. 145 F.2d 316,
319 (3rd Cir 1944); La Buy v. Howe's Leather Co.. 352 U.S. 249, 256 (1957).
8

Uciiiri'o in Hit; underlyii

again?'

\

ii MI < ill ii 'i third parties, and to seek and obtain preliminary injunctive relief.
3.

The Trial Court's Rule 53 Special Master Proceeded To
Unlawfully File Claims Upon Which The Preliminary
Injunction Is Based, File The Preliminary Injunction
Motion, And Seek And Obtain The Preliminary Injunction

I Kercisimi In.1, piitHilly mil iwlul powers, the trial court's Rule 53 Special
Master proceeded, with the approval of the trial court, to bui i n i n • II n.11 lominant
party litigant in the trial court action, replacing plaintiff Jau-Fei Chen, and
obtai <_«,

J

reuminary injunction.
<--r—,1 Master conducted an unlawful ex parte investigation.

He had regular ex parte communications with plaintiff Jau-Fei Chen Indeed, the
Rule 53 Special Master at one point used and was represented by plain.

oased upw.i .lis ex parte investigation, the Rule 53 Special Master filed
third-party claims in the trial court action on October 29, 2001 against Petitioner
ami iHIn.I uinu IUIIIH".

I in." hint* ,'.),; ..|>t < ii,il (vuslei

llmil pnly i Mini mil mil/

pmvicled the basis for the Preliminary Injunction, but also caused the expenses
• )l prosecuting the litigation to be shift)

m plaintiff Jau-Fei Chen to E. Excel

11! '.A, notwithstanding Hi >hiu mer Hwan .un Chen's ownership in I I u.H 1^ "
Rule 5'

-^cial M?

n

Octobu, c^, k U u,, colore Petitioner Hwan Lan Chen ~ r r

9

the case, and

~u*„;—w

.. ,,eliminary

IIIIIIIXJIIOM ..IIJJIIISI

I'etitionei

IIM)

nilioiy n|i i irfniipi id,

200:'
4.

The Trial Court Deferred To Its Rule 53 Special Master In
Issuing The Preliminary Injunction, Which Was Based
Upon The Reports And Testimony Of The Rule 53 Special
Master Offered As A Party Litigant And Not As A Judicial
Officer

i in (rial i mill ile fh-rii-il I i l . m n< fully authorised Rulr. 53 Special Master
in issuing the Preliminary Injunction on October 16, 2002, whiui was based
upon rie reports and testimony of the Rule 53 Special Master offered as a party
litigat

...;• .^; '

icial officer.
oecial Master testified in the Preliminary

11.j

on proceedina (which was combined with a contempt proceeding upon

plaintiff Jau-Fei Chen's contempt motions againsl di'lcnd.jnt Jau llwd Sk'Wriil)
'^IIIP 53 <------! »

icpicociiied in the combined proceeding by E. Excel USA's cour

--. Excei

ot only paid the Rule 53 Special Master's annual salary of at least
$26i

Special Mater's team, winch

amounts to at least $482,000 per year, and his attorneys fees.4

. ne trial court's Rule 53 Special Master was represented both by Jones,
Waldo. Holbrook & McDonough, which also represents E. Excel USA, and by
F ,, ,„., rioog, who is "Special Counsel" to the trial court's Rule 53 Special
Master and general counsel of E. Excel, who supervises the litigation.
10

imjnan/
2002 Findings of Fact ar.j

~.~~

* 20,

oi Law (the "Preliminary Injunction

Ruling")5 The Preliminary Injunction Ruling consists of over 100 pages of

In uInH]., ol tact ,n ii I i.iiiiclnsuiiis nf law that the liul I mul'r; Rule F»3 Special
Master had proposed as a party litigant.
"--vr Preliminary Injunctic
.. i .i Kuie o.

' ^i repeatedly cites to the testimony of the
. - :jdly i..|i.iol^s veibdliiii din.l ,it

,

-*-i r ~c the Rule F*3 Soecial Master s leports to the trial court. [Exhibit
B, at Findings of Fact fflf 153 i r- . ' " ""' 205 2.36 1 The reports reflect the
a

--\^:

special Master's .-H-as a party litigant ario ,..-.

ex parte

stances, II10 PrHimmi
upon „.u .\jle 53 Special Master's repoib and luiAimony as the determinative
evidence. [Exhibit B, at Findings of Fact ffl[ 153 15' " c n " * n 161,203,236.]

upon findings made by the trial court and also entered on August 20, 2002, with
regard to the contempt proceeding brought by plaintiff Jau-Fei Chen against
il"l"/i'|jnl Jau-Hwa Stewart (Ihe 'Uonlempl Huliny")1' I.IKI.1 Hie Preliminary
Injunction Ruling, the Contemr

\ ,,e Preliminary Injunction Rulin
6

attached as "Exhibit B."

The Contempt Ruling is attached as "Exhibit C "

11

Injunction Ruling also repeatedly cites to the testimony of the trial court's Rule 53
Special Master and repeatedly quotes verbatim and at length ce
53 Special Masters lupuir. m mr iiini

i

*

>
i i> • l< ' I the Rhlc ST Spc, , i.

Master's unlawful rolo as CEO of E. Excel USA who was purportedly was
exercising his business judgment in the interests of E. Excel USA and acting as
a party litigant.7 [Exhibit C, at Findings ol I del Ml I''. I'' I 193.]
5.

The Trial Court's Rule 53 Special Master Has Dominated
The Litigation And Acted Unlawfully In Addition To
Obtaining The Preliminary Injunction

The trial court's Rule 53 Special Master has exercisea ms unlawful powers
••:• *'••'.';<.; li'iC

Ugh

• •"* Snecial Master has lieiu i.ii..owiS cut as a Rule 53 special
master, was explicitly aranted Rule 53 special master status, and has been
recognized and accorcic,...
11 ii 111 II IH Pi 1 •

. erence as a Kule Ini special nidbtei 117 II n In il
'

*nr has never lawfully acted as a subordinate

judicial officer. In addition to seeking and obtaining the Preliminary Injunction,
other unlawful actions of the Rule o'J special lvLn.li.T, taken \

7

jne approval ol

Appeals from the Contempt Ruling are pending as Appeal No.
20020777SC. Plaintiff Jau-Fei Chen and the trial court's Rule 53 Special Master
recently filed motions to dismiss the appeal for lack of appellate jurisdiction.
Appellants oppose the motions to dismiss.
12

1.

r

- orts to the trial court between May and September 2001

which were not based upon any hearings or the taking of any evidence, but
which were based i:r~.n ex parte communications, and which reflected the Rule
53 Special MaskM
Chen, rather than a subordinate judicial officer who was reporting his findings to
the court;
2.

Settling by means of a Mailer Settlement Agreemeni

<

^re not hp'-'-~ *-

-ial

court, in a manner thai caused E, Excel USA to lose it most profitable Asia
market to the substantially benefit of plaintiff Jau I ui L I ion. During the

counsel for plaintiff Jau-Fei Chen; and
3.

Orchestrating a freeze out merger involving E. Excel USA in July

Stewart's ownership in E. Excel USA (and thereby, deprive her of standing to
assert a shareholder derivative action) and purported to affect Petitioner Hwan
I in niii'ir- M>"ni'i lii|i i Linn "illnuil imli i In l-'i-titu mi'i MVMII I n i H i i n m
benefit of a hearing, much less a trial on the merits.
The record manifestly demonstrates that, without notice to or the consent
ot Peiitionei, the trial court's Rule b'6 Sptji,wl M,i ,ter was conferred with and

exercised patently unlawful powei s wliu h k;il tin1 I'uli1 'i I Sprci.il M.ISIH In
hei.:omt' tin1 iloiniiiiinl |vnly litigant, adversely affect Petitioner's rights and
interests, file claims giving rise to the Preliminary Injunction, and move for and
obtain the Preliminary Injunction against Petitioner.

Petitioner Hwan Lan Chen
In addition to hpinq improperly and unfairly based upon the unlawful
Ijjitiui ,i1ion of the Rule 53 Special Master, the Preliminary Injunction was
issued without due process ...

^,.:.,, ier Hwan Lan ^

r

i

1.

Petitioner Hwan Lan Chen, Her Interest In E. Excel, And
Her Appearance In the Trial Court Action

Petitioner Hwan LOI; V., ,.r , .,-, /t> years old a widow, and ;r ••- nothci ol
. .-.,- . - r
. cuuuiier and hei deceaseu ;.usband, Yun a . ~

FxcelUSA.

Jhen, founded and helped

ilt'Vflop E. Excel USA, and provided substantial funding for E. Excel USA.
I 'i lihonei diid In i husband,

r

liii.bdiu, :, death, provided most of the capital for E. Excel USA's p.'uWv...i
llllMllt'SS

Petitioner Hwan L<.

ien is a

->aca n^

ni.'ih Sne spe ih'- I

who resides m uiuin,
I|IH",

English.
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imi spiMh m ro irl

ted
servir

---*••

^ u le 53 Special Master's Third-Party Complaint in the

ma! court action against Petitioner and others, which was filed on October 29,
?",*<• Petitioner first appeared in the trial court action on February za, <JUIL.
. .nywt.'h.'d 11 n-.' h!iile '»i .Special Maste
2.

'^nd-Party Complaint

The Rule 53 Special Master Proceeded Without Providing
Notice Or The Opportunity To Be Heard To Petitioner
Hwan Lan Chen

The trial court's Rule 53 Spc^.
an against Petitior

Hwc

... r™vp^ jr tne preliminary
ictnhpr

„ r :».. •_!.-.

Petitioner was not yet a party to;..~ „-ial COL.: d~:>_... . : : e Rule 53 Special
""

' --Jfiled his Preliminary Injunction motion based upon his entirely ex parte
rl nny
tiaatior

Petitioner's ownei.- up interest .n E. Excel USA, without

-v/-- providir_; <•

»r an opportunity to be heard, and, indeed, without ever

contacting Petitioner in any manner.
The Rule 53 Special Master
his reports, without ever providing notice

mlawful actions, includinn
less talking with, Petitioner,

despite the express acknowledgment in the February 21, 2001 Order by

Excel USA,
3.

The Preliminary Injunction Proceeding Occurred, In Large
Part, Prior To Petitioner Hwan Lan Chen's Appearance In
The Trial Court Action And Without Her Participation

I he Rule 53 Special Master's Preliminary Injunction motion came before

2001, November27 and 28, 2001, December 1U, I I, I.', and 13, 2001, and
February 21 and 22, 2002, all before Petitioner Hwan Lan Chen was a party
and appeared in the action and without notice to or the participation of
Petitioner.9
In addition, in issuing the Preliminary Injunction, the trial court took judicial
r

i "

' 0 days of evidentiary an ' argument hearings that had occurred in

connecii!.
nrelirnp

:n piamt;

motion
h^arinn

.

:i / ,;ii

se

.hA/ppn

and February 21, 2001, a year before Petitioner appeared in the trial court
6

The February 21, 2001 Interim Order provided:
Hwan Lan Chen claims to have advanced 3 million dollars to
the Company. There is a dispute between the Parties as to
whether such monies were advanced and all issues
associated with the purported advance. The Parties reserve
all right with respect to this issue.
[2/21/01 Interim Order at H Q T
9

The Rule 53 Special Master's Preliminary Injunction motion also was
heard and considered on March 13, 15, 18 and 19, 2002, April 17, 2002, May 7,
8, 10 and 31, 2002, and June 4, 5, 7, 25 and 26, 2002, at which hearings Hwan
Lan Chen was represented by counsel, but was not asked to provide testimony
or evidence.

action and without notice to or the participation of Petitioner.
In the end, the Preliminary Injunction was issued based upon 20 days
of hearings (out of total of 34 days of hearings) as to which Petitioner
Hwan Lan Chen had no notice and was not present.
In addition, the trial court based the Preliminary Injunction upon a
contempt proceeding which also substantially occurred before Petitioner was a
party and had appeared, and which, even after she appeared, did not involve
Petitioner.
The trial court heard and considered plaintiff Jau-Fei Chen's motions for
civil and criminal contempt along with the Rule 53 Special Master's Motion for
Preliminary Injunction. In addition to the fact that most of the proceeding
occurred before she was a party and had appeared, Petitioner never was a party
to the contempt proceeding; the contempt proceeding was directed solely
against defendant Jau-Hwa Stewart. Even after she appeared in the trial court
action at the end of February 2002, Petitioner was provided no notice that the
on-going contempt proceeding would result in findings against her or that the
Preliminary Injunction would be based upon the contempt proceeding.
Despite Petitioner's lack of notice and participation in the contempt
proceeding, the Preliminary Injunction Ruling adopts and incorporates by

-.17

reference the trial court's 118 pages of findings of fact in the Contempt Ruling.10
[Exhibit B, Findings of Fact at fl 258.] Despite Petitioner's lack of notice and
participation in the contempt proceeding, the Contempt Ruling makes numerous
adverse findings as to Petitioner (which, the trial court stated, were determined
"beyond a reasonable doubt"). [Exhibit C, Findings of Fact at ffl[ 24, 37, 55, 61,
68,90,131-133,142,145,194.]
C.

The Preliminary Injunction Exceeded The Scope Of Relief
Sought By The Preliminary Injunction Motion And The Trial
Court Improperly Excluded Relevant Evidence In The
Preliminary Injunction Proceeding

The Preliminary Injunction exceeded by far the scope of relief sought by
the Rule 53 Special Master with his Motion for Preliminary Injunction. The
Motion sought to enjoin Petitioner Hwan Lan Chen and others only from
"competing with E. Excel in any manner until such time as E. Excel has
completely rebuilt its business." Going far beyond that requested relief, the
Preliminary Injunction prohibits acts that would not entail competition against E.
Excel USA, requires Petitioner to perform affirmative acts, and imposes a
constructive trust upon Petitioner's income, all without notice to Petitioner.

10

With the Contempt Ruling, the trial court merely signed, with no
changes, 118 pages of the proposed findings of fact that had been submitted by
plaintiff Jau-Fei Chen.
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During the combined Preliminary Injunction and contempt proceeding, the
trial court repeatedly declined to allow evidence regarding the conduct of plaintiff
Jau-Fei Chen and her husband, Rui-Kang Zhang.
D.

The Preliminary Injunction Proceeding And The Rule 53 Special
Master Threaten Petitioner Hwan Lan Chen's Right To A Fair
And Impartial Final Adjudication On The Merits

The Preliminary Injunction proceeding and trial court's Rule 53 Special
Master threatens Petitioner Hwan Lan Chen's right to a final adjudication on the
merits. The Preliminary Injunction is based upon findings that are permanent in
nature and the Rule 53 Special Master now seeks to have the Preliminary
Injunction proceeding become the final adjudication for Petitioner.
The Preliminary Injunction is based upon findings in the Contempt Ruling
which, according to the trial court, were established "beyond a reasonable
doubt." Moreover, the trial court noted in its Preliminary Injunction Ruling that,
although the Preliminary Injunction Ruling findings were preliminary, the findings
"nevertheless represent this Court's well-considered evaluation of the
voluminous record before it," thereby indicating that the Preliminary Injunction
may be given weight at the final adjudication. In addition, Utah Rule of Civil
Procedure 65A(a)(2) itself provides that evidence received in a preliminary
injunction becomes part of the trial record and need not be repeated at trial.
In addition, on September 27, 2002, the Rule 53 Special Master moved to
have Petitioner held in civil contempt and have a default judgment entered
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against her on the claims the Rule 53 Special Master has asserted against her.
The Rule 53 Special Master seeks to have a default judgment entered against
Petitioner based upon the Preliminary Injunction and Contempt Rulings. These
are the same Preliminary Injunction and Contempt Rulings that were entered
without providing Petitioner a full and fair opportunity to be heard and which were
based upon the reports and recommendations of the Rule 53 Special Master,
who had not provided Petitioner any opportunity to be heard. The Rule 53
Special Master's contempt motion against Petitioner seeks to make the
Preliminary Injunction proceeding and the contempt proceeding against JauHwa Stewart - a combined proceeding as to which Petitioner did not even
participate for 20 days of hearing and, as to the contempt proceeding, Petitioner
was never a party -- the final adjudication for Petitioner on claims brought by the
Rule 53 Special Master. The Rule 53 Special Master's contempt motion against
Petitioner remains pending in the underlying action.
Meanwhile, E. Excel USA continues to pay the Rule 53 Special Master's
annual salary of at least $260,000, as well as at least $482,000 annually to the
Rule 53 Special Master's team and his attorneys fees, all without approval by the
trial court as required by Rule 53.11

11

See Utah Rule of Civil Procedure 53(a) ("The compensation to be
allowed to a-master shall be fixed by the court.") (emphasis added).
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II.

ISSUES PRESENTED
This Petition for Permission to Appeal from the Preliminary Injunction

presents the following issues for appellate review, each of which provides a
separate and independent ground for vacating and setting aside the Preliminary
Injunction.
A.

The Preliminary injunction Must Be Vacated On The Ground
That The Powers Conferred Upon And Exercised Bv The Rule
53 Special Master Were Fundamentally Unlawful And Contrary
To The Judicial Powers Authorized By Rule 53
1.

Statement of the Issue

Must the Preliminary Injunction against Petitioner and the Findings and
Conclusions upon which it was based be vacated and set aside on the grounds
that the claims made against Petitioner, the Motion for Preliminary Injunction,
and the testimony, reports and recommendations of the Rule 53 Special Master
received in evidence, were all the product of the role of a Rule 53 special master
as the dominant party litigant and were thus blatantly unlawful as being in direct
conflict with the judicial powers authorized by Rule 53?
2.

Analysis of Determinative Authority. Standard of Review.
And Preservation of the Issue Required Under Utah Rule
of Appellate Procedure 5(c)(1)

A Rule 53 special master is a subordinate judicial officer who may be
lawfully appointed and empowered to perform only judicial functions to assist a
trial court. A Rule 53 special master is bound by the duties and obligations
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applicable to Utah judges and can have no broader scope of authority than that
of the appointing judge himself. Utah Rules of Civil Procedure Rule 53; Plumb.
809 P.2d at 742-743; Webster Eisenlohr. 145 F.2d at 319; La Buy. 352 U.S. at
256.12 Where a special master has exceeded his lawful powers or acted
contrary to Rule 53, the actions of the special master and the trial court's
decisions that are based upon the special master's actions must be vacated and
set aside, without regard to the merits of the decision or the special master's
actions. Plumb. 809 P.2d at 743; Regional Sales Agency. Inc. v. Reichert. 830
P.2d 252, 258 (Utah 1992); Anderson v. Industrial Comm'n of Utah. 696 P.2d
1219,1221 (Utah 1985).
Whether a Rule 53 special master has been lawfully empowered and
acted lawfully is reviewed for correctness, with no deference to the trial court.
Plumb. 809 P.2d at 741-743.
The issues regarding the unlawfulness of the Rule 53 Special Master's
power and actions were fully preserved in the trial court by Petitioner's timely
Motion to Vacate and Set Aside Judge Howard's Orders, filed within 10 days
after the entry of the Preliminary Injunction, as required under Utah Rule of Civil
Procedure 52.

12

The Court recognized in Plumb that the Federal Rule of Civil Procedure
53 dealing with special masters is "nearly identical" to Utah Rule of Civil
Procedure 53 and held that Utah courts are to "look freely" to federal case law in
applying Utah Rule of Civil Procedure 53. Plumb. 809 P.2d at 740 n.9.
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B.

The Preliminary Injunction Must Be Vacated Because Of A
Fundamental Denial Of Due Process To Petitioner
1.

Statement of the Issue

Must the Preliminary Injunction against Petitioner and the Findings and
Conclusion upon which it is based be vacated and set aside on the grounds that
the Preliminary Injunction and Findings and Conclusions were the product of a
blatant denial of due process in that, for 20 of the 34 days of evidentiary
hearings on the Rule 53 Special Master's Motion for Preliminary Injunction,
Petitioner was not a party, had not appeared, had no notice of the Motion, and
no opportunity to participate in the evidentiary hearing that was the basis of the
Preliminary Injunction?
2.

Analysis of Determinative Authority. Standard of Review.
And Preservation of the Issue Required Under Utah Rule
of Appellate Procedure 5(c)(1)(B) & (C)

Due process requires trial courts and judicial officers to provide adequate
notice and a full and fair opportunity to be heard. See Plumb. 809 P.2d at 743;
Nelson v. Jacobsen. 669 P.2d 1207,1212-13 (Utah 1983); Cornish Town v.
Koller. 798 P.2d 753, 756 (Utah 1990); Anderson. 696 P.2d at 1221; Penny.
San Juan Hospital. Inc.. 528 F.2d 1181,1186 (10th Cir. 1975). A ruling or
determination that is made in violation of an affected person's due process rights
must be vacated and set aside. Id.
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Whether a trial court or judicial officer has acted in violation of a person's
right to due process is reviewed for correctness, with no deference to the
determinations of the trial court. State v. Hubbard. 2002 UT 45, fl22, 48 P.3d
953; InreJ.B.. 2002 UT App 268,1J7, 53 P.3d 968.
This due process issue was fully preserved in the trial court by Petitioner's
timely Motion to Vacate and Set Aside Judge Howard's Orders, which was filed
within 10 days of entry of the Preliminary Injunction, and the Third-Party
Defendants' Objection to E. Excel's Proposed Order of Preliminary Injunction,
which was timely filed before entry of the Preliminary Injunction.
C.

The Preliminary Injunction Must Be Vacated Because It Was
Not The Result Of A Fair And Impartial Adjudication
1.

Statement of the Issue

Must the Preliminary Injunction against Petitioner and the Findings and
Conclusions upon which it is based be vacated and set aside on the ground that
they were not the product of a fair and impartial adjudication, based upon: (1)
the role of the trial court's Rule 53 Special Master as the primary party seeking
the Preliminary Injunction; (2) the clear and explicit deference of the trial court in
its Findings and Conclusions to the role of the Special Master and the Special
Master's reports and evidence; (3) the verbatim adoption of almost 100 pages of
Findings - the Findings of the trial court - proposed by the Special Master; and
(4) the numerous ex parte contacts between the Rule 53 Special Master and
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plaintiff Jau-Fei Chen that excluded Petitioner and went so far as the Rule 53
Special Master's use of plaintiff Jau-Fei Chen's attorneys to represent the
Special Master in settlements that prejudiced Petitioner?
2.

Analysis of Determinative Authority. Standard of Review.
And Preservation of the Issue Required Under Utah Rule
of Appellate Procedure 5(c)(1)

It is fundamental that judges are required to provide a fair and impartial
determination and are not permitted to engage in ex parte communications. See
Plumb. 809 P.2d at 743; State v. Daniels. 2002 UT 2, fl15, 40 P.3d 611; Judicial
Code of Judicial Conduct Canon 3.B.(5), (7), (8). Consequently, a subordinate
judicial officer such as a Rule 53 special master must provide a fair and impartial
hearing and cannot engage in ex parte communications. Plumb. 809 P.2d at
742-43. A determination or ruling that is made based upon an unfair and partial
consideration by either a judge or a Rule 53 special master must be vacated and
set aside. Ig\; Reichert. 830 P.2d at 258.
Whether a trial court provided a fair and impartial hearing as a result of the
role of an unlawfully empowered Rule 53 special master and reliance upon
improper ex parte contacts is reviewed for correctness; the decision of the trial
court is subjected to "close scrutiny." See Daniels. 2002 UT 2, at fl19.
This issue regarding the unfairness and partiality of the Preliminary
Injunction proceeding was preserved in the trial court by Petitioner's Motion to
Vacate and Set Aside Judge Howard's Orders, which was filed within 10 days of
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the entry of the Preliminary Injunction, and the Third-Party Defendants' Objection
to E. Excel's Proposed Order of Preliminary Injunction, which was filed before
entry of the Preliminary Injunction.
D.

The Preliminary Injunction Must Be Vacated And Set Aside
Because It Is Based Upon Findings Entered Upon A
Proceeding As To Which Petitioner Was Not A Party
1.

Statement of the Issue

Must the Preliminary Injunction against Petitioner be vacated and set
aside because it was issued based upon over 100 pages of Findings from a
criminal contempt proceeding that did not involve Petitioner and of which she
had no notice or opportunity to be heard?
2.

Analysis of Determinative Authority. Standard of Review.
And Preservation of the Issue Required Under Utah Rule
of Appellate Procedure 5(c)(1)

The fundamental requirements of notice and opportunity to be heard
require that a preliminary injunction be based only upon evidence presented in
the preliminary injunction proceeding, with adequate notice to all adversely
affected persons. Utah Rule of Civil Procedure 65A(a)(1); Penn. 528 F.2d at
1185. A preliminary injunction does not involve a final adjudication as a matter
of law and, therefore, cannot be based upon a criminal contempt proceeding,
which involves a final determination, especially without notice to an adversely
affected party. Birch Creek Irrigation v. Prothero. 858 P.2d 990, 994 (Utah 1993)
(issuing permanent injunction based upon preliminary injunction motion and
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proceeding improper because both involve separate issues and permanent
injunction requires final adjudication on the merits). A preliminary injunction that
is based upon evidence presented in a separate, final proceeding and as to
which an adversely affected person is not a party must be vacated and set
aside. |g\
This issue of whether a preliminary injunction is improperly based upon a
separate final proceeding as to which an adversely affected party was not a
party and was without notice is a matter of law reviewed for correctness. State
v. Pena. 869 P.2d 932, 936 (Utah 1994).
This issue was preserved in the trial court with the Third-Party Defendants'
Objection to E. Excel's Proposed Order of Preliminary Injunction, which was filed
before the Preliminary Injunction was entered.
E.

The Preliminary Injunction Must Be Vacated And Set Aside
Because Its Scope Exceeds The Scope Of Relief Sought By The
Rule 53 Special Master In Moving For The Preliminary
Injunction
1.

Statement of the Issue

Must the Preliminary Injunction against Petitioner be vacated and set
aside because the Preliminary Injunction ordered relief that was far beyond the
scope of relief sought with the Rule 53 Special Master's Motion for Preliminary
Injunction, including imposing a constructive trust on Petitioner's income when
the Motion made no mention of such a trust?
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2.

Analysis of Determinative Authority. Standard of Review.
And Preservation of the issue Required Under Utah Rule
of Appellate Procedure 5(c)(1)

As a matter of notice and fairness, the scope of relief granted with a
preliminary injunction cannot exceed the scope of relief sought with the
preliminary injunction motion, if the preliminary injunction is heard in a
proceeding that has not been consolidated with the final adjudication. Utah Rule
of Civil Procedure 65A(a)(1); Perm, 528 F.2d at 1185.
Whether a preliminary injunction is issued without notice in that it exceeds
the scope of relief sought by the preliminary injunction motion is reviewed for
correctness, without any deference to the trial court. Kasco Services Corp. v.
Benson. 831 P.2d 86, 89 (Utah 1992); Wells. Fargo & Co. v. Davis. 2 Utah 411,
414(1877).13
This issue was preserved in the trial court with the Third-Party Defendants'
Objection to E. Excel's Proposed Order of Preliminary Injunction, which was filed
before the Preliminary Injunction was entered.

13

Kasco and Wells. Farao both involve questions of notice under a
contract. Given that the issues presented here concern more important
constitutional rights, specifically, adequacy of judicial notice as required for due
process, the correctness standard of review applied in Kasco and Wells Farao to
the less important contract notice situations should apply, prima facie.
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F.

The Preliminary Injunction Must Be Vacated And Set Aside
Because Of Legal Errors And Insufficiency Of The Evidence
1.

Statement of the Issue

Must the Preliminary Injunction against Petitioner be vacated and set
aside on the grounds that the Findings and Conclusions upon which the
Preliminary Injunction is based are legally incorrect and are not supported by
sufficient evidence, including, without limitation, the Findings and Conclusions
that: (1) the balancing of the equities favored issuance of the Preliminary
Injunction, when the trial court categorically excluded evidence with regard to the
illegal and improper conduct of plaintiff Jau-Fei Chen; (2) Petitioner was liable for
breach of fiduciary duty based upon her position as a director of E. Excel USA,
when the trial court previously ruled that her directorship was null and void and
of no effect; (3) Petitioner was a member of a conspiracy, when Petitioner is 76
years old and does not speak English, the conclusion is not supported by
sufficient evidence and, in fact, in the contemporaneous Findings and
Conclusions in the contempt proceeding, the trial court did not identify Petitioner
as a member of the conspiracy; and (4) Petitioner is liable under the Utah
Pattern of Unlawful Activity Act, when there is insufficient evidence to support the
conclusion and conclusion is legally insufficient?
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2.

Analysis of Determinative Authority. Standard of Review.
And Preservation of the issue Required Under Utah Rule
of Appellate Procedure 5(c)(1)

A person cannot be liable for breach of fiduciary duty based upon a
corporate directorship if the directorship never existed in the first instance or if
the alleged breach occurred after the directorship concluded. Microbiological
Research Corp. v. Muna. 625 P.2d 690, 695 (Utah 1981). There must be clear
and convincing evidence for a person to be found liable for civil conspiracy.
Israel Pagan Estate v. Cannon. 746 P.2d 785, 790 (Utah Ct. App. 1987). To be
liable under Utah Code § 76-10-1603(2) of the Utah Pattern of Unlawful Activity
Act, there must be a finding that the defendant conducted or participated in the
affairs of an enterprise through a pattern of unlawful activity, the pattern of
unlawful activity must consist of at least three separate episodes of an unlawful
act, and the findings and conclusions must be particular as to the defendant's
involvement. Utah Code Ann. §§ 76-10-1601 et. seq.: Holbrook v. Master
Protection Corp.. 883 P.2d 295, 302 (Utah Ct. App. 1994). Finally, whether a
preliminary injunction should be issued depends, in part, upon a balancing of the
equities, which makes relevant the conduct of the parties before the trial court.
43 C.J.S. Injunctions § 32 at 834-35 (1978) (in determining whether to issue an
injunction "it is the duty of the court to take into consideration the conduct and
situation of the parties" (emphasis added)); LHIW. Inc. v. DeLorean. 753 P.2d
961, 963 (Utah 1988) ("[Pjarty seeking equity must do so with clean hands").
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Categorical exclusions of relevant evidence are disfavored and, where improper
exclusion of evidence places the underlying fairness of the proceeding in doubt,
reversal is required. U.S. v. Cervantes-Pacheco. 826 F.2d 310, 315 (5th Cir.
1987); State v. Blake. 478 S.E.2d 550, 559 (W. Va. 1996).
Whether the trial court's legal conclusions in the Preliminary Injunction are
correct is reviewed for correctness. Pena. 869 P.2d at 936. Whether there is
sufficient evidence to support Preliminary Injunction is reviewed for clear error,
j d at 935-36. The trial court's exclusion of evidence of plaintiff Jau-Fei Chen's
misconduct should be reviewed for correctness because the exclusion was
categorical and was tantamount to a summary adjudication.14 jd. at 936. In
addition, the Preliminary Injunction is provided less deference due to the trial
court's verbatim adoption of the Rule 53 Special Master's proposed findings.
Automatic Control Products v. Tel-Tech. Inc.. 780 P.2d 1258,1264 (Utah 1989)
(Zimmerman J., dissenting); 9A Wright & Miller, Federal Practice and Procedure
§2578, at 535 (1995).
The issues regarding the legal and factual sufficiency of the Preliminary
Injunction were preserved in the trial court by the Third-Party Defendants'
Objection to E. Excel's Proposed Order of Preliminary Injunction, which was filed
before the Preliminary Injunction was entered.

14

In the event the Court were to decide otherwise, whether the trial court
improperly excluded relevant evidence typically is reviewed for abuse of
discretion. Slisze v. Stanlev-Bostitch. 979 P.2d 317, 321 (Utah 1999).
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III.

STATEMENT OF REASONS WHY AN IMMEDIATE INTERLOCUTORY
APPEAL SHOULD BE PERMITTED
The issues presented for appellate review by this Petition concern

substantial rights of Petitioner Hwan Lan Chen that will materially affect the
outcome of the trial court action. The issues presented by this Petition address
the fundamentally unlawful manner in which the trial court has proceeded and by
which the Preliminary Injunction was issued.
Specifically, the trial court has proceeded and issued the Preliminary
Injunction by extensively deferring to, and relying upon, the trial court's Rule 53
Special Master, who has, contrary to the subordinate judicial officer role lawfully
authorized by Rule 53, exercised absolute control of the corporation that is the
subject of the litigation and become the dominant plaintiff in the trial court action.
Moreover, the trial court has proceeded, both in conducting its own hearings and
by relying upon the reports and recommendations of its Rule 53 Special Master,
without providing Petitioner a full and fair opportunity to be heard. Only by
means of an interlocutory appeal may the impropriety of the trial court's
extensive reliance upon and deference to his Rule 53 its Rule 53 Special Master
and the denial of Petitioner's due process rights, be addressed and remedied.
In addition, a determination of the unlawfulness of the Preliminary
Injunction based upon the unlawful powers and role of the trial court's Rule 53
Special Master will better serve the administration and interests of justice
because, without an immediate interlocutory review of the Preliminary Injunction,
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the trial court's Rule 53 Special Master will continue to exercise his unlawful
powers and the findings entered in connection with the Preliminary Injunction in
reliance upon the Rule 53 Special Master may become final. The trial court has
indicated the final nature of the findings that support the Preliminary Injunction in
the Preliminary Injunction and Contempt Rulings and Utah Rule of Civil
Procedure provides that evidence received in the Preliminary Injunction
proceeding becomes part of the record that can be used at trial. Moreover, the
trial court's Rule 53 Special Master already has moved for a default judgment
against Petitioner based, in part, upon the Preliminary Injunction Ruling.
IV.

STATEMENT OF REASON WHY THE APPEAL MAY MATERIALLY
ADVANCE THE TERMINATION OF THE LITIGATION
The immediate appeal of the Preliminary Injunction will materially advance

the termination of the litigation below because the issues presented by the
appeal primarily address the unlawful role of the trial court's Rule 53 Special
Master and because of the trial court's indication of the final nature of the
findings supporting the Preliminary Injunction. Only be vacating the findings
upon appellate review can Petitioner hope for a fair and impartial final
adjudication. Moreover, most of the trial court's orders have been entered in
reliance upon the actions, reports and recommendations of its unlawfully
authorized Rule 53 Special Master. The Rule 53 Special Master continues to
dominate the trial court action as a party litigant. By determining that the trial
court erroneously issued the Preliminary Injunction, specifically in regard to the
33

trial court's reliance upon its Rule 53 Special Master, the unlawful role of the
Rule 53 Special Master can be terminated. This would materially advance the
termination of the trial court action.
V.

STATEMENT OF WHY THE SUPREME COURT SHOULD DECIDE THE
CASE
The Supreme Court should decide the case and not assign the appeal to

the Court of Appeals because the appeal presents an issue of first impression
and of substantial importance to the administration of justice, specifically, the
propriety of the unprecedented authorization and exercise of power by the Rule
53 Special Master, and a substantial constitutional issue regarding the denial of
due process.
VI.

ATTACHMENTS
Pursuant to Utah Rule of Appellate Procedure 5(c)(3), attached to this

Petition are: (1) the Preliminary Injunction, dated October 16, 2002, as "Exhibit
A"; (2) the Preliminary Injunction Ruling, dated August 20, 2002, as "Exhibit B";
and (3) the Contempt Ruling, dated August 20, 2002, as "Exhibit C."15

15

The formal title of the Preliminary Injunction is "Order of Preliminary
Injunction." The formal title of the Preliminary Injunction Ruling is "Findings of
Fact and Conclusions of Law." The formal title of the Contempt Ruling is
"Plaintiffs Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law in Connection With Plaintiffs
Motion for Order to Show Cause Why Ms. Stewart Should Not Be Held in Civil
and Criminal Contempt of Court and Plaintiffs Motion for Order Summarily
Holding Ms. Stewart in Criminal Contempt of Court."
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CONCLUSION
For all of the foregoing reasons, Hwan Lan Chen's Petition for Permission
to Appeal Pursuant to Utah Rule of Appellate Procedure 5 should be granted.
DATED this £

da

y o f November, 2002.
BERMAN, GAUFIN, TOMSIC & SAVAGE

^Z-»I^ftA^^
Daniel L. Berman

Samuel
50 South Main, Suite 1250
Salt Lake City, Utah 84144
Attorneys for Hwan Lan Chen
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STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION
This appeal arises out of a petition for interlocutory review, pursuant to Rule 5 of
the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure.
STATEMENT OF ISSUES
1.

Does the appellants' failure to marshal evidence in support of the trial

court's findings preclude their attacking the trial judge's factual findings and any legal
rulings premised upon those findings?
Standard of Review: Appellant must marshal the evidence in support of the trial
court's findings and then demonstrate that despite this evidence, the trial court's findings
are so lacking in support as to be "against the clear weight of the evidence," thus making
them "clearly erroneous." Young v. Young, 1999 UT 38, ^15, 979 P.2d 338. Where a
trial court's rulings on fact-dependent issues are challenged, this court grants broader
than normal deference to the trial court. See State v. Pena, 869 P.2d 932, 936-38 (Utah
1994). Appellants' failure to marshal the evidence requires this Court to assume that all
findings are adequately supported by the evidence. See Utah Medical Products, Inc. v.
Searcy. 958 P.2d 228, 233 (Utah 1998); In re Estate of Beesley, 883 P.2d 1343, 1347-49
(Utah 1994).
2.

Did the trial court abuse its discretion in appointing an Interim CEO of E.

Excel International, Inc. to conduct the company's business and operations and
designating him a special master as a means of providing the Interim CEO with judicial
immunity?

3.

Standard of Review: Trial courts historically are given considerable

latitude in deciding whether and when to appoint judicial officers, such as special
masters, receivers, or monitors to assist in implementing their orders. These decisions are
reviewed for an abuse of discretion. See, e ^ , Plumb v. State, 809 P.2d 734, 744 (Utah
1990) (reference to special master reviewed for abuse of discretion); Richardson v.
Arizona Fuels Corp., 614 P.2d 636, 638 (Utah 1980) (appointment of receiver reviewed
for abuse of discretion). As a consequence, the trial court's appointment of a interim
CEO and the designation of that person as special master under Rule 53 of the Utah Rules
of Civil Procedure for purposes of assuring maximum protection from legal harassment is
reviewed under a harmless error standard. Plumb v. State, 809 P.2d 734, 744 (Utah
1990) ("The standard for determining harmless error is whether it is reasonably likely
that the trial court's final order would have been different absent the master's improper
activities." (citing State v. Ramsey, 782 P.2d 480, 485 (Utah 1989); State v. Knight 734
P.2d 913, 919-23 (Utah 1987)).
4.

Did the trial court abuse its discretion in entering a preliminary injunction

against Hwan Lan Chen ("Madame Chen") and Jau Hwa and Taig Stewart (the
"Stewarts") barring them from competing with E. Excel based upon the trial court's
findings that Madame Chen and the Stewarts had conspired to strip E. Excel of corporate
assets and opportunities?
Standard of Review: "In granting or refusing interlocutory injunctions the court
shall similarly set forth the findings of fact... [which] shall not be set aside unless
clearly erroneous, and due regard shall be given to the opportunity of the trial court to

judge the credibility of the witnesses." Utah R. Civ. P. 52(a). This court will "reverse
the trial court's findings of fact... only if they are 'clearly erroneous5 as demonstrated
by the challenger's marshaling of the evidence." Searcy, 958 P.2d at 233 (Utah 1998)
(citations omitted). This court "will not disturb a district court's grant of a preliminary
injunction unless the district court abused its discretion or rendered a decision against the
clear weight of the evidence." Water & Energy Sys., Tech., Inc. v. KeiK 1999 UT 16, ^
6, 974 P.2d 821 (Utah 1999) (citing Kasco Services Corp. v. Benson, 831 P.2d 86, 90
(Utah 1992) (citing System Concepts, Inc. v. Dixon, 669 P.2d 421, 425 (Utah 1983))).
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
I.

Nature of the Case, Course of Proceedings and Disposition Below,
In September of 2000, Ms. Stewart, Madame Chen, and others purported to

remove Jau Fei Chen ("Dr. Chen") and her husband as directors and officers of E. Excel
International, Inc. ("E. Excel") and took over the operations of the company. On January
10, 2001, Dr. Chen filed a verified complaint against Ms. Stewart, then acting as CEO of
E. Excel, asserting, among other things, that Ms. Stewart improperly sought to force Dr.
Chen out as the leader of E. Excel and to establish a competing distribution network by
terminating E. Excel's exclusive contractual relationships with its territorial owners. (R.
1-24). The complaint detailed the alleged harm to E. Excel from the destruction of the
existing distribution network, including diminished profitability and significant layoffs of
E. Excel employees. (Id.). Dr. Chen simultaneously sought a preliminary injunction and
temporary restraining order prohibiting Ms. Stewart from causing E. Excel to violate its
exclusive contracts with territorial owners. (R. 27-29). On January 10, 2001, the court

granted the temporary restraining order, finding that Dr. Chen was likely to prevail on the
merits of her claim that Ms. Stewart had engaged in ultra vires acts that were damaging to
E. Excel. (R. 55-58). On January 18, 2001, Dr. Chen amended the verified complaint to
add E. Excel as a defendant. (R. 95-97).
On February 21, 2001, after evidentiary hearings on Dr. Chen's preliminary
injunction motion, the parties agreed to a stipulated order, which, among other things,
prohibited Ms. Stewart from tortiously interfering with any contract between E. Excel
and its distributors, and provided for the appointment of a CEO to conserve the remaining
assets of E. Excel and to operate the company pending a final determination of all legal
issues in the suit. (R. 626-33). On or about March 13, 2001, the Court appointed Larry
Holman to serve as Interim CEO/Special Master of E. Excel. (R. 704).
During the Summer of 2001, Dr. Chen filed two contempt motions against Ms.
Stewart, alleging extensive violations of the temporary restraining order. (R. 2072-74;
14306). On October 25, 2001, evidentiary hearings on those motions began. (R. 14244).
Those motions resulted in findings of civil and criminal contempt by the trial court and
are part of a separate appeal currently pending before this court.
On October 29, 2001, E. Excel filed an Amended Answer, Cross-Claim against
Jua-Hwa Stewart, and Third-Party Complaint naming, among others, Madame Chen and
Taig Stewart as Third-Party Defendants. (R. 4171-4214). At the same time, E. Excel
filed motions for a temporary restraining order (R. 4167-70) and a preliminary injunction
seeking to prohibit Madame Chen and the Stewarts, among others, from unlawfully
competing against E. Excel during the pendency of this action in order that E. Excel

could have an opportunity to recover for the damage done to it in the marketplace by their
wrongful acts. (R. 3718-21). E. Excel's Motion for Temporary Restraining Order was
granted on October 31, 2001. (R. 4215-4221.) Over the next ten months, joint hearings
were held on Dr. Chen's contempt motion and E. Excel's injunction motion. On August
20, 2002, after 22 days of hearings on E. Excel's motion for preliminary injunction, the
trial court entered two separate sets of findings of fact and conclusions on of law in
connection with E. Excel's motion for preliminary injunction (R. 14318) and Dr. Chen's
contempt motions. (R. 14317).1 Copies of the Preliminary Injunction Findings and
Contempt Findings are included in E. Excel's Addendum as Exhibits A and B
respectively.
On October 16, 2002, the trial court entered an order granting E. Excel's motion
for preliminary injunction. (R. 9135-45). A copy of the court's preliminary injunction
order is included in E. Excel's Addendum as Exhibit C. On October 24, 2002, Madame
Chen filed a Motion to Vacate and Set Aside Judge Howards' orders relating to the
Interim CEO's appointment. (R. 9238). On January 24, 2003, the trial court denied the
Motion to Vacate. (R. 12754-70). A copy of the court's January 24, 2003 order is
included in E. Excel's Addendum as Exhibit D. This appeal followed, as well as an
appeal of the contempt order on Dr. Chen's motion. This court entertained both appeals,
but directed the parties to address the appeal from the E. Excel action first. Both the
1

The evidentiary hearings on E. Excel's preliminary injunction were combined with
hearings on Dr. Chen's motion for contempt. However, the trial court issued separate
and independent findings of fact and conclusions of law pertaining to the preliminary

Stewarts and Madame Chen have filed briefs challenging the trial court's refusal to
vacate Mr. Holman's appointment as interim CEO and special master, and the grant of a
preliminary injunction to E. Excel. This brief responds to both those briefs.
II.

Statement of the Facts.
The trial court made extensive findings of fact that document the almost

unbelievable malicious activities of the appellants directed against E. Excel, as well as
appellants' intentional flouting of the trial court's orders and processes. This brief
synopsizes these facts in a relatively dispassionate manner. The court is invited to review
the trial court's complete findings to view this activity in full color and in detail.
A.

E. Excel and its Relationship to the Chen Family,

E. Excel International, Inc. is a manufacturer of nutritional supplements and skin
care products that are sold through multi-level marketing networks. (R. 14317 (Ex. B
hereto) at 6, ^ 6 (citing R. 14293)). E. Excel is incorporated under and governed by
principles of Utah corporate law. Various members of the Chen family have served in
various roles, as directors, officers, or employees of E. Excel. The members of the family
now include appellee Dr. Jau-Fei Chen ("Dr. Chen"), her estranged sister, appellant JwaHwa Stewart ("Ms. Stewart"), her estranged mother, appellant Hwan Law Chen
("Madame Chen"), her brother Tei Fu Chen, and two other siblings. (Id.).
Dr. Chen, the founder of E. Excel, is a highly accomplished person. She was
accepted as a student at Brigham Young University at the age of 16. She earned her

Injunction and the Contempt Motion, as noted by the Court in its January 24, 2003 Order
on Madame Chen's Motion to Vacate. (R. 12760).

Bachelors degree in microbiology at the age of 19, a Masters degree in the same subject
at the age of 21, and a Ph.D. in microbiology at the age of 26. (Id. at 6, ^ 2 (citing R.
14293)). Together with her husband, Rui Kang Zhang, Dr. Chen incorporated E. Excel
on July 20, 1987. (Id at 6, H 5 (citing R. 14293; R. 14230)). Dr. Chen quickly
established herself as a charismatic leader of this multi-level marketing company. She
was the public spokesperson for E. Excel within its distribution channels, and was often
featured in photographs and articles regarding the company. (Id. at 8, ^ 10 (citing R.
14293; R. 14262)).
Dr. Chen gained familiarity with multi-level marketing networks, in part, through
her family's work in the industry. Her brother, Tei-Fu Chen, operated his own successful
multi-level marketing business named Sunrider. (Id. at 6-7, ^ 6 (citing R. 14293)). Dr.
Chen's sister, Ms. Stewart, also gained extensive experience working at Sunrider. (Id.).
By the early 1990s, Ms. Stewart had officially left Sunrider to become vicepresident of E. Excel, where she assumed substantial responsibilities, including directing
E. Excel's finances and cash flow, arranging for credit, and overseeing the manufacturing
of product and the payment of invoices. (Id. at 7, ^f 7 (citing R. 14230)). In addition, Ms.
Stewart communicated directly with E. Excel's territorial owners - foreign distribution
companies in Malaysia, Taiwan, Hong Kong, and the Philippines, where much of its sales
originated. (Id.; see also R. 14293).
E. Excel quickly became quite successful. From its beginning, manufacturing and
selling approximately 20 product lines, it grew to market well over 100 product lines.
(Id at 8,1f 10 (citing R. 14293; R. 14262)). E. Excel sold its products to territorial

owners located in Korea, Taiwan, Philippines, Hong Kong, Malaysia, Singapore, France,
and the United States, which in turn marketed the products to end users through local
distribution networks.
B,

Ms. Stewart and Madame Chen Attempt to Destroy E. Excel Because
of a Family Dispute with Dr. Chen.

The Chen family has a long history of serious internal feuds. One familial dispute
resulted in Ms. Stewart reporting her brother, Tei-Fu Chen, to the Internal Revenue
Service and to U.S. Customs agents for various activities associated with Sunrider. As a
result of Ms. Stewart's information, Tei-Fu Chen was prosecuted, sent to prison, and
assessed several million dollars in fines and unpaid taxes. Ms. Stewart received a $2
million bounty for informing on her brother. (R. 14317 (Ex. B hereto) at 25-26, H 37
(citing R. 14230, R. 14235, R. 14255)).
Another family dispute, directly related to this case, arose when Ms. Stewart and
Madame Chen learned that Dr. Chen's husband allegedly was keeping a mistress. Ms.
Stewart and Madame Chen demanded that Dr. Chen divorce her husband immediately.
When Dr. Chen refused, Ms. Stewart and Madame Chen, along with another Chen sister,
took extreme measures. For example, the women would awaken Dr. Chen in the middle
of the night, physically shake her, and accuse her of disloyalty to the family. Madame
Chen and Ms. Stewart also told Dr. Chen that she was "of the devil" and told her that she
should kill herself to end the family's dishonor. (Id.). Ms. Stewart also threatened to
report Dr. Chen to authorities for unspecified wrongs so that she would be put in jail as
had occurred to her brother, Tei-Fu. Madame Chen demanded that Dr. Chen grant her

custody of her three minor children, and then refused to allow the children to see their
father. (Id.). Ms. Stewart also began monitoring telephone conversations between Dr.
Chen and Mr. Zhang, to determine whether she was complying with the family's wishes.
(Id.). Finally, in an apparent effort to strike at Dr. Chen's financial base, Madame Chen
and Ms. Stewart demanded that Dr. Chen terminate her relationship with E. Excel and
that she cut off all ties with the territorial owners, who were essential to the marketing
network. (Id.).
Despite all these tactics, Dr. Chen eventually decided to reconcile with her
husband. (Id at 26, \ 38 (citing R. 14230)). To punish Dr. Chen for refusing to divorce
Mr. Zhang and to resign from E. Excel, Ms. Stewart and Madame Chen developed an
elaborate scheme to oust Dr. Chen and Mr. Zhang from the company, or, in the
alternative, to destroy the company in order to prevent Dr. Chen and her husband from
sharing in the company's wealth. (Id. at 26, ^ 39). Dr. Chen's three minor children
controlled 75% of E. Excel's shares. By an action taken in October 2001 (but dated
September 1, 2000), and while Dr. Chen and her husband were out of the country, Ms.
Stewart, purporting to act as trustee for Dr. Chen's children, voted these shares to remove
Dr. Chen and her husband as directors of E. Excel. (Id at 27, % 40 (citing R. 14338)).
Ms. Stewart then voted to install her husband, Taig Stewart, and her mother, Madame
Chen, as new directors. At the same time, this newly constituted board of E. Excel voted
to remove Dr. Chen as president and Mr. Zhang as secretary. The board then appointed
Ms. Stewart as president and her husband, Taig Stewart, as secretary of E. Excel. (Id. at
27,H 40 and at 27, ^ 41 (citing R. 14338; R. 14255)).

In furtherance of their scheme to destroy E. Excel and deprive Dr. Chen and her
husband of its financial rewards, Ms. Stewart and Madame Chen also began to take
action against the territorial owners who were loyal to Dr. Chen. As a condition of
receiving additional E. Excel product, Ms. Stewart demanded that the territorial owners
sign new contracts with E. Excel that required the owners to renounce any business
relationship with Dr. Chen. (Id at 26-27, ] 39 (citing R. 14339; R. 14345)). The
territorial owners who refused to comply were replaced by new distributors loyal to Ms.
Stewart.
Perhaps mindful that her coup might be short-lived, Ms. Stewart began to take
actions directly against E. Excel - actions which would damage it financially and in the
marketplace. For example, on September 1, 2000, without any authorization from E.
Excel's board of directors, Ms. Stewart transferred $425,000 from E. ExcePs money
market account into her personal checking account. (Id. at 30, U 47 (citing R. 14255; R.
14343)). Later, on September 28, 2000, Ms. Stewart made another unauthorized transfer
of more of E. Excel's funds to her personal checking account, this time in the amount of
$1.5 million. (Id.). Ms. Stewart also established two bank accounts at the Central Bank
in Provo, Utah, one in her aunt's name, Ching-Chun Lu Huang, and one in her uncle's
name, Ching Lu. (Id. at 36, ^ 58). Ms. Stewart then arranged for over $8 million to be
transferred to these accounts. (Id.). Finally, Ms. Stewart set up a bank account in the
name of her long-time friend, Su-Chiu Kuo Shen, with funds from Madame Chen, wiretransferred from Asian accounts. Ms. Stewart and Madame Chen used this account to
fund Apogee, Inc., a competing nutritional supplements manufacturing company

incorporated and controlled by Ms. Stewart and Madame Chen. These funds were also
used to pay former employees of E. Excel in cash to perform various tasks for Apogee.
(Id at 45-46, U 68).
Similar patterns of financial manipulation of E. Excel's funds were found by a
court in Hong Kong to have been engaged in by Ms. Stewart and Madame Chen. During
this same period, Ms. Stewart brought an action in Hong Kong against the Board of
Directors of E. Excel and E. Excel Limited and its shareholders. In its order denying Ms.
Stewart's prayed for relief, the Hong Kong court found that Madame Chen personally
received over $32 million of E. Excel product sale proceeds, and that a Utah County
Central Bank account controlled by Ms. Stewart by a power of attorney received over
$7.6 million. The Hong Kong judge found as follows:
As to the alleged wrongful diversions from [E. Excel
Limited's] account.... ("Jau Hwa Stewart] not only was
privy to the diversion of $7.6 million from [E. Excel Limited]
to accounts of her aunt and uncle (for which she was the
contact person), but further that she was instrumental in the
utilization of at least part of these monies to pay certain of her
US attorney fees, and also to provide seed capital for the
establishment of companies to compete with existing
Territorial Owners in Hong Kong and Taiwan . . . .
In addition, the diversion of a sum of US $32,681,011, which
was taken from the TE. Excel Limited's] accounts to buy
cashier orders in the name of [Hwan Lan Chen] with regard to
which [Jau Hwa Stewart] holds power of attorney . . . .
(See Hong Kong court's August 30, 2001 Order atfflf68-71, included in E. Excel's
Addendum as Exhibit E.) (emphasis added).

Ms. Stewart and Madam Chen also struck at E. Excel's distribution network in
ways that appear to have been calculated to destroy both the network and the company's
goodwill. Ms. Stewart decided to unilaterally terminate contracts with Excel's Malaysian
and Taiwanese distributors, and to sever all business relations with those territorial
owners. (R. 14317 (Ex. B hereto) at 26,1j 39 (citing R. 14339; R. 14345; R. 14223; R.
14223; R. 14226)). Ms. Stewart, acting as President of E. Excel, cut off the flow of
product to E. Excel's historical distributors. Ms. Stewart also arranged to fill some of the
distributors' orders with expired or poor quality products. (IdL at 47, ^ 70 (citing R.
14226)). In addition, Ms. Stewart and Madame Chen arranged for a transfer of millions
of dollars back to Asia in order to establish new distribution networks loyal to them. (R.
14318 (Ex. A hereto) at 9, ] 15).
On January 10, 2001, Dr. Chen filed this action in the district court, alleging
corporate waste, breach of fiduciary duty, and improper removal of a director. (R. 1-24).
She then moved for a temporary restraining order to protect her and her children's
interests in E. Excel. On January 10, 2001, Judge Howard of the Fourth District Court
granted a temporary restraining order prohibiting Ms. Stewart from "directly or indirectly
causing [E. Excel] to violate any of its exclusive contracts] with [the historical
distributors] or to compete with the [historical distributors] in violation of such
contracts." The district court also directed Ms. Stewart to "fill, complete, and ship all
pending orders for products received from [the historical distributors.]" (R. 14318 (Ex. A
hereto) at 16-17, f 33 (citing R. 14341)).

Ms. Stewart and her co-conspirators knew that there was a strong possibility that
Ms. Stewart would be removed as president of the company. Faced with this likely loss
of control, Ms. Stewart and Madame Chen, soon joined by Taig Stewart and others,
determined both to destroy E. Excel, rather than let it revert to Jau-Fei Chen's control,
and also to replace it in the market with Apogee, a new nutritional supplements
manufacturing company controlled by Ms. Stewart and Madame Chen alone. (Id. at 17, %
34 (citing R. 14262)).
Over the next few weeks, following entry of the temporary restraining order, the
district court held several days of evidentiary hearings in order to determine whether the
temporary restraining order should be converted into a preliminary injunction. During
the time the court was hearing the evidence, and while the temporary restraining order
was in place, Ms. Stewart and the third party defendants who assisted in the scheme,
disabled the surveillance system that monitored activities at E. Excel5s warehouses and
offices. Ms. Stewart and her conspirators then stole or destroyed millions of dollars
worth of E. ExcePs inventory and equipment, as well as E. Excel's business records and
computer files. (Id. at 23, ^ 53; and at 26-27, ^ 63-67)). In one of the more bizarre
episodes in a bizarre case, the conspirators first removed huge amounts of product from
E. Excel's warehouse and converted it to their own purposes. They then purchased mice
at a pet store and released them into E. Excel's warehouse for the purpose of giving them
a basis to claim that it was necessary to remove the products from the warehouse because
of the presence of rodents. (IcL at 23, ^ 53; and at 28-29;ffi[71-74).

Some of the conspirators' activities, including the looting of E. Excel5s warehouse
and offices, were in direct violation of the temporary restraining order entered on
January 10, 2001. Another example is Ms. Stewart's intentional failure to fill confirmed
orders from the historical distributors. (R. 14317 (Ex. B hereto) at 35-36, % 57). In
addition, Ms. Stewart intentionally allowed and even caused shipments of E. Excel
product within her control to be shipped to new distributors loyal to her. (Id.).
Matters came to a head when, on February 13, 2001, a tape was anonymously
delivered to Dr. Chen and her attorneys which contained definitive evidence of Ms.
Stewart's ongoing wrongdoing, and of her flouting of the trial court's temporary
restraining order. The tape contained a recording of a telephone conversation between
Ms. Stewart and two of her loyal distributors located in Asia, Sam Tzu and Richard Hu.
During the conversation, Ms. Stewart, Mr. Tzu and Mr. Hu agreed that they all would
testify falsely during the evidentiary hearing by denying knowledge of certain critical
matters, and then blaming Dr. Chen for certain events harmful to E. Excel for which Ms.
Stewart or others were actually responsible. (Id. at 57-60,ffl[88-92). In fact, one of these
associates did give false testimony in court in accordance with this joint agreement before
the tape recording was delivered to the court and Ms. Stewart was confronted with it.
(Id.). As a result of this incident, the trial court referred the tape recording and a
transcript of the witness testimony to the County Attorney. (R. 14229). The hearing
transcript relating to these events is included in E. Excel5s Addendum as Exhibit F.

C

The Entry of the February 21,2001 Interim Order and Mr. Holman's
Appointment as Interim CEO of E. Excel.

Following these evidentiary hearings, and in anticipation of the court's ruling
against Ms. Stewart and the other defendants, all parties stipulated to an interim order.
Among other things, the stipulated order prohibited Ms. Stewart from tortiously
interfering with any contract between E. Excel and its distributors or third parties. The
order also required Ms. Stewart to return to E. Excel's corporate headquarters any
corporate assets in her custody or control, including corporate records. (R. 626-632). A
copy of the Interim Order is included in E. Excel's Addendum as Exhibit G. Finally, the
Interim Order provided for removal of Ms. Stewart as President of E. Excel, removal of
Madame Chen and Taig Stewart from the board, reinstatement of Dr. Chen and Rui Kan
Zhang to the board, and appointment by the court of a CEO to conserve the remaining
assets of E. Excel and to operate the company pending a final determination of all legal
issues in the suit. This stipulated order was presented to the court and became the court's
February 21, 2001 Interim Order. (Id.). Actions taken by the court pursuant to the
Interim Order are the subject of this appeal.

2

The trial court later determined that, despite its February 21, 2001 Interim Order, Ms.
Stewart and her husband continued to remove files, computer files, equipment, and the
"entire contents of E. Excel's surveillance room" from E. Excel's offices. Ms. Stewart
also continued to direct shipment of product to new E. Excel distributors using a new
entity, Shannon River, Inc. (R. 14317 at 74-79;ffi[112-114). To conceal these activities,
Ms. Stewart's assistant Angela Barclay "removed all of the records relating to the
Shannon River shipments from the premises of E. Excel and delivered them to Jau-Hwa
Stewart," and erased all computer files pertaining to Shannon River (R. 14318 at 44, f
126).

Paragraph 1 of the Interim Order directed the parties to exchange lists of proposed
candidates for the position of Interim CEO/President of E. Excel. (R. 632 (Ex. G
hereto)). However, the parties were unable to agree on a candidate, so the issue was
submitted to the court. Significantly, from the standpoint of this appeal, the Interim
Order does not contemplate that the interim CEO will be designated as a special master,
nor does it suggest that any judicial powers will be conferred upon the CEO. Rather, the
Interim Order is specific as to the interim CEO's duties with respect to the operations of
the company. (R. 626-632). It provides that the "CEO / President shall have full
executive authority to act on behalf of the Company, and conduct its business, subject to
the continuing oversight of the board of directors and the Court." (R. 629). The Interim
Order also obligates the CEO / President "to provide monthly written reports ... [and]
financial statements, including a balance sheet, a statement of operations, cash receipts
and disbursements journals, a detailed sales journal, copies of all bank statements, bank
reconciliations, a detailed report showing what invoices have not been paid, and any
other reports or information reasonably requested by the parties." (Id.).
The parties could not agree upon a candidate for the CEO position. The district
court then held a telephonic hearing on March 5, 2001 to discuss the appointment of the
Interim CEO / President. (R. 14274). A transcript of the March 5, 2001 Hearing is
included in E. Excel's Addendum as Exhibit H. During the hearing, Dr. Chen's counsel
noted that the proceedings had been hotly contested, and that, given the circumstances,
anyone appointed to the Interim CEO position in the middle of hostile litigation would be
very wary of becoming embroiled in the litigation personally. For that reason, Dr.

Chen's counsel argued that as an incentive to serve, the Interim CEO should be granted
some form of judicial immunity or other protection from liability. Suggestions included
the immunities available to "a receiver" or "a master."3
MR. CARLSTON [counsel for Dr. Chen]:
Each of our candidates is
very concerned, however, that they receive the maximum protection from
the Court in the form of being—even though they're designated as an
interim CEO—have the protections they would have if they were appointed
a receiver or otherwise received limited judicial immunity. But they're
both fine candidates. The people that THE JUDGE:
I didn't understand your last statement. They're
concerned about what protection?
MR. CARLSTON: Well they're, they're concerned that as contentious as
this is that, that even though they're referred to as an interim CEO that they
also be accorded the protection of being a, a master or a, or something like
that so that, so that they're acting under the direction of the Court so they
don't, so that these decisions can, can be taken to the Court as contemplated
by the order and they be protected through that process.
(Id. at 5-6) (bracketed material and emphasis added). In response to this concern, the
district court, when it appointed Mr. Holman as Interim CEO, also designated him as a
"Special Master." (R. 704). A copy of the March 13, 2001 order naming Mr. Holman
Interim CEO and special master is included in E. Excel's Addendum as Exhibit I.
The colloquy among court and counsel during the March 5 telephonic hearing, like
the text of the stipulated order, makes it clear that all parties understood that the interim
CEO was not appointed as some form of neutral magistrate, but instead was appointed as
manager of E. Excel, to act in its best interests, and pursue any claims the company may
have. All understood and agreed that the Interim CEO/President would have the
2

It soon became evident that this protection was necessary; Jau-Hwa Stewart sued Mr.
Holman and E. Excel CFO Gary Takagi in December 2001.

authority to cause the company to assert claims and to conduct litigation on behalf of the
company. In fact, Ms. Stewart's counsel relied on this fact as a basis for arguing to the
Court on March 5 for the appointment of her candidate, a team from Arthur Anderson:
MR. JORDAN [former counsel for Ms. Stewart]: Well, you're asking me,
what I hear you saying is is the CEO going to participate in the litigation.
THE JUDGE:
And maybe the CEO is going to be burdened by the
litigation. Maybe that's the way I MR. JORDAN:
Well, we asked that question of everyone too. And
we, of course, indicated that there's a provision in the, in the order of the
Court already that allows the parties to proceed with the litigation on behalf
of their respective clients unless the CEO decides he wants to participate in
those claims actively.
The advantage of having someone like a Mr. Shields or Mr., or the Arthur
Anderson group is is that they have the capability to investigate and
participate in those claims. ... When I asked the question of Mr. Homan
and Mr. Boyer about that they indicated they, they could do it as well. But
obviously, if they're going to be participating in litigation that's going to
deprive them of their time, directly of their time. Whereas if you were
involving just members of the other two fellows' groups it doesn't take
away from the other team members' ability to run the company while the
litigation is going on.
(R. 14274 (Ex. H hereto) at 17-18) (bracketed material and emphasis added).
The district court confirmed this understanding of the anticipated duties when, in
its March 13, 2001 order appointing Mr. Holman Interim CEO/Special Master, it gave
him all authority provided for in the stipulated order just discussed. The March 13 order
states: "Mr. Holman is given complete executive authority in his role as chief executive
officer and special master . . . subject to this Court's Interim Order." (R. 703 (Ex. I
hereto) at ^f 3). Illustrative of the fact that the district court's addition of "special master"
designation was intended to accomplish only the grant of immunity requested by the

lawyers as an incentive to the applicants for the interim CEO position is the fact that the
district court never granted Mr. Holman authority to conduct functions appropriate to a
neutral judge surrogate, such as hearing evidence, settling discovery issues, or taking
testimony.
Consistent with one functioning as a fiduciary and CEO acting in the interest in E.
Excel, and inconsistent with one functioning as a quasi-judicial official, all parties
understood and agreed that in order to run the company the Interim CEO would engage in
ex parte communications with both Jau-Fei Chen and Ms. Stewart, as well as with other
E. Excel employees and territorial owners. (R. 14236 at 72). To that end, the parties
specifically acknowledged the establishment of a procedure for Mr. Holman's necessary
ex parte communications with parties and witnesses. (Id. at 69-74).
Pursuant to the Interim Order, and the rather atypical character of the "special
master" designation, Mr. Holman has not acted in any quasi-judicial capacity as a neutral
judge surrogate. Rather, he has behaved as a court appointed CEO whose duty is to
preserve and protect the assets and the ongoing business opportunities of the company
under the court's jurisdiction—E. Excel.
D.

The District Court Issues a Preliminary Injunction Against Ms.
Stewart and Madame Chen.

In the fall of 2001, E. Excel filed a cross-claim against Ms. Stewart and third-party
complaints against several other third-party defendants, including Mr. Stewart and
Madame Chen, seeking a preliminary and permanent injunction to prevent them from
competing with E. Excel in the marketplace in order to permit E. Excel to recover from

the damage done by the defendants in the marketplace. (R. 4214). Beginning on
November 27, 2001 and continuing through the winter and spring of 2002, the district
court heard approximately 22 days of testimony and argument on E. Excel's motion for
preliminary injunction. On August 20, 2002, the district court entered lengthy and
comprehensive findings of fact and conclusions of law. (R. 14318 (Ex. A hereto)). It
held that E. Excel had met its burden of proving an entitlement to the preliminary
injunction against the Stewarts, Madame Chen, and against most of the Third-Party
Defendants. (Id).
A few weeks later, the district court issued an Order of Preliminary Injunction,
granting, with several notable modifications, E. Excel's proposed form of preliminary
injunction. (R. 9135-45 (Ex. C hereto)). In entering the order, the district court overruled
numerous specific objections to the form of the order lodged by the Stewarts, Madame
Chen and the other Third-Party Defendants. (R. 8550-73). A copy of the trial court's
Ruling on Appellant's Objections is included in E. Excel's Addendum as Exhibit J.
E.

Trial Court's Denial of Motion to Vacate.

On October 24, 2002, Madame Chen, after retaining her current counsel, filed a
Motion to Vacate and Set Aside Judge Howard's orders relating to the Interim CEO's
appointment. In her motion, Madame Chen for the first time argued that Mr. Holman's
appointment as a "special master" exceeded the parameters of Rule 53 of the Utah Rules
of Civil Procedure, which limited a special master's role to that of a subordinate judicial
surrogate. Based on her newly developed theory, Madame Chen argued that all court
orders subsequent to Mr. Holman's appointment should be set aside because they were

contaminated by reliance on the reports to the court of Mr. Holman and on his activities.
(R. 12766-12767 (Ex. D hereto)).
Judge Howard denied the Motion to Vacate on January 24, 2003. (R. 12754-70
(Ex. D hereto)). He ruled that Mr. Holman's appointment and the powers to act as
interim CEO which were bestowed on him and exercised by him under the order of
reference were consistent with Rule 53(c) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure because
that rule allows the Court to "specify or limit" a special master's powers. In particular,
the trial court found that the unique circumstances which confronted E. Excel in early
2001 required "a unique and immediate response." (R. 12765). Specifically, the court
concluded that "E. Excel was in chaos," that it "was losing stability rapidly," and that
"[ejxigent circumstances necessitated the immediate appointment of a CEO / President of
E. Excel without which the company would cease to operate." (Id).
The court also revisited its decision to afford Mr. Holman judicial immunity by
designating him a "special master." (R. 12764). The trial court noted that the "parties
agreed that an interim CEO/President of E. Excel would be appointed to forestall the
erosion of E. Excel's business and attempt to revitalize the business." (Id.). The trial
court further noted that Mr. Holman was initially appointed as an interim CEO /
President, but that he was given "the same immunities and protections of a special master
... because of the potential for oppressive lawsuits against him." (Id.). The Court also
noted that all parties to the litigation at the time of his appointment had stipulated both to
Mr. Holman's appointment as an interim CEO and the appropriateness of the
accompanying judicial immunity. (Id.).

Finally, the trial court ruled that Madame Chen had waived her challenge to Mr.
Holman's actions. The court found she had participated in the litigation for over 10
months, from December 12, 2001 on, with full knowledge of the provisions of the
Interim Order and of the terms upon which Mr. Holman operated under the court's
supervision, without raising an objection or asking the court to revisit Mr. Holman's
authority. (R. 12761-12762). Rather, Madame Chen waited until after the lengthy
preliminary injunction hearing was completed—and the district court had issued its
findings which were adverse to her—before lodging any objection.
Based on the foregoing, the court concluded that Mr. Holman's appointment was
proper.
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT
The Stewarts and Madame Chen make two basic challenges to the trial court's
actions in this interlocutory appeal. First, and most important, they challenge the orders
of reference pursuant to which the trial court appointed Mr. Holman to act as an interim
CEO / President of E. Excel and gave him the title of "special master". Second, they
challenge both the entry and the scope of the trial court's preliminary injunction. Both of
these challenges fail.
A fundamental flaw runs through appellants' challenge to these two rulings.
Although appellants claim that this appeal presents only legal questions, in fact, the legal
questions are heavily fact dependent. For the appellants to prevail, this court must revisit
the facts and redetermine them. But appellants have not laid the necessary groundwork.
They have not even attempted to marshal the evidence in support of the findings, and

then show the evidence is legally insufficient, as required by this court's long-standing
authority. For good reason. The trial court heard 22 days of testimony and argument,
and entered 110 pages of factual findings before entering the preliminary injunction.
Then, when appellants belatedly challenged the appointment of Mr. Holman following
the entry of the preliminary injunction, the court heard argument and issued another
ruling that contained additional factual findings. All these findings are overwhelmingly
adverse to appellants, which explains their aversion to discussing them. Because these
findings are not properly challenged and must be accepted for purposes of this appeal,
and because they are thoroughly integral to the rulings under attack and are more than
sufficient to support them, the trial court's rulings can be affirmed on this basis alone.
The primary focus of Madame Chen and the Stewart's appeal is their challenge to
the appointment of Mr. Holman as the interim CEO / President. Their challenge is based
on the fact that he was given the title of "special master" under Utah Rule of Civil
Procedure 53. Because Mr. Holman has not acted as a neutral judicial officer, appellants
claim that everything that has happened since his appointment must be undone.
Appellants are wrong, and the trial court's rulings should be upheld, for three
independent reasons:
•

First, there is no dispute that the trial court had ample legal authority to appoint
an interim CEO / President to manage E. Excel's business affairs during the
pendency of the litigation; such an appointment was clearly necessary in the
context of this case; and Mr. Holman acted at all times consistent with the

detailed terms of the trial court's orders, which orders, not the title "special
master/' define his authority.
•

Second, appellants did not timely challenge Mr. Holman's appointment. Ms.
Stewart stipulated to the appointment of an interim CEO / President, and to the
orders defining his responsibilities, and Madame Chen actively participated in
the case for almost a year before raising this issue. Because the appellants
chose to wait until after they had lost the preliminary injunction motion to raise
this issue, this court should not entertain it now.

•

Third, even if the trial court erred in using the title "special master," that error
was technical only and completely harmless because (i) Mr. Holman's actions
were entirely consistent with the actions of a receiver appointed pursuant to
Rule 66 of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, and (ii) the trial court
specifically found that even without the special master's reports to the court,
there was ample evidence to support the preliminary injunction.

As something of an afterthought, the appellants attempt to challenge the
preliminary injunction entered against them. Madame Chen argues that the trial court
erred in finding that E. Excel had shown the requisite likelihood of prevailing on the
merits, and both appellants argue that the injunction is overbroad because it is
prospective. In challenging the preliminary injunction, appellants face an extremely
heavy burden - they must show that the trial court abused its discretion or rendered a
decision that was against the clear weight of the evidence. They have not begun to carry
this burden. Madame Chen challenges the extensive findings that she acted wrongfully,

but does not even attempt to marshal the evidence, which overwhelmingly supports the
injunction. And both appellants challenge the injunction's prospective operation, without
attempting to refute the trial court's findings that appellants' actions are particularly
egregious and harmful to E. Excel, and that it needs protection against further
depredations pending the final termination of this litigation. Finally, Madame Chen
claims, for the first time on appeal, that her due process rights were violated by the trial
court's entry of the preliminary injunction against her because she was present and
represented by counsel at only 18 of the 22 days of preliminary injunction hearings. She
makes this argument even though she actively evaded service of process, her counsel was
present for all 22 days of hearing, she had ample opportunity to present whatever
evidence she deemed appropriate in her defense, and she never complained of any
prejudice until after the trial court ruled against her.
For each of these reasons, the trial court's orders should be affirmed, and this
matter remanded to the trial court for further proceedings.
ARGUMENT
I.

The Trial Court's Findings of Fact Have Not Been Properly Challenged.
The Stewarts and Madame Chen try to paint their appeal as raising only questions

of law. See Stewarts' Br. at 1-3; Madame Chen's Br. at 2-6. However, given the
devastatingly negative findings that the trial court entered respecting the conduct of the
Stewarts and Madame Chen, and the implication that those findings have for the legal
issues, the briefs of both the Stewarts and Madame Chen attempt to recast the facts in a
light more favorable to them. In so doing, they implicitly acknowledge the centrality of

the facts to the issues on appeal. When the highly selective statements of facts in
appellants5 two briefs are read against the extensive findings of the trial court, findings
which appellants seldom cite, (see Stewarts' Br. at 5-27; Madame Chen's Br. at 6-46), it
becomes apparent that not only are both the Stewarts and Madame Chen explicitly
challenging the trial court's rulings of law, but of necessity implicitly challenging the trial
court's factual findings upon which those rulings are based. Yet neither brief even
attempts to carry the heavy burden Utah imposes upon one who seeks to overturn a trial
court's factual findings.
A.

The Stewarts and Madame Chen Have Failed to Marshal the Evidence.

As repeatedly recognized by this court, one attacking a trial court's findings "must
marshal the evidence in support of the findings and then demonstrate that despite this
evidence, the trial court's findings are so lacking in support as to be against the clear
weight of the evidence, thus making them clearly erroneous." In re Estate of Bartell, 776
P.2d 885, 886 (Utah 1989) (internal quotation and citation omitted). The Utah Court of
Appeals, following the Supreme Court's lead, has said that "[i]n order to properly
discharge the duty of marshaling the evidence, the challenger must present, in
comprehensive and fastidious order, every scrap of competent evidence introduced at trial
which supports the very findings the appellant resists." Neelv v. Bennett, 2002 UT App
189, T[ 11, 51 P.3d 724 (finding that appellant failed to meet marshalling duty despite
presenting 68 pages and 284 numbered paragraphs of facts) (emphasis added); Harding v.
Bell 2002 UT 108,119, 57 P.3d 1093 (holding that appellant must marshal "every
scrap" of evidence); Timm v. Dewsnup, 2003 UT 47, ^ 24 (holding appellant must

marshal "all relevant evidence .. . that tends to support the findings") (citation and
quotation omitted).
The marshalling process requires that the challenger "assume the role of devil's
advocate." Harding, 2002 UT 108 at <| 19 (internal quotations and citation omitted).
"The party challenging the jury's verdict must therefore temporarily remove its own
prejudices and fully embrace the adversary's position." Id. (internal quotation and
citation omitted). This "rigorous" and "strict requirement both grows from and nurtures
two interrelated court objectives: efficiency and fairness." Oneida/SLIC v. Oneida Cold
Storage and Warehouse, Inc., 872 P.2d 1051, 1053 (Utah Ct. App. 1994). A proper
marshaling of the evidence promotes efficiency by avoiding "retrying the facts" and by
assisting the court in "decision-making and opinion-writing." Id. It also promotes
fairness by requiring that the appellants bear the expense and time of marshalling the
evidence rather than putting the appellee in the "precarious position" of performing the
appellants' work, "at considerable time and expense." IdL at 1053-54. "[T]he deference
[appellate courts] afford to trial courts' factual findings is based on and fosters the
principle that appellants rather than appellees bear the greater burden on appeal." Id.
Instead of marshalling the evidence supporting the factual findings and then
demonstrating the insufficiency of this evidence, the Stewarts and Madame Chen have
presented either a selection of facts that support arguments they have made below (for
example, while arguing against the scope of the injunction, the Stewarts and Madame
Chen do not point to all the racketeering activity the trial court found they committed
against E. Excel), or they have asserted that there is "no evidence" to support the trial

court's findings. The marshalling duty, however, is not met by "merely presenting]
carefully selected facts" or by simply "rearguing" the evidence that was presented below.
Oneida, 872 P.2d at 1053. And, even if an appellant asserts that there is "no evidence"
for certain factual findings, the "heavy burden of marshaling all of the evidence in
support of the finding of fact does not shift to the appellee in order to refute the
appellant's assertion of the absence of evidence." Wilson Supply, Inc. v. Fradan Mfg.
Corp., 2002 UT 94, % 22, 54 P.3d 1177. Instead, "the appellee, when confronted with
such a 'no evidence' sufficiency challenge, need only point to a scintilla of credible
evidence from the record that supports the finding of fact in order to overcome the
appellant's 'no evidence' assertion and to demonstrate that the appellant has failed to
meet its marshaling burden." Id (emphasis added).
As we will demonstrate throughout the argument section of this brief, the Stewarts
and Madame Chen have utterly failed to meet their marshaling burden under this
standard.
B.

Because the Trial Court's Findings of Fact Are Not Properly
Challenged and Because They Dispose of the Stewarts' and Madame
Chen's Legal Arguments, This Court Should Affirm the Trial Court's
Decisions.

Each of the legal issues appellants raise are highly fact-dependent. For example,
the trial court's finding that the Stewarts and Madame Chen have waived their right to
challenge the order of reference appointing Mr. Holman as a special master is dependent
upon what the appellants knew and what they did during the period preceding the filing
4

See, e.g., Madame Chen's Br. at 41- 46 (the phrase "no evidence" is used at least ten

of their challenge. Similarly fact sensitive are the correctness of the trial court's
determination of the need for, and the conditions under which, Mr. Holman was
appointed interim CEO of E. Excel and a special master; the correctness of the trial
court's conclusion that if the special master designation was error, it was harmless; the
correctness of the trial court's conclusion that E. Excel can make out a prima facie case
of wrongful conduct against Madame Chen sufficient to support the preliminary
injunction against her; the correctness of the trial court's conclusion that Madame Chen
was not prejudiced by not being technically represented at 4 days of E. Excel's
preliminary injunction hearings; and the appropriateness of the scope of the preliminary
injunction. Yet all of these rulings are challenged by appellants without properly
challenging the fact findings that underlie them. See Madame Chen's Br. at 53-83;
Stewarts' Br. at 28-49.
Where a trial court's rulings on such fact-dependent issues are challenged, this
court grants broader than normal deference to the trial court. See State v. Pena, 869 P.2d
932, 936-38 (Utah 1994); see a]sp Soter's, Inc. v. Deseret Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass'n, 857
P.2d 935, 939-42 (Utah 1993) (recognizing that waiver is a highly fact intensive question
on which trial courts exercise discretion in applying the law to facts). Consistent with
that approach, this court has recognized that even if an appellant purports only to
challenge a legal ruling, if a determination of the correctness of a court's application of a
legal standard is extremely fact sensitive, the appellant also has a duty to marshal the
evidence. See, e.g. In re Estate of Beeslev. 883 P.2d 1343, 1347-49 (Utah 1994) (because

A in Tf>c<ncmsf> in almost all of the trial court's findings).

the appellant did not marshal the evidence, the findings were presumed valid and the
findings proved fatal to appellant's legal argument). As the court explained in Utah v.
Teuscher. 883 P.2d 922, 929 (Utah 1994), because the court "accord[s] a measure of
discretion to the trial court's determination unless such determination exceeds established
legal boundaries," it requires "as a preliminary matter" that the appellant "marshal all
evidence in favor of the in favor of the facts as found by the trial court and then
demonstrate that even viewing the evidence in a light most favorable to the court below,
the evidence is insufficient to support the findings of fact."
As discussed in greater detail in the following sections, the Stewarts and Madame
Chen's failure to properly marshal and then challenge the sufficiency of the evidence
adduced respecting the factual predicates of each of the trial court's legal rulings under
appeal ultimately dooms both the Stewarts and Madame Chen's arguments on all points
under appeal.5
II.

The Trial Court's Decision To Appoint An Interim CEO And To
Afford The CEO Judicial Immunity As A Special Master Was Lawful.

In their opening briefs, the Stewarts and Madame Chen argue that Mr. Holman's
appointment as interim CEO / President of E. Excel was improper under Rule 53 of the
Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. See Madame Chen's Br. at 53-71; Stewart's Br. at 28-38.
The Stewarts and Madame Chen contend that because Mr. Holman was given the title
5

Even if this court were to consider these fact issues, they are reviewed for whether any
errors in the admission or exclusion of evidence were so substantial and prejudicial that
the Stewarts and Madame Chen were deprived in some manner of a full and fair
consideration of the disputed issues. Ashton v. Ashton, 733 P.2d 147 (Utah 1987),

"special master/' rather than, for example, "receiver/5 he necessarily was converted from
a CEO—a person having the duty to preserve company assets and operations, to protect
them from others, and to operate the company with a view to making it profitable—to a
quasi-judge whose powers and activities are strictly limited to that of a neutral magistrate.
See Madame Chen's Br. at 54-57; Stewart's Br. at 28-29. They argue that all his postappointment activities on behalf of E. Excel, and the court proceedings in which he
participated, were fatally flawed because he did not act with impartiality towards all
parties, and asserted claims on behalf of E. Excel against the appellants. See Madame
Chen's Br. at 53-57; Stewart's Br. at 32. To remedy this hypothesized problem, the
Stewarts and Madame Chen ask this court to treat Mr. Holman's activities on behalf of E.
Excel as without legal effect and to disregard two years of litigation and forty days of
evidentiary hearings by vacating Mr. Holman's appointment and any subsequent court
orders. See Madame Chen's Br. at 58-63; Stewart's Br. at 45-47. The Stewarts and
Madame Chen's argument is as sophistic as it is belated.
Interestingly, the Stewarts and Madame Chen are silent about the implications that
setting aside Mr. Holman's actions and the trial court's orders would have on E. Excel's
territorial owners, creditors, and customers, all of whom have relied on Mr. Holman's
board-approved actions in contracting and dealing with E. Excel. It takes little
imagination to see that the consequences would be devastating for E. Excel.

Onveabor v. Pro Roofing, Inc., 787 P.2d 525 (Utah App. 1990). That has not occurred
here.

The response to their claim is three-fold. First, Judge Howard acted properly in
appointing Mr. Holman to act as interim CEO for E. Excel. Contrary to the Stewarts and
Madame Chen's assertions, the terms of Mr. Holman's appointment never encompassed a
grant of quasi-judicial powers. He was given the title of "special master" only to provide
him with some form of judicial immunity to protect him in this highly acrimonious
family war of attrition. The determinant of his authority or his role is not the title
"special master," but the highly specific terms of the court's orders of February 21, 2001
and March 13, 2001. These orders nowhere suggest Mr. Holman's role was that of a
neutral magistrate.
A second reason for rejecting appellant's challenge to Mr. Holman's appointment
as Interim CEO/Special Master is that the Stewarts and Madame Chen did not timely
challenge that appointment. Mrs. Stewart originally consented to Mr. Holman's
appointment as interim CEO and the grant of judicial immunity to him by way of his
being titled "special master." Both the Stewarts and Madame Chen were fully aware of
all relevant facts concerning Mr. Holman's appointment and his activities throughout ten
months of litigation and forty days of evidentiary hearings, yet never challenged Mr.
Holman's appointment until after the court ruled against them and Madame Chen
retained new counsel. The Stewarts and Madame Chen's objection to the reference is
untimely and, therefore, waived.
Finally, even assuming that the trial court erred in titling Mr. Holman a "special
master" under Utah Rule of Civil Procedure 53, the court's order appointing Mr. Holman
should still be upheld and his actions sustained because any error was technical only and

was harmless. One reason is that in running E. Excel and in seeking to vindicate E.
Excel's legal rights, Mr. Holman's actions were all within the scope of what a courtappointed CEO would ordinarily do, and would have been entirely unexceptional if he
had been titled a court-appointed "receiver." See Utah R. Civ P. 66(a). A second reason
appellants cannot show harmful error is that the trial court specifically found that, even
without the special master's testimony, there was ample evidence to support its entry of a
preliminary injunction against the Stewarts and Madame Chen. Under these
circumstances, any error the court may have committed by titling Mr. Holman a "special
master" was harmless.
A.

The Trial Court had Authority to Appoint an Interim CEO to Manage
E. Excel's Business Affairs and Operations.

Judge Howard's decision to exercise his inherent equitable powers to appoint an
interim CEO to manage E. Excel's affairs was both lawful and necessary under the
circumstances of this litigation. The need for an Interim CEO in early 2001, when the
order under attack was entered, cannot seriously be questioned. At that time, members of
the Chen family were fighting for control of E. Excel, and Ms. Stewart and Madame
Chen were systematically wrecking the company and stripping it of its assets. In its
January 24, 2002 order, the trial court rejected appellants' belated challenge to Mr.
Holman's appointment, a decision which is under review here. In so doing, the trial court
described the company's situation at the time of Mr. Holman's appointment as follows:
The circumstances of the litigation was an extraordinarily troubled one in
January and February 2001 creating the need for a unique and immediate
response. Exigent circumstances necessitated the immediate appointment
of a CEO / President of E. Excel without which the company would cease

to operate. E. Excel was in chaos and was losing stability rapidly. Among
other things the record reflects that E. Excel was missing important files,
documents, equipment, product, and cash flow needed for day to day
operations. This Court later discovered and concluded fiom the evidence
that E. Excel had been stripped by it's [sic] acting President and Officers
and that certain of it's [sic] employees were involved in a conspiracy led by
Defendant Mrs. Stewart and funded by Madame Chen. The intent and
purpose of the conspiracy was to destroy E. Excel and then install a new
competing company named Apogee with a distribution network carved
from E. Excel's distribution network.
(R. 12764-65 (Ex. D hereto)).
The .court's January 24, 2003 order then describes the response of the court and
the parties, after the court held its initial hearings at which the malfeasance of Ms.
Stewart, Madame Chen, and others was revealed:
Following the initial 10 day hearing, the Court and the parties agreed that
an interim CEO / President of E. Excel would be appointed to forestall the
erosion of E. Excel's business and attempt to revitalize it's [sic] business.
Mr. Holman was appointed to this position and was given the title of
interim CEO / President. The parties and Mr. Homan insisted that the same
immunities and protections that a special master would receive be bestowed
on him because of the potential for oppressive lawsuits against him as
interim CEO. At this critical time the parties included Plaintiff Jau-Fei
Chen, Defendant Jau-Hwa Stewart and E. Excel. Each stipulated that Mr.
Holman would act as CEO / President of E. Excel and as special master
with full executive authority to act as CEO under the direction of the Board
of Directors and with the prescribed protections an immunities. The parties
having stipulated to such appointment, the Court approved the stipulation.
(Id).
Significantly, in their brief to this court, the Stewarts and Madame Chen never
seriously challenge Judge Howard's findings on this point. They do not dispute that a
court-appointed officer was necessary to protect E. Excel's interests. They do not assert
that the trial court lacked the inherent equitable power to appoint an Interim

CEO/President for E. Excel to preserve its assets and operations. They do not contend
that the authority the court bestowed on Mr. Holman, pursuant to the stipulation of all
parties to the terms of the February 21, 2001 order, exceeded the scope of the court's
equitable power.6 Instead, the Stewarts and Madame Chen contest Mr. Holman's
appointment and challenge everything he and the court have done thereafter on the
ground of one technicality: that the court entitled Mr. Holman a "special master" in an
effort to give him immunity, rather than a "receiver." They argue that as a Rule 53
special master, Mr. Holman had to act as a quasi-judicial neutral magistrate only, and that
any number of the things he did as interim CEO / President were inconsistent with those
limitations. See Madame Chen's Br. at 54-57; Stewart's Br. at 39-42. In the words of
the trial court before which this same argument was made, appellants contend that "Mr.
Homan is a renegade judicial officer operating far afield from the mandates of his
appointment" and far beyond what the court had authority to authorize under Rule 53.
(R. 12765 (Ex. D hereto)).
1.

The trial court had ample equitable powers to appoint an
Interim CEO.

The first problem with the Stewarts' and Madame Chen's argument is that the trial
courts' power to appoint Mr. Holman did not derive solely from Rule 53. The rules of
civil procedure that established modes for the exercise of substantive power by courts,
such as Rule 53 on special master, and Rule 66 on receivers, were not created out of
whole cloth. Rather, they are efforts to describe circumstances and procedures which

6

Indeed, they could not. See Utah R. Civ. P. 66(a).

govern the exercise by courts of inherent judicial power. It is well established under the
common law that a trial court has the equitable authority to appoint a receiver or other
judicial officer to preserve the corporation's assets and manage its operations. See, e.g.,
Wilentz v. Home Serv. Society. 21 A.2d 795, 795 (N.J. Ct. Chan. 1941); State Ex Rel.
Ind. Dist. Telegraph Co. v. Second Judicial Dist. Ct., 39 P. 316, 321 (Mont. 1895). This
authority is particularly well recognized where, as here, allegations are made that a
shareholder has converted corporate assets for their own use, or otherwise destroyed the
value of the corporation. See, e.g., Anglo-American Royalties Corp. v. Brentnall, 29
P.2d 120, 121 (Olka. 1934); Allen v. Hawlev. 6 Fla. 142, 164 (Fla. 1855); Southern
Maryland Agricultural Assoc, v. Magruder. 81 A.2d 592, 595 (Md. Ct. App. 1951).7
Utah follows the uniform weight of authorities recognizing that a court may
"appoint a receiver at the request of the stockholders of the corporation suing either
individually or on behalf of the corporation." Richardson v. Arizona Fuels Corp., 614
P.2d 636, 638 (Utah 1980) (citing 3 Clark on Receivers § 738(d) (3rd ed. 1959); 16
Fletcher, Cyclopedia of the Law of Private Corporations, § 7688 (rev. perm. ed. 1979);
65 Am. Jur.2d Receivers § 11 (1972); 19 C.J.S. Corporations § 833c (1940)). In that

"7

The modern courts continue to observe this inherent equitable power. See, e.g., SEC v.
Keller Corp., 323 F.2d 397, (7th Cir. 1963) (recognizing federal courts possess equitable
authority to appoint trustee-receiver for protection of corporation and stockholders);
Dixon v. Barry, 967 F. Supp. 535 (D.D.C. 1997) (noting that a trial court may appoint a
receiver in the absence of a statute pursuant to its inherent equitable authority); Suphers
v. Scardino, 1985 U.S. Dist. Lexis 13161 * 56 (E.D. Penn. 1985) (recognizing that the
appointment of a receiver is warranted when gross mismanagement of a corporation or
misappropriation of corporate assets is at issue); Petitpren v. Taylor School Dist., 304
N.W.2d 553, 557 (Mich. Ct. App. 1981) (receiver maybe appointed under appropriate
facts and circumstances pursuant to the court's equitable jurisdiction).

regard, Utah law also observes the well-established common law rule that allows a court
to appoint a receiver "in cases where misappropriation of corporate assets by corporate
insiders is asserted." Id. (citing Stevens v. South Ogden Land, Bldg. & Improvement
Co., 14 Utah 232 (1896); Bookout v. Atlas Fin. Corp., 395 F. Supp. 1338 (D. Ga. 1974)).
The vitality of these principles is acknowledged in modern law through the
adoption of Rule 66 of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, which sets guidelines for the
exercise of this inherent power. That rule allows the trial court to appoint a receiver over
a "corporation in imminent danger of insolvency" or in other cases where a receiver
could be appointed by a court of equity. See Utah R. Civ. P. 66(a). Recognizing that a
receiver is appointed to protect the property and assets at issue, Rule 66 further empowers
a receiver to "bring and defend actions in his own name as receiver, to take and keep
possession of the property, to receive rents, to collect debts, to compound for and
compromise the same, to make transfer and generally to do such acts respecting the
property as the court may authorize." Utah R. Civ. P. 66(e). Thus, without relying on
Rule 53 pertaining to special masters, the trial court had undisputed authority to appoint
an officer to act on behalf of E. Excel and to preserve its assets.
While the trial court would have been within its authority under Rule 66 to appoint
Mr. Holman as a receiver for E. Excel in order to protect the company's assets and
interests, the title "special master" was bestowed to acknowledge Mr. Holman's
immunity from suit in his personal capacity. Like Rule 66, Rule 53 of the Utah Rules of
Civil Procedure also recognizes the trial court's inherent ability to appoint a officer to
assist the court in carrying out its orders. .See Plumb v. State, 809 P.2d 734, 741 (Utah

1990) ("We see little virtue in an interpretation of rule 53(b) that unnecessarily narrows a
trial judge's options in dealing efficiently with the issues presented for decision."). To
that end, Rule 53 allows a court to refer any or all issues pending in an "to a master upon
the written consent of the parties..." and to "specify or limit" the master's powers
through the order of reference. See Utah R. Civ. P. 53(a) and 53(c). Rule 53 also allows
a court to appoint a variety of judicial officers as masters, including referees, auditors,
and examiners. Utah R. Civ. P. 53(a).
The facts surrounding the formulation of the interim order by counsel for all
parties and the court in February 2001, (see supra, at pp. 12-18), demonstrate that the
appointment of an interim CEO for E. Excel was contemplated as being done pursuant to
this inherent equitable power. There is no indication that anyone contemplated the
appointment of a neutral judicial officer to run E. Excel. See supra at pp. 15-18. Instead,
the duties specified in the stipulated interim order are entirely consistent with this court's
equitable power to appoint an officer to preserve and protect E. ExceFs assets, to conduct
the company's operations, and to restore it to profitability. The special master
designation was only to provide Mr. Holman some protection from collateral harm he
might suffer in this highly acrimonious family war of attrition. The title bestowed on him
was not the determinant of his authority or role. Rather, the determinant is the highly
specific terms of the court's interim order.

2.

Mr. Holman's activities were consistent with his authority as a
Court-Appointed CEO.

The Stewarts5 and Madame Chen's challenges to specific activities of Mr. Holman
acting as interim CEO of E. Excel are all specific applications of their general legal claim
that anyone given the title of a Rule 53 special master is limited to performing actions
consistent with the role of a neutral judicial officer. Each of these particularized
contentions is subject to the same fundamental flaw: Mr. Holman's appointment was not
so limited.
The Stewarts and Madame Chen contend that Mr. Holman overreached his
authority under Rule 53 when he directed that E. Excel pursue its claims against the
Stewarts and Madame Chen, among others. They contend that such actions are
unsuitable for a special master. See Madame Chen's Br. at 58-63; Stewart's Br. at 40-42.
The response is that not only are such activities appropriate to an interim CEO, but all
parties understood at the time of Mr. Holman's appointment that the court-appointed
interim CEO would be authorized to pursue litigation as an officer of the corporation, and
subject to the board's control. As described in detail above, during the March 5, 2001
telephonic hearing, which preceded Mr. Holman's selection as interim CEO, the parties
discussed the role of the court-appointed CEO in the pending litigation. See supra at pp.
15-18. The parties and the trial court understood and agreed that the Interim
CEO/President, acting with board approval, would have the right and authority to cause
the company to bring claims on behalf of the company. Indeed, it was precisely because
the court and parties foresaw that anyone appointed would be involved in the time-

consuming activity of investigating and pursuing claims on behalf of E. Excel that Mr.
Jordan, Ms. Stewart's former counsel, argued in favor of appointing a team of
accountants to run E. Excel, as opposed to one individual. See supra at p. 18; (R. 14274
(Ex.Hhereto)atl7-18).
Another contention of the Stewarts and Madame Chen that is a particularized
application of this general claim that Mr. Holman is limited to acting as a neutral judicial
officer is the assertion that his actions have manifested a bias in favor of Jau-Fei Chen,
and as such, he has engaged in conduct that undermines appellants in the litigation. The
Stewarts and Madame Chen wholly ignore the trial court's finding that the Stewarts and
Madame Chen - not Jau-Fei Chen - acted against the interest of E. Excel. Among other
things, the trial court noted that Ms. Stewart and Madame Chen founded Apogee, Inc., an
entity which Madame Chen funded, to compete with E. Excel. (R. 12759 (Ex. D hereto)
(citing R. 14318 at ^ 138, 143)). Madame Chen and Mrs. Stewart attempted to conceal
these activities from Mr. Holman. (Id; R. 14245 at 94-95). The trial court also
recognized that its findings were largely in favor of E. Excel and Dr. Chen, but it
observed that it found "the evidence in this matter overwhelmingly persuasive to the
positions of Dr. Chen and E. Excel."
The Stewarts and Madame Chen mount an attack on Mr. Holman and the trial
court that depends entirely on the premises that designating Mr. Holman a special master
trumped all the provisions of the stipulated interim order and entirely vitiated the
authority that equity would permit a court to bestow on an interim CEO. Once that

premise is rejected, all their particular claims of misconduct and trial court error must
fail.
3.

A Rule 53 Special Master is not necessarily precluded from
exercising the power of an Interim CEO if the Order appointing
him specifically so provides.

The Stewarts and Madame Chen assert that the text of Utah Rule of Civil
Procedure 53, and the cases construing that rule and its federal analogue, require that the
rule be construed narrowly and that anyone appointed under that rule cannot be other than
a neutral judicial officer. They contend that to appoint someone to act as an interim CEO
for a company with power to act in the company's interests, even if that requires bringing
suit against others, is necessarily beyond the power the rule gives to a court.
Significantly, the Stewarts' and Madame Chen's position is based on their reading
of LaBuv v. Howes Leather Co., 352 U.S. 249 (1956), which construed the Judicial Rule
53 narrowly and displayed a traditional hostility of federal courts to the delegation of
judicial power to non-judges. The Utah Supreme Court has previously recognized that
Rule 53 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure is nearly identical to Rule 53 of the Utah
Rules of Civil Procedure. Plumb, 809 P.2d at 740, n. 9. Thus, federal case law is
considered a "useful guide" in interpreting Rule 53, provided that it does not
"unnecessarily narrowf ] a trial judge's options in dealing efficiently with the issues
present for decision. Id. at 740, n. 9; 741. But this court specifically rejected LaBuv's
approach to Utah's analogous Rule 53 in Plumb v. State, 809 P.2d 734 (Utah 1990). As
noted in Plumb, the LaBuy decision was authored over forty years ago, long before the
widespread use of magistrates within the federal system softened the federal courts'

hostility to delegating judicial authority. In addition, this court has recognized that
LaBuy is too limited in scope as it "unnecessarily narrows a trial judge's options in
dealing efficiently with the issues presented for decision." Id. at 741.
A number of more recent federal and state cases demonstrate a tendency to allow
trial courts to appoint a variety of officers to assist in implementing their orders under
Rule 53, even when they do not seem to fall squarely within the literal terms of Rule 53.
The key to these decisions seems to be the fact that the scope of the officer's authority is
determined by the court order appointing the officer, not the arbitrary title assigned to the
officer. The ultimate question is whether the court has the power to make the
appointment and has spelled out the master's duties so as to minimize the potential for
abuse.
The Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals articulated this principle in Jenkins v.
Missouri, 890 F.2d 65 (8th Cir. 1989), a case involving a court-appointed monitoring
committee. In Jenkins, the state of Missouri challenged the trial court's decision to
appoint a monitoring committee to oversee its desegregation orders. Specifically, the
state argued that the district court did not comply with Rule 53 of the Federal Rules of
Civil Procedure in appointing the committee. In affirming the trial court's appointment,
the Eighth Circuit rejected the narrow approach to what can be done under Rule 53:
Rule 53 does not terminate or modify the district court's inherent equitable
power to appoint a person, whatever be his title, to assist it in administering
a remedy. The power of a federal court to appoint an agent to supervise the
implementation of its decrees has long been established. Such courtappointed agents have been identified by a confusing plethora of titles:
'receiver, Master, Special Master, master hearing officer, monitor, human

rights committee, ombudsman,' and others. The function is clear, whatever
the title.
Id at 67 (quoting Ruiz v. Estelle. 679 F.2d 1115, 1161 (5th Cir. 1982 ) (emphasis
added)).
The Ninth Circuit has reached a similar conclusion in Federal Trade Commission
v. World Wide Factors, Ltd., 882 F.2d 344 (9th Cir. 1989), a case involving a courtappointed receiver / special master. In World Wide Factors, the district court entered a
preliminary injunction finding that the defendants had violated certain FTC regulations.
The court sua sponte appointed a special master to account for and preserve the
corporations' assets so that they would be available for distribution following trial. See
id. at 348. The defendant challenged the appointment, arguing that the special master had
been transformed into a "receiver" for purposes of the litigation. See id. In reviewing the
district court's decision, the Ninth Circuit recognized that the special master's
responsibilities technically met the definition of a receiver. Nevertheless, the court
concluded that the trial court had not erred by designating the court-appointed officer a
special master. Id. at 348.
The same principles apply to the case at hand. Here, the trial court appointed an
interim CEO, pursuant to a stipulation of the parties and in the exercise of its historical
equitable powers, in order to preserve E. Excel's assets and operations. Although the
same objective of protecting E. Excel's assets likely could have been achieved by
appointing a receiver or some other officer, under Utah Rule of Civil Procedure 66 or
otherwise, the title "special master" was bestowed in the hope it would protect Mr.

Holman from being dragged into the family's internal and ongoing struggles. Mr.
Holman has behaved entirely consistently with the definition of his authority in the
stipulated order, and has acted with board approval and under the court's supervision.
The Stewarts and Madame Chen do not suggest any judicial act taken by Mr. Holman in
his capacity as CEO / special master. The fact that the trial court denominated Mr.
Holman a special master under Rule 53, pursuant to the agreement of the parties and to
protect him from suit does not change the scope of duties or responsibilities under the
Interim Order. There is nothing inherent in Rule 53 that forbids a judge from defining
with particularity duties a special master is to perform. Consistent with the liberal
approach signaled by Plumb v. State, and the decisions in the Jenkins and World Wide
Factors cases, the trial court's appointment of Mr. Holman as a special master under Rule
53 should not be found to have been in error.
B.

Madame Chen and the Stewarts Waived Their Right to Challenge Mr.
Holman's Appointment When They Failed to Timely Object.

As shown above, the challenge to Mr. Holman's actions based on his being titled a
"special master" fails on its merits. But this court need not reach the merits of that
challenge because Madame Chen and the Stewarts have waived their right to challenge
the order appointing the interim CEO/special master by not asserting their challenge in a
timely manner.
A party challenging an order of reference to a special master must timely raise
their objection or forfeit their claim. See, e.g., Score v. Wilson, 611 P.2d 367, 368 (Utah
1980) (defendant failed to object to master's report and was barred from raising same);

Cruz v. Hauck, 515 F.2d 322, 327 (5th Cir. 1975) (party waived objection to by failing to
object to reference at earliest possible opportunity).8 The policy behind this rule was
articulated by the Fifth Circuit in Cruz:
A party objecting to a reference should do so prior to or at the.time of the
reference. If this is infeasible, the objection should be made to the judge at
the earliest possible opportunity. Such procedure permits the proper and
efficient administration of the judicial process. Otherwise, a party
disappointed with a master's report would be able to obtain "a second bite
at the apple" by withholding his objection to the reference until after the
report.
Cruz, 515 F.2d at 331.
In this case, the same policy against parties having a second bite at the apple is
applicable. Madame Chen participated in litigation for 10 months, between December
12, 2001 and October 2002. During that period she raised no challenge to Mr. Holman's
appointment as CEO of E. Excel or as a special master. And Ms. Stewart not only
participated in the litigation for over two years without challenging the terms of Mr.
Holman's appointment, but had stipulated to them originally. Both Madame Chen and
Ms. Stewart waited until after Mr. Holman filed several extensive and unfavorable
reports, had filed claims against them on behalf of E. Excel, and had successfully sought
8

This principle is well-established by the federal appellate courts interpreting Rule 53.
See, e.g.. Regents v. Knight 321 F.3d 1111,1127-28 (Fed. Cir. 2003) (finding parties
waived objection to special master's appointment when the parties had waited over one
year before raising objection, and only objected after special master issued two
unfavorable reports); Adrian Intl. Corp. v. Lewis & Co.. 913 F.2d 1406, 1410 (9th Cir.
1990) ("[A]n objection to the appointment of a special master must be made at the time
of the appointment or within a reasonable time thereafter or the party's objection is
waived.") Constant v. Advanced Micro-Devices, Inc., 848 F.2d 1560, 1566 (Fed. Cir.
1988) ("A party cannot wait to see whether he likes a master's findings before

a preliminary injunction against them, and after Madame Chen hired new counsel, to
challenge his appointment as CEO/special master.
As this court has recognized, "waiver is a highly fact-dependent question." Pena,
869 P.2d at 938. When Madame Chen's new lawyer raised the issue for the first time in
October of 2002, and the Stewarts then joined in the objection, the trial court addressed
the issue at length and found, inter alia that Madame Chen had been involved in the
litigation, had engaged in "hide and seek tactics" in an effort to evade service of process,
and had been given "ample opportunity to timely challenge the Master's appointment....55
(R. 12761 (Ex. D hereto)). In light of these unchallenged findings and the supporting
evidence, the trial court correctly concluded that Madame Chen and the Stewarts5
objections to the special master's appointment were untimely, and therefore waived.
C.

Any Error by the Court in Designating Mr. Holman as a Special
Master was Harmless.

As noted above, there is precedent for the proposition that designating as a Rule
53 special master a person charged with performing the duties traditionally those of a
receiver at equity is not an abuse of discretion on the part of a trial court. See FTC v.
WW Factors, 882 F.2d at 348. However, even if this court were to conclude that Mr.
Holman should not have been titled a "special master," that fact would not warrant
reversal of the trial court's order appointing him E. Excel's interim CEO, or any
consequent order of the trial court, because any such error would have been harmless.

challenging the use of a master. Failure to object in a timely fashion constitutes a
waiver.'5).

An entirely separate ground for affirming the trial court is the rule that this court
will not reverse a trial court if the ruling in question can be sustained on alternative
grounds. See Higgins v. Salt Lake County, 855 P.2d 231, 235 (Utah 1993) (appellate
court affirm trial court's ruling "on any ground available to the trial court, even if it is one
not relied on below."). The trial court here equally could have designated Mr. Holman a
"receiver" under Rule 66, or under its common law equitable power, and given him
exactly the same duties. See Utah R. Civ. P. 66(d) (recognizing power of receiver to
preserve assets and assert claims on behalf of corporation). As a receiver, nothing Mr.
Holman has done would be exceptional. Under this approach, the appointment of Mr.
Holman was not error, much less harmful error. Under either approach, a reversal would
not be warranted.
Returning to the harmless error analysis, this court has said it will reverse a trial
court's decision based on the fact that it acted improperly in the appointment of a special
master only if this court first determines that "it is reasonably likely that the trial court's
final order would have been different" if the court had not committed the Rule 53 error.
Plumb v. State, 809 P.2d 734, 744 (Utah 1990). In Plumb, the trial court acted on a
report prepared by a special master that was beyond the scope of his authority and in
connection with which parties had had little opportunity to participate. Id.; see also State
v. Ramsey. 782 P.2d 480, 485 (Utah 1989). In this case, appellants cannot show that Mr.
Holman did anything inconsistent with the order appointing him. Also, nothing that Mr.
Holman did as a special master, as opposed to as a CEO, altered the outcome of the

preliminary injunction proceeding. And appellants openly contested with E. Excel at
every stage.
The Stewarts and Madame Chen attempt to draw an analogy between the activities
of the special master in Plumb and the activities of Mr. Holman in an attempt to show
that the trial court's rulings are somehow tainted by reliance on Mr. Holman as a court
officer. This argument is without merit, as the trial court's January 24, 2003 ruling
demonstrates. When Madame Chen moved to vacate on this ground, Judge Howard
viewed as whole the evidence that had been presented to determine if there would have
been a different result absent the alleged error in designating Mr. Holman as a special
master. (R. 12760 (Ex. D hereto)). The court noted that "[t]here exists an extensive
record in this case from which the Court based its Findings of Fact and Conclusions of
Law." (Id.). The court concluded that the "Findings and Conclusions relative to the
Preliminary Injunction and Civil Conspiracy, while they include recitals to the Special
Master Reports, were based upon record recitals independent from the Master Reports
and the Master's Settlement Agreement." (Id.). The trial court also noted that while the
Special Master's Reports were admitted into evidence, the reports represented only a
small fraction of the record which was relied upon in entering its findings.9 The court
then specifically concluded "that the outcome of the hearings would not have been any
different if the errors alleged by Madame Chen, particularly regarding the Special Master,
9

For example, other evidence which supports the trial court's factual findings regarding
the malfeasance of Ms. Stewart and Madame Chen, among others—evidence which was
not marshaled by appellants—includes the testimony of Jwa-Hwa Stewart, the testimony

had never occurred." (Id). This court, viewing the evidence as a whole, should be led to
the same conclusion.
The Stewarts and Madame Chen assert, again in an attempt to make the case
appear analogous to the facts of Plumb, that the trial court relied entirely on Mr. Holman
and adopted E. Excel's proposed findings in their entirety. See Madame Chen's Br. at
25; Stewarts'Br. at 18.
This, is not true. Rather, Judge Howard made several notable revisions to the
proposed findings. For example, he excised block quotations from Judge Schofield in
two separate places, removed Dr. Kim O'Neill and Dr. Byron Murray from the list of
individuals and entities associated with the criminal racketeering enterprise, and removed
"Dr. Kim O'Neill's statement at his deposition regarding his trip to California on behalf
of Apogee" from the list of the false or inconsistent material statements made by
members of the criminal racketeering enterprise. These changes, which were substantive
in nature, indicate that the trial court carefully reviewed the proposed findings and that
those entered were the court's own.10

of Beverly Warner, and the tape recording introduced on February 13, 2001, all of which
were relied upon in the trial court's findings of facts.
10
In its separate and independently-authored ruling, issued after two months of
deliberations, the district court noted that it had received and carefully reviewed the
proposed findings and conclusions submitted by all parties in their entirety. The district
court referred to all of the proposed findings as "legal service of the highest quality" and
stated that it had given "studious consideration" of all the proposed findings and
conclusions. In addition, the court noted that it had also undertaken a considerable
review of the cited record and authorities.

III.

The Trial Court Did Not Abuse Its Discretion In The Entry Or Scope Of The
Preliminary Injunction Against The Appellants,
Seemingly as an afterthought, appellants challenge the trial court's entry of the

preliminary injunction on the following three grounds: (i) Madame Chen challenges the
findings of fact alleging there is no evidence of a "prima facie" case against her (See
Madame Chen's Br. at 77-83); (ii) Madame Chen and the Stewarts both challenge the
scope of the preliminary injunction (See Madame Chen's Br. at 74-77; Stewarts' Br. at
47-49); and (iii) Madame Chen claims that the preliminary injunction was entered in
violation of her due process rights. See Madame Chen's Br. at 72-74. Each of these
arguments should be rejected.
A.

The Preliminary Injunction Against Madame Chen is Supported by
the Court's Factual Findings.

Madame Chen claims that E. Excel "did not come close" to make a prima facie
showing of the elements of its underlying claims that support the injunction. See
Madame Chen's Br. at 77. She argues that "[t]he evidence against Hwan Lan Chen
shows only that she was a mother, a matriarch of a Chinese family that defers to its
elders, a director for a limited time, and a potential competitor." Id. Madame Chen
explicitly challenges the following legal conclusions and findings made by the trial court:
(i) that Madame Chen breached her duty of care to E. Excel; (iii) that Madame Chen
breached her duty of loyalty to E. Excel; (iii) that Madame Chen usurped E. Excel
corporate opportunities for her own benefit; (iv) that Madame Chen engaged in unfair
competition; (v) that Madame Chen engaged in racketeering activities directed to
destroying E. Excel; and (vi) that Madame Chen engaged in a conspiracy to unlawfully

disable E. Excel. See Madame Chen's Br. at 77-83 (challenging the court's finding at R.
9142-44 (Ex. C hereto)).
These conclusions of the trial court are obviously highly fact-dependent. See, e.g.,
C&Y Corp. v. General Biometrics, Inc., 896 P.2d 47, 54 n. 7 (Utah Ct. App. 1995) ("we
point out that the law of breach of fiduciary duty by corporate directors is highly factdependent") (internal citation and quotation omitted). As noted earlier in this brief, when
challenging fact-dependent legal conclusions an appellant faces a very high hurdle. See
supra at pp. 25-30. The appellant must marshal all evidence in support of the underlying
factual findings and then demonstrate that the findings are so lacking in support that they
are clearly erroneous. See Young v. Young, 1999 UT 38 at Tf 15. And when one
challenges a preliminary injunction, the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure underscore the
burden on the challenger. Rule of Civil Procedure 52(a) states that a trial court's findings
of fact made in support of a preliminary injunction "shall not be set aside unless clearly
erroneous, and due regard of a preliminary injunction shall be given to the opportunity of
the trial court to judge the credibility of the witnesses." Utah R. Civ. P. 52(a). The
appellate court gives the trial court an added measure of deference when reviewing the
application of the law to those facts. Searcy, 958 P.2d at 233, n. 7. Madame Chen has
not begun to overcome these hurdles.
1.

Madame Chen has failed to marshal the evidence, much less
show that it is insufficient to support the trial court's factual
findings.

In Utah Medical Products, Inc. v. Searcy, this court addressed the issue of
marshaling in the course of reviewing a challenge to the denial of a preliminary

injunction by the trial court. See 958 P.2d at 232-33. It held that appellant failed to meet
its marshaling burden when it "[i] merely stated those facts favorable to its position or [ii]
stated that there was no evidence whatsoever to support the trial court's findings." Id. at
232 (bracketed material added). This is precisely what Madame Chen has done.
Madame Chen acknowledges in the facts sections of her brief that she has a
marshaling burden, but she fails to comply with that burden in the fact section when she
points only to select evidence. See Madame Chen's Br. at 41-46. To comply with the
marshaling requirement, appellants must marshal all the favorable evidence at the point at
which they challenge the factual finding. See Roderick v. Ricks, 2002 UT 84, % 47 n. 11,
54 P.3d 1119 (citing Tanner v. Carter. 2001 UT 18,ffi|18-19, 20 P.3d 332; Fitzgerald v.
Critchfield, 744 P.2d 301, 304 (Utah Ct. App. 1987) (concluding appellant's listing of
favorable facts in facts section did not meet marshaling requirement)). Madame Chen's
attempt to comply with her marshaling burden only in the fact section of her brief fails
for this reason. And, in the argument section of her brief, Madame Chen simply asserts
there was "no evidence" of any wrongdoing by her. See Madame Chen's Br. at 77-83. *
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Among other things, Madame Chen states as follows: "there is no evidence, or even a
finding, that Hwan Lan Chen either funded, acquired or controlled an 'enterprise' through
a 'pattern of unlawful activity." Madame Chen Br. at 77. "There is no evidence that
Hwan Lan Chen committed any of the alleged predicate acts under UPUAA." Id. at 78.
"[Tjhere is no evidence that Hwan Lan Chen conspired to violate UPUAA or 'unlawfully
disable[d] E. Excel." IdL "There is no direct evidence of any agreement by Hwan Lan
Chen to violate UPUAA or unlawfully act against E. Excel." Id. "There is no evidence
that Hwan Lan Chen acted to cripple E. Excel, stole any of its assets, solicited any of its
employees while she was an E.Excel director, or had any involvement with Jau-Hwa
Stewart's cutting off the Territorial Owners from obtaining E. Excel Products." Id. at 80.
"[TJhere is no evidence that any of Hwan Lan Chen's actions that allegedly were in
breach of her fiduciary duties were continuing, as required to support the Preliminary

This assertion of "no evidence" directly contradicts the trial court's factual findings, as is
demonstrated below, and is legally insufficient, as Searcy found.
In support of the preliminary injunction against Madame Chen, the trial court
made extensive specific findings of wrongdoing which she has not addressed other than
with flat denials. Among those findings are the following which we give with supporting
record references:
•

"Ms..Stewart and [Madame Chen] determined to take revenge upon [Dr. Chen's
husband], and, when [Dr.] Chen objected, upon [Dr.] Chen herself." (R. 14318
(Ex. A hereto) at 7, ] 10 (citing R. 14228 at 73; R. 14222 at 49, 63; R. 14277 at
112-13)).

•

"Having seized control of E. Excel, Ms. Stewart and Hwan Lan Chen then
proceeded to attack E. Excel's historical distributors in Asia. . . . Hwan Lan Chen
and Jau-Hwa Stewart arranged for the transfer of millions of dollars to pay for
Richard Hu and Sam Tzu to establish new distribution networks." (Li at 9, ^ 15).

•

"The second part of Jau-Hwa Stewart and Hwan Lan Chen's strategy, as it
developed through November and December 2000, was to establish new
distribution channels for E. Excel's product by splitting portions of E. Excel's
distribution channels . .. away from the historical distributors." (Id at 14, ^ 24).

•

"Ms. Stewart and her mother, Hwan Lan Chen, then sent $2.3 million to Sam Tzu
for the purpose of setting up a new distribution company." (Id at 14, ^j 27 (citing
R. 14247 at 119-20)).

•

"Also at that same time period, Ms. Stewart and her mother provided no less than
$400,000 to Richard Hu to set up a new distribution company in the Philippines."
(Id at 14, K 28 (citing R. 14247 at 120-21)).

•

"In December 2000, however, Ms. Stewart and her mother purported to initiate a
transaction that would have rendered the children minority shareholders and made
Ms. Stewart and Hwan Lan Chen collectively the majority shareholders of E.

Injunction." Id. at 82. "There is no evidence that Hwan Lan Chen committed or hand
any knowledge of any theft of E. Excel assets or their use to compete with E. Excel." Id.
"There is no evidence that Hwan Lan Chen was in any manner connected with, directed,
or was otherwise responsible for the Asian distributors5 sale of E. Excel products under
the name of Apogee." Id.

Excel." (Id at 16,132 (citing R. 14223 at 62-64; R. 14293 at 37; R. 14228 at 6162)).
"Faced with this likely loss of control, Jau-Hwa Stewart and Hwan Lan Chen,
soon joined by Taig Stewart and others, determined both to destroy E. Excel,
rather than let it revert to Jau-Fei Chen's control, and also to replace it with a new
nutritional supplements manufacturing company controlled by Ms. Stewart and
Hwan Lan Chen alone. Without such an agreement between Ms. Stewart, Hwran
Lan Chen, and the others, there is no way to understand the coordinated efforts
that followed." (Id at 17,1 34).
"Having commenced the disablement of E. Excel, Ms. Stewart and Hwan Lan
Chen also determined to start their own competing enterprise (Apogee)." (Id at
24,1(58).
"During that same period of time, Ms. Stewart, her mother, her sister, Sheue Wen
Smith, and Dale Stewart, were making preparations to abscond with product and
raw materials belonging to E. Excel and to use those items to support the new
Apogee enterprise they were planning." (Id at 27, ^ 65).
"On February 20,. . . one day before Hwan Lan Chen was removed as a director,
Sheue Wen Smith signed the lease for the ATL warehouse . . . . In her initial
Answer in this matter, Ms. Smith directly implicated her mother in her decision to
rent the facility, 'affirmatively alleging] that she was asked to lease the
warehouse by her mother, Hwa[n] Lan Chen, and that she was not given an
explanation as to the purpose of the warehouse.'" (Id at 31-32, ^ 81 (citing R.
5607)).
"From the outset, Jau-Hwa Stewart and her mother, Hwan Lan Chen, worked
hand-in-hand to establish the Apogee enterprise. As Ms. Stewart explained, 'My
mother helped me - my mother helped me to pay for anything of a bigger amount,
but in setting up the - my mother - my mother helped to pay for anything of a
larger, you know, more larger expenses.' As Ms. Stewart also explained, she
could not have taken any steps to set up Apogee without her mother's active
participation and assistance: 'I really can't do anything with my own idea. My
mother's the one with the money. I have no money.... In the first place you have
to have some cash order to really make things happen.' In some accounts, Ms.
Stewart goes even further, stating that everything that happened prior to June 2001
(when Ms. Stewart resigned her directorship with E. Excel) was 'all my mother's
idea.' Whatever the exact allocation of responsibilities between them, the Court
has no difficulty finding that Ms. Stewart and her mother, Hwan Lan Chen, have
been working closely together from September 2000 onward." (Id. at 47-48, H 137
(citing R. 14248 at 40; R. 14295 at 45; R. 14250 at 75)).

•

u

•

"Ms. Stewart admitted, also, that all of the funds in the account were arranged for
by Hwan Lan Chen, and that Ms. Stewart may herself have assisted in the wire
transfers." (Jd at 48, \ 139 (citing R. 14264 at 7, 22)).

•

"On March 12, 2001, Hwan Lan Chen paid $1.2 million in cash for the land
purchased for use by Apogee, drawn entirely on the common fund '424 account.5"
(Id at 50,^144 (citing R. 14264 at 12; R. 14343)).

•

"Stan Houghton held three to four meetings in the 'first week to ten days of
March' with Jau-Hwa Stewart, Hwan Lan Chen, and Sheue Wen Smith, leading to
the creation of a drawing for an 80,000 square foot facility to be built on behalf of
Apogee at a cost of $3.2 million." (Id at 50,1146 (citing R. 14249 at 13-14)).

•

"Hwan Lan Chen paid the cost of the construction for the Apogee facility." (Id at
51, H 148 (citing R. 14249 at 17-19)).

•

"According to Ms. Stewart, the money for the new distribution arms, a 'few
million dollars,5 came from Hwan Lan Chen and was used to 'to help [Jau-Hwa
Stewart] to prepare to compete with E. Excel.'" (Id at 56, ^f 163 (citing R. 14250
at 80)).

•

"Ms. Stewart's own expert, Dr. Bamossy, testified that it was inappropriate for
Jau-Hwa Stewart and Hwan Lan Chen to use Richard Hu or Sam Tzu as a
distributor for Apogee or to use the distribution systems that they had set up on
behalf of E. Excel." (Id at 56, U 163 (citing June 7, 2002 Transcript at 193-94,
which is missing from the record)).

•

"As Dale Stewart now admitted on the stand he, like Beverly Warner, had been
receiving envelopes containing cash ($1500 twice per month), ever since he left E.
Excel. In his case, Mr. Stewart claimed that the money came from Hwan Lan
Chen as a gift, rather than from Jau-Hwa Stewart as a salary.... Dale Stewart
acknowledged finally that he understood that the cash, whatever its source, was
given to him because of his assistance on the 'Apogee enterprise.'" (Id at 67-68,
Till 163-64 (citing R. 14295 at 119-21, 123)).

•

"Exhibits 577K-L are E. Excel products that reflect that they were manufactured
by E. Excel International, Inc., in Springville Utah. Under the shrink wrap for
each of these products is a sticker indicating that it was imported by Mr. Hu's new

In preparation for the Apogee enterprise, Hwan Lan Chen arranged for a wire of
$3.5 million into a Central Bank account, No. 42407353 . . . . As explained by Ms.
Stewart, Hwan Lan Chen used the nominee bank account in order to conceal the
existence of the monies in that account from Mr. Holman." (Id. at 48, K 138
(citing R. 14344; R. 14264 at 22)).

distributor, Excellent Essentials International. The demonstrated presence of this
product in the hands of Apogee Philippines persuades the Court that the Apogee
distributors are nothing other than the former "new distributors" for E. Excel set
up by Ms. Stewart and Hwan Lan Chen, now operating under a different name."
( R at 78,1233).
These factual findings provide ample support for the trial court's conclusion that
E. Excel has made out a prima facie case of multiple claims of wrongdoing against it by
Madame Chen and that it was entitled to a preliminary injunction against Madame Chen.
Madame Chen has not begun to meet her marshaling duty, much less demonstrate that the
evidence is insufficient to support these findings. Her challenge to the injunction should
be rejected on this ground alone.
2.

The trial court's findings against Madame Chen are supported
by substantial evidence.

To be entitled to a preliminary injunction, a party must show the following:
(1) The applicant will suffer irreparable harm unless the order
or injunction issues; (2) the threatened injury to the applicant
outweighs whatever damage the proposed order or injunction
may cause the party restrained or enjoined; (3) The order or
injunction, if issued, would not be adverse to the public
interest; and (4) There is a substantial likelihood that the
applicant will prevail on the merits of the underlying claim, or
the case presents serious issues on the merits which should be
the subject of further litigation.
Searcy, 958 P.2d at 231 (citing Utah R. Civ. P. 65A(e)). Here, the trial court concluded,
based on its factual findings, that E. Excel had satisfied these requirements. (R. 91369145 (Ex. C hereto)). On appeal, Madame Chen does not challenge the trial court's
finding that E. Excel has shown it will be irreparably harmed in the absence of an
injunction, that the balance of the hardship weighs in favor of issuing an injunction in

favor of E. Excel, or that the injunction will not be adverse to the public interest. (R.
9142-43). Rather, she only appears to attack the trial court's grant of an injunction on
one ground—that E. Excel has not shown a "substantial likelihood of prevailing on the
merits." See Madame Chen's Br. at 77-83.
E. Excel's response to this challenge is twofold. First, Madame Chen
misconceives E. Excel's burden. While the trial court's factual findings are adequate to
support a conclusion that a prima facie case of the various causes of action has been
established against Madame Chen, E. Excel need not meet that standard. Because this
appeal is from the grant of a preliminary injunction, rather than from a final judgment on
the merits, Utah law requires only that E. Excel "make a prima facie showing that the
elements of its underlying claim can be proved," Keil 1999 UT 16, at f 8 (emphasis
added), or in the words of Utah Rule of Civil Procedure 65A(e)(4), quoted above, that
"the case presents serious issues on the merits which should be the subject of further
litigation." Utah R. Civ. P. 65 A(e)(4).12 No matter how narrowly construed, the trial
court's factual findings satisfy this test. Second, the trial court's factual findings on their
face are more than sufficient to support the conclusion that E. Excel has a "substantial
likelihood of prevailing on the merits" on its claims of breach of the duty of care, breach
of the duty of loyalty, usurpation of corporate opportunities, unfair competition,

12

Utah has expressly adopted the Tenth Circuit's relaxed standard in considering
requests for injunctive relief under which the movant only needs to "raise[s] questions
going to the merits so serious, substantial, difficult, and doubtful as to make them fair
ground for litigation and thus for more deliberate investigation." Otero Saving and Loan
Ass'n v. Federal Reserve Bank of Kansas City. 665 F.2d 275, 279 (10th Cir. 1981); see
also Utah R. Civ. P. 65A comment at % (e).

racketeering, and civil conspiracy. Madame Chen's bald assertion of "no evidence" or
"no findings" on necessary elements of E. Excel's substantive claims cannot avail her
here.
This court has long followed the rule that it surveys evidence and the reasonable
inferences that may be drawn therefrom in the light favorable to the trial court's findings.
See, e.g., Ovard v. Cannon, 600 P.2d 1246, 1247 n.l (Utah 1979) (citing Charlton v.
Hackett, 360 P.2d 176, 176 (Utah 1961)). The trial court's findings, just a few of which
are detailed above (see supra at pp. 53-56 ), made after some 22 days of evidentiary
hearings and two days of argument, together with the reasonable inferences drawn from
those findings, demonstrate that there is overwhelming evidence that E. Excel has made a
"prima facie showing that the elements of its underlying claims can be proved." Keil,
1999 UT 16, at Tl 8 (emphasis added) (citing Utah State Road Comm'n v. Friberg, 687
P.2d 821, 833 (Utah 1984) (comparing the state's prima facie showing of the authority to
condemn to the prima facie showing for a preliminary injunction and indicating that it
can be met by a showing of "some evidence"). This trial court's finding that there is a
prima facie showing will not be disturbed unless it is against the clear weight of the
evidence. Id. at TJ 6. The trial court here was presented with overwhelming evidence that
supported the factual finding of a prima facie case against Madame Chen, including the
testimony of Ms. Stewart. For example, the trial court made the following finding:
As Ms. Stewart also explained, she could not have taken any
steps to set up Apogee without her mother's active
participation and assistance: 'I really can't do anything with
my own idea. My mother's the one with the money. I have
no money.... In the first place you have to have some cash

order to really make things happen.5 In some accounts, Ms.
Stewart goes even farther, stating that everything that
happened prior to June 2001 (when Ms. Stewart resigned her
directorship with E. Excel) was 'all my mother's idea.5
Whatever the exact allocation of responsibilities between
them, the Court has no difficulty finding that Ms. Stewart and
her mother, Hwan Lan Chen, have been working closely
together from September 2000 onward.
(R. 14318 (Ex. A hereto) at 47-48, % 137 (citing R. 14248 at 40; R. 14295 at 45; R. 14250
at 75)).
Madame Chen's efforts to deflect any wrongdoing are simply not supported b\ tin
record, and the trial court had more than sufficient evidence, particularly in the context of
a preliminary injunction hearing, to conclude that E. Excel has made out a prima facie
case against her for causes of action of racketeering, conspiracy, breach of fiduciary duty,
usurpation of corporate opportunities, and unfair competition. Madame Chen's challenge
to the trial court's findings should rejected.
B

The Scope of The Injunction is Proper Based on the Appellants'
Actions.

This court "will not disturb a district court's grant of a preliminary injunction
unless the district court abused its discretion or rendered a decision against the clear
weight of the evidence." Keil 1999 UT 16 at ^ 6 (citing Kasco Services Corp. v. Benson,
831 P.2d 86, 90 (Utah 1992) (citing System Concepts, Inc. v. Dixon, 669 P.2d 421, 425
(Utah 1983))). This court considers "whether the trial court exercised its discretion using
sound equitable principles based on all of the facts and circumstances." Dairy Prod.
Servs. v. Cityof Wellsville, 13 P.3d 581, 587 (Utah 2000) (citation omitted) (emphasis
added). The trial court's detailed findings, which have not been marshaled by Madame

Chen or the Stewarts, show that it did not abuse its discretion either in granting the
preliminary injunction or in fixing its scope.
On October 16, 2002, in a detailed order, the trial court entered a preliminary
injunction against the appellants. Among other things, until there could be a final hearing
on the merits, enjoined them from "competing, or preparing to compete with E. Excel or
otherwise engaging or preparing to engage in the worldwide manufacture or marketing of
herbal and dietary consumer products, and personal care, cosmetic, or hygiene products."
(R. 9125-45 (Ex. C hereto)). The district court's preliminary injunction was based on
findings and conclusions that the Stewarts and Madame Chen had: (i) breached their duty
of care to E. Excel by, among other things, wrongfully causing E. Excel to terminate its
highly successful relationships with its historical distributors; (ii) breached their duty of
loyalty by, among other things, seeking the disablement of E. Excel by disabling its
operations and establishing a competing enterprise; (iii) usurped E. Excel corporate
opportunities for their own benefit; (iv) engaged in unfair competition by unlawfully
misappropriating and converting E. Excel's property and using it to compete with E.
Excel; (v) engaged in racketeering activities directed to destroy E. Excel, including
stealing and selling E. Excel's product through a competing business; and (vi) engaged in
a conspiracy to unlawfully disable E. Excel. (R. 9142-44 (Ex. C hereto)). Based on these
findings, the court enjoined the Stewarts and Madame Chen from competing in E.
Excel's field pending a final hearing on the merits.
Appellants do not challenge the trial court's findings that E. Excel was the victim
of a particularly aggressive racketeering enterprise that was aimed at destroying E.

Excel.

Instead, appellants quibble with the scope of the preliminary injunction.

Specifically, they claim that the injunction is overbroad because it operates prospectively.
See Madame Chen's Br. at 74-77; Stewarts' Br. at 47-49. They imply that the court's
extensive findings of wrongful conduct do not include findings that the wrongful conduct
is on-going, and that such a finding is essential.14 See id. In substance, the appellants
argue that even if they were bad in the past, that provides no basis for restraining them in
the future. Their arguments lack any merit.
Plaintiffs ignore the trial court's power under the Utah Pattern of Unlawful
Activity Act, Utah Code Ann. § 76-10-1601 et seq. ("UPUAA"), to issue preliminary
injunctions to protect the rights of innocent persons against the threat of ongoing,
racketeering activity. UPUAA provides that "[bjefore liability is determined in any
action brought under this section, the district court may issue restraining orders and
injunctions." Utah Code Ann. § 76-10-1605(10)(b)(i). Appellate courts construing the
analogous Federal racketeering statute have consistently held that trial courts have broad
authority to issue injunctive relief not only to restrain past, but to prevent future,
i^

The Stewarts do not challenge the factual findings, (See Stewarts' Brief,passim) and
Madame Chen recognizes that E. Excel has been the victim of a racketeering enterprise,
but simply claims she is not to blame. See Madame Chen's Br. at 77-83 (for example,
Madame Chen does not dispute that E. Excel's assets were stolen and used to compete
with E. Excel, she simply claims that there is no evidence that she committed the theft).
Neither party even attempts to marshal the trial court's findings regarding the acts that
were committed at crippling and destroying E. Excel.
Once again, appellants attempt to challenge the trial court's findings without
marshalling the evidence. See Madame Chen's Br. at p. 75 (the trial court made "no
finding of any continuing irreparable harm"); Stewarts' Br. at p. 49 ("Because there is no
underlying support or purpose for the Preliminary Injunction, it must be reversed."). As

racketeering violations. See, e^g., United States of America v. Local 30. 871 F.2d 404,
407-09 (3rd Cir. 1989).15 In the present case, the trial court took a similar approach to the
Stewarts' and Madame Chen's conduct. When presented with the appellants' objections
to the scope of the instant preliminary injunction, the trial court ruled:
This is a case where the Court has determined that the
[appellants] have engaged in a 18-month long criminal
racketeering enterprise and whose members have repeatedly
and willfully spoliated evidence, committed perjury, and
defied numerous court orders. The Court concludes that the
E. Excel Proposed Order is properly tailored to prevent
further criminal activities by the [appellants].
(R. 9129-30).
Appellants have failed to show that the court abused its discretion in entering an
injunction which only remains in effect until a final decision on the merits and is
narrowly tailored to prevent future racketeering activities.16 Given the appellants' past

discussed herein, the trial court specifically found that the injunction was necessary to
prevent "further criminal racketeering activities." (R. 9128-9134).
15
The UPUAA was modeled after the federal RJCO statute. See State v. Bell 770 P.2d
100, 101 n.l (Utah 1988). Because Utah law on this issue is sparse, and because the
provisions of the Utah act are nearly identical to those in the federal act, federal district
courts "look to the law of other states and to federal case law for guidance." See
Brickyard Homeowners' Ass'n Mgmt. Comm. v. Gibbons Realty, 668 P.2d 535, 540
(Utah 1983) (stating that "[i]dentity in language [in Utah and federal statutes] presumes
identity of construction"); see also State v. Hutchings. 950 P.2d 425 (Utah Ct. App. 1997)
(adopting federal courts' interpretation of RICO as Utah law).
16
Appellants' complaint about the length of the injunction has only been exacerbated by
there own conduct of trying to avoid an adjudication of the merits of this suit, including
action such as pursuing this interlocutory appeal.

conduct, and the trial court's detailed factual findings, this court should ilot disti irb the
1*7

preliminary injunction in place.
C.

The Court's Entry of the Preliminary Injunction did not Violate
Madame Chen's Due Process Rights.

Madame Chen claims that she was denied due process because she was not a party
to the case during a portion of the period during which E. Excel's preliminary injunction
evidentiary hearing was being held. She asserts that the bulk of the hearing occurred
"without notice to her." Madame Chen's Br. at 73-74. This argument should be rejected
for two reasons. First, it was not properly preserved. Second, even if it was preserved,
its factual premise is contradicted by the facts in the record.
1.

This due process argument was not properly preserved below.

For the first time in this litigation, Madame Chen contends before this court that
she was deprived of due process because the preliminary injunction against her was based

1

7

*

Appellants also claim that they do not currently have a duty not to compete, and,
therefore, cannot now be barred from competition even if they violated their fiduciary
duties while the duty existed. See Madame Chen's Br. at 74-75; Stewarts' Br. at 48. As
found by the trial court, however, where the activities in question had their inception
while fiduciary relationship existed, it does not matter if the director or officer resigns
before the activities are consummated. (R. 14318 at 97-98 (citing Microbiological
Research Corp. v. Muna, 625 P.2d 690, 695 (Utah 1981); Powell v. Bitner. 652 N.E.2d
1372 (111. Ct. App. 1995)). Despite appellants' protestations, the trial court found that
they breached their fiduciary duties and engaged in racketeering activities while they
were still officers or directors. Those findings are not effectively challenged because the
appellants once again have not marshaled the evidence.

on "18 days of evidentiary-hearings held before she was joined as a party."

Madame

Chen's Br. at 72-74.19
This court adheres to the rule that it will not consider issues raised for the first
time on appeal, including constitutional issues. Julian v. State. 966 P.2d 249,258 (Utah
1998); see ajso Monson v. Carver. 928 P.2d 1017, 1022 (Utah 1996). To properly
preserve an issue for appeal, a party must raise it in a manner in which the "trial court [is]
offered an opportunity to rule on [the] issue." Badger v. Brooklyn Canal Co., 966 P.2d
844, 847 (Utah 1998). "A trial court has the opportunity to rule if the following three
requirements are met: (1) 'the issue must be raised in a timely fashion;' (2) 'the issue
must be specifically raised;' and (3) a party must introduce 'supporting evidence or
on

relevant legal authority.5" Id. (citation omitted).

Madame Chen satisfied none of these

conditions. Madame Chen never argued to the trial court that she had been denied her
due process rights because evidence had been taken before she entered her appearance,
even in her objection to the proposed form of order for the preliminary injunction. (R.
91

8550-73 (Ex. J hereto)). This court should decline to consider the claim now.
18

In fact, Madame Chen was not formally present at only 4 of the days of hearings on E.
Excel's motion for preliminary injunction, not 18. See infra, at pp. 68-69.
19
Pursuant to Rule 24(a)(5)(A), Madame Chen is required to provide a "citation to the
record showing that the issue was preserved in the trial court." Madame Chen has failed
to meet this requirement regarding this due process claim.
20
The only exceptions to the preservation requirement are plain error and manifest
injustice, neither of which are applicable here. See State v. Lopez, 886 P.2d 1105,1113
(Utah 1994).
91

Madame Chen did not raise this argument on the record or in her objection to the
proposed order of preliminary injunction. (R. 8550-8573 (Ex. J hereto)). Indeed, it
would have been difficult for Madame Chen to do so, because she was present for 18 of
the 22 days of evidence, her counsel was present during the entire hearings, and her

Madame Chen's avoidance of service, and actual notice of and
participation in the preliminary injunction hearing, bars her
claim.
Even if this court were to ignore Madame Chen's failure to preserve the issue
below, her claim should still be rejected. Madame Chen claims that the preliminary
injunction must be "set aside because it granted in fundamental denial" of her due process
rights under article 1, section 7 of the Utah Constitution and Amendment XIV of the
United States Constitution. Madame Chen's Br. at 72-74. The Utah and federal due
process provisions provide that no person shall be deprived of "life, liberty or property,
without due process of law."

In interpreting this protection, this court has recognized

that "due process is not a technical conception with a fixed content unrelated to time,
place, and circumstances." Dairy Prod. Servs. v. City of Wellsville, 13 P.3d 581, 593
(Utah 2000) (citing V-l Oil Co. v. Department of Envtl. Quality, 939 P.2d 1192, 1196
(Utah 1997) (quoting Cafeteria Workers Union v. McElrov, 367 U.S. 886, 895, 6 L. Ed.
2d 1230, 81 S. Ct. 1743 (1961)). "Instead, due process is flexible and, being based on the
concept of fairness, should afford the procedural protections that the given situation
demands." Id. (internal quotation and citations omitted).
Madame Chen's current counsel argued in the petition for review, which this court
granted, that she "first appeared in the trial court action on February 28, 2002," and that,

counsel was given a full opportunity to present evidence, call new witnesses, and re-call
the former witnesses for cross-examination. See infra at pp. 66-70.
22
The Utah Supreme Court has repeatedly held that Utah's constitutional guarantee of
due process is substantially the same as the due process guarantees contained in the Fifth
and Fourteenth amendments to the United States Constitution. See, e.g., Untermeyer v.
State Tax Comm'n. 129 P.2d 881, 885 (Utah 1942).

as a result, the preliminary injunction proceeding occurred, "in large part, prior to Hwan
Lan Chen's appearance" and "without her participation." (R. 10206-07). Madame Chen
has since abandoned that argument. She now asserts that she first made an appearance in
this matter on December 17, 2001, and that the findings made against her were based on
evidence presented before she "was made a party and without notice to her." Madame
Chen's Br. at 28. But even this retrenchment is in error. In fact, her counsel stated on
December 12, 2001, on the fourth day of the E. Excel preliminary injunction proceeding,
that he would be appearing for her. And the record shows, and the trial court specifically
found, that Madame Chen had actual notice of the preliminary injunction proceedings
from the beginning, that she participated in the vast majority of the preliminary injunction
hearing, that she would have participated in the entire proceedings if she had not avoided
service, and that her counsel never asked the trial court for an opportunity to cure any
prejudice that she now claims she supposedly suffered by reason of not participating in
all of the evidentiary hearings. There is no merit to her due process claims.
On October 29, 2001, E. Excel filed its Amended Answer, Cross-Claim, and
Third-Party Complaint, naming Madame Chen as a Third-Party Defendant. (R. 41714214). Four days earlier, E. Excel had filed a Motion for Preliminary Injunction,
specifically seeking injunctive relief against "Jau-Hwa Stewart [and] Third-Party
Defendants Taig Stewart, Hwan Lan Chen, Sam Tzu, Richard Hu, and Apogee, Inc." (R.
3718-21). A few days later, E. Excel began its efforts to serve the new Third-Party
Defendants with the Third-Party Complaint. On November 8, 2001, E. Excel
successfully served process upon Apogee, Inc., a shell corporation owned and/or

controlled by Madame Chen. (R. 4490-93). That same day, E. Excel began a series of
unsuccessful efforts to personally serve Madame Chen with the Third-Party Complaint.
On or about November 29, 2001, E. Excel asked the Court to allow alternative
service upon Madame Chen. (R. 4750-55). That motion was granted by the court, but
before service occurred, on December 12, 2001, E. Excel's counsel stated in open court
that a Default Certificate would soon be filed against Apogee, Inc., which had theretofore
refused to appear. (R. 14248 at 117-18). Not two hours later, Mr. Matt Steward of
Clyde, Snow, Sessions & Swenson, the law firm that had been representing some of the
Third-Party Defendants, stood up in open court and stated that his law firm was "filing a
notice of appearance on behalf of two third-party defendants, Hwan Lan Chen, also
known as Madam Chen, and the corporation Apogee Incorporated." (R. 14248 at 18283) (emphasis added). The Court asked Mr. Steward, to be cleai whether he was
representing both Apogee as well as Madame Chen, and Mr. Steward responded in the
affirmative.24 (Id.). Thus, according to the record, Madame Chen was represented by

On November 8, 2001 at 5:45 p.m., E. Excel's process server went to the Orem
mansion where Madame Chen resides (along with Jau-Hwa Stewart and Taig Stewart).
(R. 4750-55). There is a security system at the mansion, including a camera and video
surveillance system. The neighbors told the process server that there were persons at
home in the mansion, but, despite the process server's continuing efforts for 20 minutes,
no one would answer the door. (Id.). On November 10, November 13, and November
14, the process server returned, and received the same treatment each time—no one
would answer the door at the Orem residence. (Id.).
24
The next day, December 13, 2001,-the Court again specifically asked Mr. Steward it he
would "be representing Apogee and Madam Chen." (R. 14249 at 172). Mr. Steward
again responded in the affirmative. (Id.). Four days later, on December 17, 2001, Clark
Sessions and Matt Steward of Clyde Snow Sessions & Swenson filed a written document
entitled Notice of Entry of Appearance of Counsel, in which they stated that they "enter

counsel in the preliminary injunction/contempt hearing no later than the afternoon of
December 12, 2001.
Plainly, Madame Chen was not prejudiced by not being formally represented until
December 12. The hearing on the preliminary injunction began on November 27, 2001.
(R 14250). Contrary to Madame Chen's assertions, there were 22 days, not 34,25 of
combined hearings and argument on Dr. Chen's contempt motions and E. Excel's
preliminary injunction motion. (R. 8109-8113). Madame Chen was present and
represented at all hearings after and including December 12, 2001 (18 of the 22), and
could have been present or represented at all 22 had she not dodged the process server.
Moreover, Madame Chen's counsel, although not formally present for her until
December 12, was present at all 22 hearing dates representing other third-party
defendants, and thus did not have to get up to speed after being officially retained by

an appearance as counsel of record for the Third-Party Defendants Hwan Lan Chen and
Apogee, Inc." (R. 4998-5000 (emphasis added)).
25
Two of the hearing dates occurred in late October 2001, before the consolidation of the
hearings on the contempt motions and the preliminary injunction motion, and were solely
devoted to Dr. Chen's contempt motions which are not the subject of this appeal. (R.
14244, 14245, 14243 at 63-64, 14250). The other hearings occurred in January and
February 2001, long before Dr. Chen filed her contempt motions, and before E. Excel
filed its preliminary injunction motion. Any argument that Madame Chen makes that the
district court committed error by relying upon the evidence presented during those earlier
hearing dates is meritless. First, a district court may rely on affidavits and other forms of
written unexamined evidence in granting a preliminary injunction. See, e.g., Drywall
Tapers & Pointers Local 1974 v. Local 530, 954 F.2d 69, 76-77 (2nd Cir. 1992)
(affidavits and records generated in prior hearings were sufficient to establish factual
record). Second, at no time did Madame Chen come forward, even after her entry in the
case, and object to the district court's reliance on the evidence presented at these early
hearing dates. Finally, and most significantly, nowhere does Madame Chen explain how
she was possibly prejudiced by such reliance, given that she was an active participant in

Madame Chen on December 12. He actively participated in the entire hearing, knowing
all the while that relief was specifically being sought against Madame Chen. In addition,
counsel for Jau-Hwa Stewart and Taig Stewart, Madame Chen's daughter and son-in-law
with whom Madame Chen shares a home, had been present for the entire proceeding.
Thus, despite Madame Chen's representations to the contrary, she was a participant in the
vast majority of the preliminary injunction hearing. In addition, the court specifically
found that Madame Chen had "actual knowledge" of the court's proceedings from the coconspirators, including Ms. Stewart with whom she lived, from the very beginning of the
proceedings.

(R. 12756 (Ex. D hereto)). Her non-participation was plainly hn nwn

choice. As Judge Howard explained:
[W]hat's troublesome and disturbing to me is this
stonewalling in light of the rather involved injunctive TRO
proceeding that is before the Court. I have reason to believe
that the parties with the ability to retain counsel and to secure
legal assistance had information available to them such that
the preliminary injunction hearing, and had every opportunity to present evidence, call
new witnesses, and re-call the former witnesses for cross-examination.
Madame Chen has been involved in the matters central to this case from the very
outset, and has been acutely aware of this litigation from the beginning. Courts do not
look favorably upon litigants that are aware of litigation that impacts their interests, but
sit back and wait until the court has taken action, and then attempt to intervene to undo
action taken by the court. See, e.g., Republic Ins. Group v. Doman, 774 P.2d 1130, 1131
(Utah 1989). The record discloses the following information: (1) Madame Chen was a
member of the board of directors of E. Excel from September 2000 through February 21,
2001 and this litigation began during Madame Chen's tenure on the board (R. 14318 at 8,
K 12); (2) on February 1, 2001, Madame Chen and Taig Stewart had a conversation about
the ongoing preliminary injunction hearing, and, specifically, that the $3,000,000 upon
which Madame Chen bases at least part of her newfound ownership claim was at issue in
the litigation (R. 14226 at 16-18); and (3) Madame Chen (along with Jau-Hwa Stewart)
was the one "in charge" of Third-Party Defendant Apogee (the front company for the
criminal racketeering enterprise) as she was the one who had funded the project, (R.
14250 at 37-38), and was the driving force behind Apogee. (R. 14250 at 79-80).

they could have acted more expeditiously.
(R. 14258 at 35).
Finally, it is noteworthy that Madame Chen does explain how she suffered any
actual prejudice by reason of not being formally represented by counsel for 4 of the 22
hearing dates. See Madame Chen's Br. at 74-77.
This court should reject Madame Chen's due process claim both because it was
not properly preserved and because it lacks any merit.
CONCLUSION
The trial court in this case was confronted with a highly unusual situation. The
court had before it a company, E. Excel, that had become the battleground of a highly
contentious family war. That war was being fought by individuals with astounding
personal wealth, an endless appetite for confrontation, and very little regard for the
American rule of law. The trial court correctly recognized that E. Excel was not mere
pawn, but a separate legal entity, with employees and distributors who depended on it for
their livelihood. The trial court saw that this unusual situation required immediate action
if E. Excel was to survive the pending litigation. The trial court's decisions to appoint an
independent CEO / President, and to enter TRO's and preliminary injunctions, were
solidly within its discretion. These decisions were not made casually - they were made
only after what must be among the longest preliminary injunction proceedings in the
history of this state.
The appellants' attacks on those rulings should be rejected because, as explained
above, they are entirely without merit. But this court also should recognize the

seriousness of the issue before it. Although the appellants are silent about the necessary
implications of a ruling that would set aside the appointment of Mr. Holman, and void his
actions and the trial court rulings based upon them, such a decision likely would be
devastating to E. Excel. E. Excel's territorial owners, its suppliers, its creditors, and its
customers have all relied upon the lawful and binding nature of Mr. Holman's boardapproved actions in contracting for and acting on behalf of E. Excel as its CEO. Only
because of the trial court's protective actions toward E. Excel has it been able to survive
the appellants' determined efforts to destroy it. Unwinding those protections on the
technical and flimsy grounds advanced by the appellants could well permit them to
accomplish by indirection that which the trial court stopped them from doing directly.
The trial court's orders should be affirmed, and this matter remanded to the trial court for
further proceedings.
DATED this 26th day of November, 2003.
Snell&WilmerL.L.P.
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JURISDICTION
This appeal arises from petitions for interlocutory review under Rule 5 of the Utah Rules
of Appellate Procedure. On January 13,2003, this Court granted Jau Hwa Stewart's petition for
interlocutory appeal of the preliminary injunction entered against her in the trial court on
October 16, 2002, based on Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law entered on August 20,
2002. On April 2, 2003, this Court also granted Jau Hwa Stewart's petition for interlocutory
appeal of the decision of the trial court entered on January 24, 2003 and denying Third-Party
Defendant Hwan Lan Chen's1 Motion to Vacate and Set Aside the trial court's Orders relating
to the Rule 53 appointment of Special Master Holman. This Courts' April 2,2003 Order also
consolidated both interlocutory appeals under case number 20020927-3C.2
STATEMENT OF T H E ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW
A N D T H E STANDARDS OF REVIEW
This appeal seeks review of the trial court's Orders ofJanuary 24,2002, in which the trial
court denied Hwan Lan Chen's Motion to Vacate and Set Aside, in which Mrs. Stewart had
joined (R.12754-12770); and the Preliminary Injunction entered by the trial court on October
16,2002 (R. 8110-13), based on its Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law andOrder^R. 14317)
filed on August 20, 2002.

1

Jau Hwa and Taig Stewart each individually joined in Hwan Lan Chen's Petition. Taig
Stewart's Joinder in Hwan Lan Chen's Petition for Permission to Appeal Pursuant to Utah Rule
of Appellate Procedure 5 dated November 5,2002, and Jau Hwa Stewart's Joinder in Hwan Lan
Chen's Petition for Permission to Appeal Pursuant to Utah Rule of Appellate Procedure 5 dated
November 5,2002, both filed in the Utah Supreme Court. Appellant Hwan Lan Chen and Taig
Stewart were joined in this action at the same time, both as Third-Party Defendants. Taig
Stewart, therefore, incorporates by reference the Brief of Appellant Hwan Lan Chen.
2

A separate appeal of the trial court's August 20, 2002 contempt ruling is also before
the Court under case number 2002077-SC. This -case was not consolidated and no briefing
schedule has been established.

Issue No. 1; Did the trial court err in appointing Special Master Holman as a Rule 53
Special Master and simultaneously as interim CEO of E. Excel, Inc. ("E. Excel") and
subsequently allowing Special Master Holman to become a party-litigant?
Issue Preserved for Appeal: Hwan Lan Chen's Motion to Vacate and Set Aside
preserved this issue. This Motion wasfiledtimely within ten days of the entry of the Preliminary
Injunction (R. 9230-38), and Mrs. Stewart joined in it. {R. 10119-10125). Issues regarding the
impartiality of the Special Master also were presented and preserved in Stewart's Motion to
Disqualify Larry C. Holman as Special Master and Interim CEO of E. Excel (R 5176-78).
Standard of Review: The trial court's interpretation and empowerment of Special
Master Holman under Rule 53 of Utah Rules of Civil Procedure is a question of law that is
reviewed for correctness. See Plumb v. State, 809 P.2d 734, 741-43 (Utah 1990).
Issue No. 2: Did the trial court err in entering its "Special Master Orders" purportedly
empowering Special Master Holman with the non-judicial authority to participate in the action
as a party-litigant and Special Master Holman's resulting exercise of those non-judicial powers,
requiring all such "Special Master Orders" to be vacated and set aside?
Issue Preserved for Appeal: This issue was reserved for appeal in exactly the same
manner as Issue No. 1, which is incorporated by reference.
Standard of Review: The issue regarding the trial court's entry of Orders related to the
Special Master's empowerment is a question of law that is reviewed for correctness. Plumb v.
State, 809 P.2d at 741-43.
Issue No. 3: Did Mrs. Stewart stipulate to the appointment of a Rule 53 Special Master
or to allow Special Master Holman to participate as an active party litigant, and if such
stipulation occurred, is it binding if the trial court lacked discretion to confer non-judicial powers

upon a Rule 53 special master?
Issue Preserved for Appeal: This issue was reserved for appeal in exacdy the same
manner as Issue No. 1, which is incorporated by reference.
Standard of Review: The issue regarding Mrs. Stewart's stipulation to the Special
Master's empowerment are a question of law that is reviewed for correctness. State v. Pena, 869
P.2d 932,936 (Utah 1994).
Issue No. 4: Did the trial court err in deferring any resolution of Stewart's Motion to
Disqualify Larry C. Holman as Special Master and Interim CEO of E. Excel {R. 5176-78)?
Issue Preserved for Appeal: This issue was reserved for appeal in exacdy the same
manner as Issue No. 1, which is incorporated by reference.
Standard of Review: The issue regarding the deferral of Stewart's Motion to Disqualify
is a question of law that is reviewed for correctness. State v. Ptna, 869 P.2d at 936.
Issue No. 5: Did the trial court abuse its discretion in entering a Preliminary Injunction
barring Mrs. Stewart from all competition with E. Excel and from any participation worldwide
in the entire health food supplement industry for an undetermined period of time where Mrs.
Stewart has no ongoing duty not to compete with E. Excel?
Issue Preserved for Appeal: These issues regarding the scope of the Preliminary
Injunction were preserved in Jau Hwa Stewart's Trial Brief Summarizing the Facts and the Law
Applicable to Jau Fei Chen's Motions for Contempt and E. Excel's Motion for Preliminary
Injunction (R. 7169-7436, specifically 7188), Mrs. Stewart's June 25,2002 closing argument on
E. Excel's Motion for Preliminary Injunction (R. 14291:105 & 175)and Stewart's Objections
to E. Excel' Order of Preliminary Injunction <R. 8660; 14291).
Standard of Review: This court reviews issues of the permissible scope of preliminary

injunctions under an abuse of discretion standard. Water & Energy Sys, Tech., Inc. v. Keil, 1999 UT
16,T|6, 974 P.2d 821 (Utah 1999).
DETERMINATIVE RULE
Utah Rule of Civil Procedure 53, entitled "Masters," is attached as Addendum No. 1.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
E. Excel is a multi-million dollar closely-held corporation, owned by members of the
Chen family. A disagreement arose between Jau Hwa Stewart ("Mrs. Stewart") and her sister,
Jau Fei Chen ("Mrs. Chen"), which resulted in the restructuring of the Board of Directors of E.
Excel. Mrs. Chen, removed as a director during the restructuring, brought suit against Ms.
Stewart for breach of fiduciary duty, invalid removal of director and officer, unauthorized and
ineffective voting of shares, and breach of the standard of conduct Early in the litigation, the
trial court entered an Interim Order, reversing the restructuring, removing Mrs. Stewart as
president, and requiring the appointment of an interim CEO to be agreed upon by the parties
or, if they could not agree, to be Court appointed.
The relationship between the parties prevented an agreement as to an appropriate interim
CEO. At the suggestion of Mrs. Chen, however, Larry Holman was nominated to proceed as
Special Master and Interim CEO. The trial court accepted the nomination and appointed Mr.
Holman as Special Master and Interim CEO of E. Excel. It became apparent that Mr. Holman
was partisan, allied with two of the parties to the proceeding, E. Excel and Jau Fei Chen, and
devotedly opposed to Jau Hwa Stewart. Mr. Holman's alignment with Jau Fei Chen's interests
never faltered. He was so obvious in his prejudiced alliance throughout the proceedings that his
own attorney was the first to suggest that Mr. Holman was "partisan."

STATEMENT OF FACTS
I.

E. Excel International and What Led to the Present Litigation

The Chen family is a traditional Chinese family and adheres to the longstanding Chinese
custom wherein the role of family relationships and the seniority of family members are very
significant and afforded great deference and authority. (R. 14230:13). Mrs. Stewart is the older
sister of Mrs. Chen. (R. 14230:13). Hwan Lan Chen is the widowed matriarch of the Chen
family. Her husband, Yung Yeuan Chen, died in 1995.
After receiving a degree in micro-biology {R. 14250:101), Mrs. Stewart worked at
Sunrider USA (R. 14250:102), an international manufacturer and multi-level marketer of herbal
health products. Mrs. Stewart's older brother, Tei Fu Chen, owns and operates Sunrider. At the
behest of her mother, Hwan Lan Chen, Mrs. Stewart left Sunrider in 1990 to work for E. Excel,
then a fledgling, closely-held corporation the Chen family formed in 1987. (R. 14250:101). At
the time, Mrs. Chen and her husband, Rui Kang Zhang, managed E. Excel. (R. 14230:128).
Hwan Lan Chen and Yung Yeuan Chen asked Mrs. Stewart to assist with the management of
E. Excel because the company was struggling to establish itself as a multilevel marketer of herbal
products, and the Chens hoped Mrs. Stewart's experience with Sunrider would benefit the new
company. (R. 15250:101,14293:30).
E. Excel was formed as a family business, headquartered in Springville, Utah, with the
goal of benefitting and supporting the Chen family. {R. 14257:21). Hwan Lan Chen and Yung
Yeuan Chen financed E. Excel with millions of dollars of initial capital. (R. 14257:21-23;
14230:78). Mrs. Stewart became vice-president of E. Excel, with Mrs. Chen serving as president
and Mr. Zhang as chief financial officer.

{R. 14230:82-83). This management structure

remained in place until September 2000. {R. 14245:6).

E. ExcePs markets quickly expanded, and the company grew into a successful multilevel
marketing entity with substantial markets in Taiwan and Malaysia. (R. 14342:Ex.280:^fll).
Approximately 90-95% of E. ExcePs revenue historically has been generated in markets in
Malaysia, Singapore, Taiwan, Hong Kong and the Philippines. (R 14342:Ex.280:TJll). E. Excel
manufactures over 100 product lines and markets its products internationally through the use
of 'Territorial Owners," which purchase product direcdy from company. (R 14342:Ex.280).
The Territorial Owners then sell the product to local distributors who, in turn, sell the product
direcdy to consumers. (R 14342:Ex.280). Each Territorial Owner had the exclusive right to
distribute E. Excel products within one or more foreign territories assigned to the Owner. (R
14342:Ex.280). Historically, E. Excel held no ownership interest in its Territorial Owner
entities. Instead, Barry Le (Taiwan) and Hendrik Tjandra (Malaysia) primarily owned and
operated those entities. (R. 1425:39)
In the summer of 2000, Mr. Zhang's long-term affair with a woman in California was
exposed, as well as the diversion of E. Excel funds to support her. (R 14230:7; 14245:123-24).
Mrs. Stewart and Hwan Lan Chen insisted that Mrs. Chen divorce her husband and that he sever
his relationship with the company. (R. 14230:7; 14235:64-65). When Mrs. Chen refused, Mrs.
Stewart and her mother insisted that both she and Mr. Zhang end their affiliation with E. Excel.
(R. 14230:8-10). Despite Mrs. Chen's resistance, Mr. Zhang eventually resigned his position
with E. Excel in June 2000 and moved to Singapore. Mrs. Chen joined him shordy thereafter,
and with the exception of a brief return to the United States in October and November of 2000,
the couple has remained in Singapore ever since. (R. 14223:79).
Believing that she controlled 100% of the outstanding shares of E. Excel, Mrs. Stewart

subsequently acted to remove Mrs. Chen as directors of the corporation.3 The new board then
removed Mrs. Chen as officers and assumed control of the company. (R. 14338:Ex.23). Mrs.
Stewart became president of E. Excel and installed Hwan Lan Chen as vice-president and her
husband, Taig Stewart, as secretary. (R. 14338:Ex.22).
As president, Mrs. Stewart attempted to reinvent E. ExcePs relationship with its
Territorial Owners and to establish new distribution networks in which E. Excel would have an
ownership interest. (R. 14245:33). She also was deeply concerned that Mr. Le and Mr. Tjandra,
who were very loyal to Mrs. Chen, would use their distribution networks to distribute new
product Mrs. Chen and Mr. Zhang manufactured. {R. 14245:33-37).
Accordingly, Mrs. Stewart arranged a meeting with the historic Territorial Owners at the
Provo Marriott Hotel on October 19,2000. (R. 14245:128). Mr. Tjandra and Mr. Le attended
the meeting along with Mrs. Chen, Richard Hu and Sam Tzu, both of whom had served as
managers for Mr. Le and Mr. Tjandra. (R. 14245:128). At the meeting, Mrs. Stewart attempted
to persuade the Territorial Owners to abandon Mrs. Chen and secure their support for E. Excel
and its products. (R. 14295:66-67).
Mr. Tjandra and Mr. Le maintained their devotion to Mrs. Chen and refused to accept
Mrs. Stewart as president of E. Excel. (R. 14222:44). Mr. Tzu and Mr. Hu, however, agreed to
establish new distribution channels in Hong Kong and the Philippines in which E. Excel would

3

Mr. Zhang previously had resigned as a member of the Board of Directors. Mrs.
Stewart held 25% of the outstanding shares of E. Excel stock (R. 14228:Ex.20) and reasonably
believed that the remaining shares were held in trust for Mrs. Chen's children, with Mrs. Stewart
acting as trustee. (R. 14338:Ex.21a-c). The trial court subsequently determined that die trust
was invalid because an exhibit describing the trust res was never attached to the trust agreement.
The trial court, therefore, determined that Mrs. Stewart's actions related to the voting of the
children's shares were void ab initio. (R. 7956-59).

have an ownership interest. (R. 14245:139-141).4 In November and December 2000, Mrs.
Stewart caused substantial funds to be distributed to Mr. Hu and Mr. Tzu to finance the
construction of the new distribution channels. (R. 14245:25-26). Hwan Lan Chen provided the
funds for the establishment of the new channels and additionally infused $3 million in operating
capital to keep the company afloat during the transitional period. (R. 14245:79-81).
Much of the cash flow problem confronting E. Excel after Mrs. Chen and Mr. Zhang
departed was a result of the company's course of dealing with the Territorial Owners.
Historically, the products shipped to the Territorial Owners were accompanied by two invoices:
one lower-priced invoice payable to E. Excel; and one higher-priced invoice payable to a Hong
Kong entity known as E. Excel, Ltd. (Affidavit of Gil Argyle Miller, R. 1255-1866). Mrs. Chen
and Mr. Zhang controlled the funds remitted to E. Excel, Ltd. Mr. Zhang's two sisters
nominally owned and operated E. Excel, Ltd. (R. 14230:19). Mrs. Chen was then responsible
for remitting operating capital to E. Excel on a regular basis. (Affidavit of Gil Argyle Miller, R.
1255-1866). Mrs. Chen maintained control of the flow of funds to E. Excel, Ltd., and stopped
sending funds to E. Excel necessary for its operation. (R 14226:24-25; 14223:34)
Shortly after she became president, Mrs. Stewart learned that the lack of any contractual
relationship between E. Excel and the historic Territorial Owners made this course of conduct
largely possible. In an effort to protect the company and to ensure full-payment for product
shipped, Mrs. Stewart refused to ship product to the historic Territorial Owners until they
produced their written contracts with E. Excel. (R. 14245:139-141). The Territorial Owners
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Prior to September of 2000, E. Excel never owned a distribution channel. (R.
14245:38). It was always Mrs. Stewart's intention that E. Excel own a controlling share of the
new distributors in Hong Kong and the Philippines. (R 142245:44-45).

refused to produce contracts and ultimately sued E. Excel.

II.

Present Litigation

On January 10, 2001, Mrs. Chen filed a lawsuit in the Fourth Judicial District Court as
guardian of her three children against Mrs. Stewart, Civil No. 010400098. (R. 1-24). At the
time, Mrs. Chen's three children owned 4,500 shares of E. Excel stock, and Mrs. Stewart owned
1,500 shares of E. Excel stock. (R. 30). Mrs. Chen sued to regain control of the corporation,
and argued that Mrs. Stewart had breached her fiduciary duties as a director and was wasting
corporate assets. (R.24). Recognmng that her claims were derivative in nature, Mrs. Chen later
amended her Complaint to add E. Excel as a putative party defendant «(R. 95-97).
E. Excel, under Mrs. Stewart's direction, filed an action in Hong Kong, No. 558/2001,
against Mrs. Chen, Mr. Zhang and E. Excel, Ltd., claiming that Mrs. Chen and Mr. Zhang had
used E. Excel, Ltd., and the double-invoicing scheme to divert at least $75 million from E.
Excel. (R. 14342:Ex.280).6
At the outset of her case, Mrs. Chenfileda Motion for Temporary Restraining Order and
Preliminary Injunction to compel the shipment of product to the distributors (Territorial
Owners). (R. 29). The trial court granted Mrs. Chen's Motion for Temporary Restraining Order
(R. 55-58, 89-92) and subsequent Preliminary Injunction hearings were held January 19, 2001
through February 21, 2001. The hearings were comprised of approximately ten days of
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The action wasfiledin the Fourth Judicial trial court in January 2001 as consolidated
Civil Nos. 1040200 and 01400189. The Territorial Owners claimed that E. Excel had breached
the distribution agreements and sought to compel the company to fulfill outstanding orders for
product. The original contracts never were produced.
6

Mrs. Stewart alsofileda similar action individually against Mrs. Chen, Mr. Zhang, Mr.
Le and Mr. Tjandra in the Fourth Judicial District Court, captioned as Civil No. 01400201. That
case was eventually consolidated with Civil No. 010400098 and the two cases form the basis of
this appeal, although no formal Consolidation Order was entered.

testimony. (R. 112-13,231-32, 265-66, 558-59, 582,624-25).
A,

Appointment of the Special Master

During the preliminary injunction hearings, the parties stipulated to the entry of an
Interim Order on February 21, 2001 ("Interim Order''). The Interim Order required Mrs.
Stewart to resign as president (R 631), reinstated the prior board of directors (R 630-31), and
compelled Mrs. Stewart to return any E. Excel property in her possession.

(R. 626). The

Interim Order also called for the appointment of an Interim CEO to manage E. Excel during
the pendency of the litigation. (R. 632). The Interim Order made absolutely no mention of the
appointment of a special master. The Interim Order only provided that Mrs. Chen and Mrs.
Stewart jointly would select an "interim CEO/President" to manage the corporation, or if the
parties could not agree, the Court would select the Interim CEO/President (R 631-32).
The Interim Order did not allow the Interim CEO to initiate and prosecute litigation on
behalf of E. Excel. Rather, Paragraph 9 of the Order envisioned E. ExcePs role as that of a
independent neutral third party, stating:
The Company shall not be required to pursue or pay for the pursuit of
claims against the Parties or other persons that are of a shareholder derivative
nature, and the Parties may pursue such derivative claims in their own names.
Neither the Company's board of directors nor the Interim CEO/President shall
cause to be dismissed, settled, or otherwise compromise, any lawsuit pending
purportedly on behalf or against the Company, without prior approval of the
Court. The Parties reserve the right to apply to the Court for relief requiring the
Company to take or forbear specific actions with respect to any litigation to
which the Company is a putative party.
(R 628). Based upon the language of paragraph 9, actual pursuit of the litigation would remain
among the members of the Chen family, with the Interim CEO focusing on the day-to-day
operations of E. Excel.
Because the parties could not agree on an individual to serve as interim CEO, the trial

court held a hearing on March 5,2001. (R. 684). The trial court selected Mr. Holman upon the
suggestion of Mrs. Chen's counsel, made for the first time during the course of the hearing, and
during the course of the hearing, determined that Mr. Holman also "would serve as a master
status and make reports to the court" (R. 14274:21). The trial court's special master ruling was
not the product of a stipulation, but rather was entered without notice, briefing or a finding of
exceptional circumstances warranting the appointment of a special master.
As a result of the March 5, 2001 hearing, on March 13, 2001, the trial court entered an
Order appointing Larry Holman ("Special Master Holman") as Interim CEO of E. Excel. (R.
702-04). Although it was not part of the stipulated Interim Order, the trial court also appointed
Mr. Holman as Special Master under the provisions of U.R.C.P. 53. (R. 2033). As the trial court
specifically stated in the March 13,2001 Order
[I]he Court selects Mr. Larry C. Holman to serve as the interim chief
executive officer of E. Excel and as special master for and on behalf of the
Court... Mr. Holman is to serve as a special master, appointed by the court,
and chief executive officer of E. Excel with all rights, protections and
immunities available to a special master under the law
Mr. Holman is given
complete executive authority in his role as chief executive officer and
special master, in accordance with and subject to this Court's Interim
Order, dated February 21,2001.
(R. 703)(emphasis added). The March 13,2001 Order provided that Mr. Holman would serve
as a subordinate judicial officer, while also maintaining complete executive authority over
E. Excel International which was a "passive" party-litigant at the time.
B.

Expansion of Special Master Holman's Power

Special Master Holman was keenly aware of his role as a subordinate judicial officer with
the constraints and obligations of a judge. This specifically was evidenced during a hearing on
March 26,2001, when Special Counsel to the Special Master, Patrick Hoog ("Mr. Hoog"), raised
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the issue of the Special Master Holman's intent to engage in ex parte communications with the
parties. In his address to the trial court, Mr. Hoog stated the following:
Your honor, it's an ethical [issue]... [Mr. Holman] is the Special Master • . .
[H]e is bound by the judicial conduct as a Special Master. And as the
Special Master he has to follow the duties of the Judge . . . And one such
duty, he is prohibited from having ex parte communications . . . {Mr. Holman]
wants to make it clear for everyone t h a t . . . in fact he has met, and the parties
by their participation, he is meeting with everyone on an ex parte basis and
separately to conduct his business. At the same time, as a special master he has
contemplated that he is free to have open communications with the Court,
without the participation of the parties, because he is, in effect, is a judge and
is the judge's representative.
(R. 14236:71)(emphasis added). Special Master Holman's admission that he was having ex parte
communications with the parties and was seeking to continue having those ex parte
communications, marked the first and last time Special Master Holman addressed with the trial
court that his actions both as interim CEO and special master under Rule 53 were in violation
of the Code of Judicial Conduct
At the March 26,2001 hearing, Mrs. Chen and Mrs. Stewart stipulated to Special Master
Holman's ex-parte communications, but Mrs. Stewart reserved the right to discontinue those
communications. (R. 14236:74-75). Counsel for Mrs. Chen also recognized that "Mr. Holman
is a special master and we acknowledge his authority and capacity with the Court," and asked
that Special Master Holman exercise judgment in his exparte communications regarding the
lawsuit

(R. 14236:73). The trial court accepted the limited stipulation regarding ex-parte

communications and ruled that Special Master Holman's communications to the Court had to
be in the form of written reports. (R. 733; 14236:75).
On May 11,2001, over Mrs. Stewart's objections, Special Master Holman's non-judicial
power was expanded further when the trial court empowered him to act as a party-litigant and

make deals on behalf of E. Excel, without the need for trial -court approval. .(R. 762). This act
came resulted from Special Master Holman's power as interim CEO under the Interim Order
and from the growing dispute among the parties regarding Special Master Holman's ability to
direct litigation on behalf of E. Excel. At Special Master Holman's request, therefore, the trial
court modified the Interim Order as follows:
The Special Master and CEO, Larry C. Holman, is granted and has full
executive authority to direct and control, initiate, dismiss, settle or
otherwise determine [E. ExcePs] interests in all business relationships,
assets, disputes and lawsuits, subject to approval of the Board of Directors of
the Company, as necessary under the by-laws of the Company, all without
further Order of this Court.
(R. 762)(emphasis added). The only exception to the additional power granted to Special Master
Holman was a limitation on his power to settle the ongoing Hong Kong litigation, which still
required approval of the trial court. (R. 762).
C.

The Conflict Created by Appointing Special Master Holman under Rule
53 to Also Serve as Interim CEO of E. Excel

1.

Master Settlement Agreement

Shortly thereafter, Judge Howard approved Special Master Holman's power to act as
corporate deal maker and party-litigant by approving his negotiation and execution of his
comprehensive "Master Settlement Agreement" (R. 14344:Ex.534). By virtue of the Master
Settlement Agreement, Special Master Holman accomplished the following:
•

Special Master Holman released Mrs. Chen, Mr. Zhang and the Territorial
Owners of all claims brought by E. Excel, including the claim that those parties
had stolen approximately $75 million from the corporation using an elaborate
double invoicing scheme. (R. 14344:Ex.534,^|4.1). This clemency was not
extended to Mrs. Stewart.

•

Special Master Holman settled all pending litigation in which E. Excel was a
party, including the Hong Kong action, but excluding the action in die Fourth
Judicial District <R. 14344:Ex.534:^4.1{a)).
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•

Special Master Holman completely restructured E. Excel and essentially turned
over 90% of its international business to Mrs. Chen, Mr. Zhang and the historic
Territorial Owners.
(R. 14344:EX534:1[3.1, S.8; 14222:99-102, 141, 164;
14235:42-44-48). This provision of the Master Setdement Agreement divested
E. Excel of approximately 90% of its overseas sales in exchange for a paltry 1.5%
royalty on all products sold to the Territorial Owners, with a minimum annual
royalty of $500,000, and a $2.5 million annual purchase commitment by the
Territorial Owners to purchase E. Excel products actually manufactured by E.
Excel. (R. 14344:Ex.534, S.8). This left E. Excel in a position to recoup
approximately 5-10% of the company's historical international sales, (R.
14265:174-76)

Among the outstanding issues settled by Mr. Holman was a forgiveness of any debt owed
to E. Excel by E. Excel, Ltd., as well as approval of E. ExcePs relationship with certain contract
manufacturers that produce E. Excel products for sale domestically and overseas. (R. 14344: Ex.
534: S.3A) The forgiveness of the debt E. Excel, Ltd., owed to E. Excel was approved without
any investigation into the amount of the debt owed or the nature of the obligation. As Gary
Takagi, Chief Operating Officer of E. Excel, stated in his deposition:
Q.
How much money did E. Excel, Ltd., owe E. Excel, at the
time of the execution of the Master Settlement Agreement?

A.

I don't know.

Q.
Okay. So as you sit here today, you have no idea as to
h o w m u c h money E . Excel, Ltd. owed E . Excel when the
Master Agreement was executed? Isn't that a fair statement?

A.

Yes.

(R. 5184:31){emphasis added). The approval of E. ExcePs relationship with certain contract
manufacturers also was done without the benefit of any investigation regarding ownership of
the plants, their location or methods they employ to manufacture E. Excel products. (R. 517980; 5183: 95-96).

No officer in Mr. Holman's regime had any idea how the contract

manufacturers obtained E. Excel's secret formulas before the Master Settlement Agreement was
signed. (R 5183:94-96).
In stark contrast to his lack of investigation into E. Excel's relationship with the contract
manufacturers and the amount of debt E. Excel, Ltd., owed to E. Excel, Mr. Holman focused
his attention and the corporation's assets toward an exhaustive investigation of Mrs. Stewart's
conduct with regard to E. Excel as evidenced by Special Master's Reports 1-5. (R. 14297,14298,
14300,14302,14310). Instead of attempting to retrieve the estimated $75 million E. Excel, Ltd.,
owed to E. Excel International, Mr. Holman chose to chronicle every scrap of paper and each
piece of office furniture Mrs. Stewart purportedly removed from E. Excel. Instead of analyzing
the ownership structures of the contract manufacturers that produce and sell E. Excel products
to determine whether they should be allowed to compete with E. Excel, Mr. Holman again
focused his efforts and the company's resources toward preventing only Mrs. Stewart from
competing with E. Excel.
Mr. Holman also submitted materially misleading financial reports to this Court, as well
as to lending institutions associated with E. Excel. Mr. Holman also signed E. Excel's 2000
Federal Income Tax Return, which also was materially misleading. As chronicled in Stewart's
Memorandum in Support of Her Motion for Temporary Restraining Order and Preliminary
Injunction supported by the attached deposition transcripts (R. 5200-04; 5229-40), Mr. Holman
submitted financial reports and filed tax returns based on inventory numbers that understated
E. Excel's then current inventory by approximately $20 million.7

7

These inventory numbers have been historically provided to E. Excel's former
accountant, Lynn Gilbert, by Mrs. Chen and Mr. Zhang. There is no indication that Mr.
Holman has investigated Mrs. Chen and Mr. Zhang's conduct in this regard or that he intends
to take action against them on behalf of the corporation.
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The Master Settlement Agreement was the subject of two hearings. On May 30,2001,
the trial court heard Mrs. Stewart's Motion for Temporary Restraining Order to prevent the
Board of Directors of E. Excel from considering the Master Settlement Agreement. (R. 777798; 14239). The trial court denied Mrs. Stewart's Motion. The second hearing, held on June
1,2001, involved Special Master Holman's Rule 53 Motion to have the trial court approve the
Master Settlement Agreement (R. 1887-88),
During the course of both hearings, Judge Howard reaffirmed that Special Master
Holman indeed was appointed as a subordinate judicial officer authorized to act direcdy as a
party litigant For example, on May 30, 2001, the trial court stated, "I have employed a
Special Master to get this company up and rolling/* (R. 14240:15). Later in that same
hearing the trial court stated, cT)o I have to try all of the business decisions of E. Excel to see
if my special master is making appropriate ones?" (R. 14240:40). Similarly, on May 30, 2001,
Special Master Holman also emphasized his role as the trial court's "representative," in asking
the Court to defer to his business judgment and approve the Master Settlement Agreement
[Special Counsel Hoog:] So you acquired a Special Master and said, cSpecial
Master, you have two roles. You're my representative of the court, a
judicial officer. You're to go and investigate and report to me, and you're
to operate the company.' He's exercised his business judgment. He's
investigated, and he's come back and reported . . . . (R. 14240:28)
[Special Master Holman] is a judicial officer

(R. 14240:30)

The final point, Your Honor, is that you've put in place a Special Master and
asked for his business judgment.
(R. 14240:34).
Deferring to Special Master Holman's business judgment, the trial court entered an Order
on June 1,2001, approving the Master Settlement Agreement and authorizing the Special Master

to "enter into and conclude the Master Settlement Agreement forthwith." (R. 2032). Noting
Special Master Holman's reference of authority under Rule 53, the June 1,2001 Order reads as
follows:
That under Utah Rules of Civil Procedure Rules 53(e)(2) and 6(d), based on the
Report No. 3 of the Special Master... that exigent circumstances exist and cause
is shown to fix the time of notice of the Report No. 3 and the Special Master's
Motion for Order thereon at five calendar days . . .
[T]his Court accepts the conclusion of the business judgment made by the
Special Master, acting as president and CEO of E. Excel, Inc.
Consequently, the Special Master's [sic] is hereby authorized to enter into and
conclude the Master Settlement Agreement forthwith, and perform such acts as
necessary to comply with the terms thereof, including but not limited to effecting
the immediate dismissal with prejudice of the Hong Kong [action] on behalf of
the Company.
(R. 2032-34). Subsequently, in the last days ofextensive Preliminary Injunction hearings, Special
Master Holman and his counsel acknowledged that the Master Settlement Agreement had a
"devastating impact" on E. Excel as the transfer of manufacturing rights to Mrs. Chen and the
Territorial Owner's "substantially jeopardized" E. Excel. (R. 14270:27; 14324:3).
Subsequently, Mrs. Chen brought a Motion to Dismiss Plaintiffs Second Amended
Complaint. The trial court dismissed Mrs. Stewart's Second Amended Complaint containing her
$18 million-*- claim against Mrs. Chen and Mr. Zhang, among others, ruling that Special Master
Holman was a "court appointed representative" and that he was "independent because of his
appointment by the Court and the Court's supervision over E. ExcePs business affairs." This
derivative action was dismissed because the trial court considered Mr. Holman to be an
independent party who was in a position to determine E. ExcePs best interest. (R. 14850).
2.

Special Master Reports

During this same time period, Special Master Mr. Holman also submitted a total of five
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"Special Master Reports" to the trial court between April 11,2001 and September 18,2001. (R.
14297; 14298; 14300; 14302; 14310). Special Master Holman acknowledged the reports were
submitted under Rule 53 in his capacity as a Rule 53 special master.8 Periodic hearings were
held to entertain Mrs. Stewart's objections to the various Special Master Reports, but ultimately,
the trial court adopted each of the five Reports verbatim upon Special Master Holman's Motions
under Rule 53. (R. 2033; 2043; 2294; 14297; 14298; 14309; 14310; 14317:47-48, 109-117;
14318:89). In a surprisingly frank admission, counsel for Special Master Holman and E. Excel
revealed to the trial court that the Special Master Reports were "clearly partisan" in nature.
(R. 14287:117,125).
This startling admission came approximately four months after the trial court relied
substantively on the content of the Reports in entering its Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law
and Order on August 20, 2002, holding Mrs. Stewart in Criminal and Civil Contempt (R.
14318). A year earlier, on July 12,2001, the Special Master submitted his Report No. 4, detailing
his activities for the period June 2,2001 through July 6, 2001. (R. 14302:1,9-12). As noted in
the trial court's Findings, virtuaDy all of the evidence relied upon to conclude that Mrs. Stewart
was continuing to violate the terms of the Interim Order was simply lifted from the pages of
Special Master Report No. 4, which was not subject to cross-examination, is hearsay and was
proffered by a party litigant cloaked as a subordinate judicial officer. (R.14302).9

8

Both Special Master Holman and the trial court recognized that he was appointed as
special master under Rule 53. (R. 1885, 2033).
9

Special Master Holman also frequently used his status as subordinate judicial officer
to obtain information on behalf of E. Excel and in compiling his Reports. A supplement to
Report No. 5 indicates that in a meeting with E. ExceFs lenders, "the Special Master identified
his role under Rule 53 and questioned counsel for Zions Bank in such capacity." (R. 14310:2).

As Special Master Holman evolved into a dominant party-litigant, he notified the trial
court in May 2001 that he had retained the law firm of Jones, Waldo, Holbrook & McDonough
(Jones Waldo) "to assist him." (R. 14298:2; 2033). Previously, only Mr. Hoog, who served as
Special Counsel to the Special Master, represented and "assisted" the Special Master. Of die first
125 documents filed by Jones Waldo, ninety-seven identify Jones Waldo as counsel for both the
Special Master and E. Excel. Jones Waldo entered an appearance for Special Master Holman
on April 26, 2001 (R. 750-51) and represented both Special Master Holman and E. Excel
throughout the very last of those hearings on June 26,2002. (R. 14269:2).
4.

Special Master as a Dominant Party Litigant

Special Counsel Hoog's role in the litigation essentially has been limited to "direcdy
supervising" Jones Waldo. (R. 8674). Concurrent with Hwan Lan Chen's Motion to Vacate,
Jones Waldo conspicuously stopped listing their representation of Special Master Holman in the
caption of the documents they filed with the trial court Despite this obvious attempt to create
distance between Mr. Holman the party-lit? gant and Mr. Holman the subordinate judicial officer,
Jones Waldo has not filed a notice of withdrawal of counsel pursuant to Rule 4-506 of the Utah
Code of Judicial Administration.
In late October 2001, Special Master Holman's evolution as a party-litigant reached
fruition when he caused E. Excel to file a Cross-Claim and Third-Party Complaint against Mrs.
Stewart and a host of Third-Party Defendants, including Mrs. Stewart's mother, husband (Taig
Stewart), sister and sister-in-law. (R. 4171-4214). In conjunction with his Cross-Claim and
Third-Party Complaint, Special Master Holman filed a Motion for Temporary Restraining Order
and Preliminary Injunction seeking to enjoin Mrs. Stewart and the Third-Party Defendants from
competing with E. Excel. {R. 4167-70). Jones Waldo, as attorneys for both E. Excel and Special
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Master Holman, filed both the Complaint and Motion. (R. 4170, 4214).
Paragraph 3 of the Cross-Claim and Third-Party Complaint shows the level of Special
Master Holman's involvement as a party-litigant
After commencing an investigation of [E. Excel's] finances and operations,
Special Master Holman has determined that E. Excel should initiate litigation
against the cross-defendant Jau Hwa Stewart and the third party defendants* in
order to preserve the assets of E. Excel, to protect E. Excel from tortious and ongoing harm, and to render E. Excel a viable business going forward.
(R. 4205). As evidenced by this paragraph, the unthinkable occurred: a subordinate judicial
officer, appointed under Rule 53 and described by his own counsel as a "judge and the judge's
representative," sued Mrs. Stewart and most of her family.10
Acting as a party-litigant, Special Master Holman proceeded to obtain a Preliminary
Injunction against Mrs. Stewart and the Third-Party Defendants, enjoining them from
competing in any fashion with E. Excel. Hearings on Special Master Holman's Motion for
Preliminary Injunction were combined with Mrs. Chen's Motions brought to hold Mrs. Stewart
in Criminal and Civil Contempt of Court. (R. 14243:64). Despite his status as a subordinate
judicial officer, Special Master Holman testified as a witness in the combined proceedings in
support of the Motion for Preliminary Injunction. Although he testified as a party-litigant,
Special Master Holman still argued, in response to a Notice of Deposition filed by Mrs. Stewart
(R. 2701), that "p]t would be entirely inappropriate to allow [Mrs.] Stewart . . . to question
Special Master Holman regarding his mental processes in making his recommendations/' (R.
2721). Jones Waldo represented Special Master Holman at his deposition, and his counsel
10

Since at least September of 2002, Special Master Holman has been identifying himself
to the world on E. ExcePs website as the trial court's "independent Special Master" who
allegedly was appointed "as a result of the wrongful conduct of Mrs. Jau Hwa Stewart" (R.
11380).
9A

instructed him not to answer the question on the grounds that the question "invades the
province of his role as the special master." (R. 14281:40-41).
Similarly, on May 31, 2002 during the combined hearings, counsel for Special Master
Holman objected to questions aimed at comparing his actions as Interim CEO with Mrs.
Stewart's actions during her reign as president of the corporation. Counsel for Special Master
Holman argued that the questions were irrelevant and stated the following:
If Mr. Holman is asked, I believe he would testify that the basis for his powers
came from the Court's order empowering him as the special master. That's what
is unique about him and why you can't compare what he did with respect to what
Ms. Stewart did.
(R. 14267:17). The trial court sustained the objection, therefore recognizing Special Master
Holman's status as a Rule 53 Special Master and affording him an elevated status as a partylitigant (R 14267:17).
If Mrs. Stewart and Special Master Holman engaged in the same activity for the same
reasons, such as securing E. Excel's distribution network, her actions were despicable and his
were irrelevant. {Cf. R. 14267:17 with R. 5467-68). As a subordinate judicial officer, Special
Master Holman's actions were not subject to the same scrutiny visited upon Mrs. Stewart, and
she was even deprived of the opportunity to explain her actions in relation to his conduct in the
same position under the same circumstances. In the same hearing, Special Master Holman also
recognized that he had "additional powers as special master that would not typically be vested
in the CEO of the company." (R. 14289:16).

The trial court heavily relied upon Special

Master Holman and his counsel in granting the Preliminary Injunction. (K. 9136-914S).11 The

11

The trial court also granted Special Master Holman's Motion for Sanctions in which
he claimed that Mrs. Stewart had engaged in 'litigation misconduct" that undermined his ability
to prosecute his claims against her and the Third-Party Defendants. (R. 5828). In granting
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Court's Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law and Order represent a virtual wholesale adoption
of the findings and conclusions filed by Special Master Holman and his litigation team. Ten
findings of fact are based solely upon the testimony of Special Master Holman, which typically
was cited as determinative evidence. The Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law and Ruling
expressly incorporated all of the Findings and Conclusions entered in the related contempt
proceedings. Eight of the Findings of Fact in the Contempt Ruling are based upon the Special
Master's Reports and the June 1, 2001 Order approving the Master Setdement Agreement
In September 2002, Special Master Holman moved to have the August 20, 2002
Contempt Ruling against Mrs. Stewart extended to apply to all of the Third-Party Defendants.
(R. 8943, 9016). Special Master Holman's Motion sought to hold all of the Third-Party
Defendants in contempt and to have their pleadings stricken based upon a theory of coconspirator liability. Similarly, Special Master Holman filed another Motion for Order to Show
Cause Why Hwan Lan Chen and Jau Hwa Stewart Should Not be Held in Contempt, claiming
that Mrs. Stewart and her mother had violated the newly-entered Preliminary Injunction. {R.
14329-14330). The Motion was largely based upon a secret sworn statement (a deposition
without notice to any other party) that is rife with hearsay and absurd testimony.12 (R. 14330J).

Special Master Holman's Motion for Sanctions, the trial court struck Mrs. Stewart's pleadings
(presumably for the second time) and granted Special Master Holman and E. Excel attorneys'
fees and costs in excess of $900,000. <R. 8167).
12

The partisan Special Master arranged and conducted the secret sworn statement for
Mrs. Chen without notice to Mrs. Stewart or Hwan Lan Chen and with no attempt to establish
or explore the foundation of the witness's incredible story. The witness testified that in
September 2002, he flew from Taiwan to San Francisco (a 12-hourflight),was driven from San
Francisco to Salt Lake City (a 12-hour drive) by a women who he only knew as "Grace" (rather
thanflydirecdy to Salt Lake City), stayed in a Salt Lake City hotel he could not describe or recall,
met with Hwan Lan Chen and an unknown Asian women at Hwan Lan Chen's house in Orem
(despite staying in Salt Lake City after allegedly having been driven from San Francisco), and was
99

Special Master Holman, a subordinate judicial officer, made no effort to cross-examine the
witness or establish the veracity of his testimony.
From April 2002 through August 2002, Special Master Holman worked closely with Mrs.
Chen to orchestrate a £ree2e-out merger to eliminate Mrs. Stewart's 25% share of E. Excel. (R.
14320:Ex.l; 14324). At the conclusion of the merger, despite the fact that E. Excel had revenue
in excess of $20 million in 2000, Special Master Holman offered Mrs. Stewart a mere $75,000
for her 25% share.13 (R. 14320:Ex.l Agreement 2(b)(ii)). Special Master Holman's valuation of
the company placed its value at $300,000: the equivalent of his salary for one year. Special
Master Holman personally presented the merger proposal to the Board of Directors, which was
comprised only of Mrs. Chen and Mr. Zhang at the time, issued the statutory notice to
shareholders and signed the merger agreement for E. Excel and the acquiring company.
(R. 7954, 7957,14270,14320).
The merger dissolved the corporation the trial court appointed the Special Master to
direct. Special Master Holman, however, still acts as CEO of the new E. Excel and shows no
signs of ever stepping down regardless of his one-time "interim" moniker. Prior to the freeze-

given $25,000 and subsequently $2 million in 'TJtah dollars" by an anonymous woman he
believed was acting for Hwan Lan Chen to arrange a media xampaign in Taiwan at the request
of Mrs. Stewart and Hwan Lan Chen.
After briefing was completed on the Motion for Contempt regarding the media
campaign, E. Excel never pursued obtaining a hearing on the Motion or otherwise pursued the
Motion in any fashion. Most notably, E. Excel has not approached the trial court since the entry
of the stay to request that the Motion be heard. As such, E. Excel has not even attempted to
exhaust its remedies at the trial court level before seeking relief from this Court. (R. 14330:J).
13

Mrs. Stewart exercised her statutory dissenter's rights and Special Master Holman
initiated an action to value the shares. Regardless, Mrs. Chen attached whatever interest Mrs.
Stewart will eventually obtain pursuant to the Court's Contempt Ruling.
23

out merger, the only obstacle preventing Special Master Holman from forcing Mrs. Stewart out
of the corporation was a prohibition against shareholder's meetings in the February 21, 2001
Interim Order. To remove this obstacle, Mrs. Chen moved to amend the Interim Order and on
June 26,2002, again recognized that Special Master Holman served a dual role as judicial officer
and party-litigant
[Mrs. Chen's Counsel:] The {February 21, 2001] interim order
provided for a process to take place to investigate and to locate
someone to be in charge of the corporation pending the resolution
the dispute. As a result of that, of course, Mr. Holman was
appointed to serve as the chief executive officer as well as
appointed as special master for the Court and has functioned
in those dual capacities since, I believe, approximately March
13 of 2001.
(R. 14276:124)(emphasis added). The trial court amended the Interim Order to allow for
shareholder meetings, and within a few months, Mrs. Stewart's ownership interest evaporated
in the vapor of the squeeze-out merger. (R. 7950-54).
C.

Conflict Created by Appointing Special Master H o l m a n as Brisbane. Ltd.'s
Receiver

On November 1,2001, Mr. Holman also was appointed as the receiver of Brisbane, Ltd.
("Brisbane") and vested with the authority to compromise the outstanding claims and interests
between Brisbane and E. Excel which are atissue in separate litigation. {R.14265:190). Brisbane
and E. Excel share common ownership, but with different percentages of ownership. The two
entities also share a history of legal and financial transactions regarding Brisbane's ownership of
E. ExcePs business premises and various other investment ventures. (R. 14265:199; 14297:8).
Brisbane, Ltd., is a limited partnership, with Mrs. Stewart as general partner.
(R.14265:199). It was intended to and did hold the real estate for the E. Excel business,
consisting of an office building and two large warehouses valued at $5 million. (R.14265:198).

E. Excel filed a lawsuit against Brisbane and Jau Hwa Stewart, as its general partner.
(R.14265:198). As a result of the Brisbane settlement, E. Excel released Brisbane in exchange
for all of the real estate Brisbane held and the payment of $50,000 to Brisbane. (R.14265:190).
The rent expenses for E. Excel dropped from $1.7 million in 2000, to $162,000 in 2001. (R
14265:190-91). Holman believes that E. Excel is better off owning the buildings rather than
renting them. (R. 14265:193).
Despite their shared ownership, the existence of litigation between the two entities is
evidence of E. Excel's and Brisbane's adverse interests. Among the conflicts between Brisbane
and E. Excel is a dispute over E. Excel's unpaid rent to Brisbane (R. 14265:190-91), a dispute
over funds transferred by E. Excel to Soldier Summit Recreation and Development Company,
L.L.C., in exchange for a promissory note issued to Brisbane, and a dispute regarding the
obligation to satisfy C&A Construction Company's mechanic's lien on E. Excel's business
premises. (R.14265:8-9,14; 14298:4). Therefore, by serving as Special Master and Receiver of
Brisbane, Mr. Holman created a conflict that prohibits him from acting impartially with regard
to the two entities.
D.

The Unresolved Motion to Disqualify Larry Holman as Special Master and
Interim CEO of E. Excel

On January 23,2002, Jau Hwa Stewart filed Stewart's Motion to Disqualify Larry Holman
as Special Master and Interim CEO of E. Excel. (R. 5176-78) At a hearing held on April 17,
2002, Judge Howard stated:
THE COURT: As to the motion to disqualify Mr. Holman, the Court is
going to defer that. I'm persuaded - even though the pleadings may not state
succinct factual dispute, I've heard enough in this case to know where the quarrel
is. And I think that these allegations and claims are large and serious and
are subject to an evidentiary hearing. Therefore. I'll defer the matter for
evidentiary hearing. But our plate is full right now, and I can't
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accommodate that just yet.
In that sense, Mr. Larsen, it's deferred, I know that's troubling, but I
don't have much more that I can say other than I would expect to hear
evidence on these matters because I think they're serious and large and
they're disputed, and there may be explanations or examination that's necessary.
We'll accommodate scheduling for such a matter after you give the Court
better indication of what your discovery is, if you're going to conduct discovery
on these questions, when you've completed it and when you're prepared to
schedule i t
Anything further today? I think that's all we have.
(R. 14258;63-64). Stewart's Motion to Disqualify Larry Holman as Special Master and Interim
CEO of E. Excel remained unresolved when the trial court entered its Findings of Fact and
Conclusions of Law.
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
By appointing Special Master Holman as Interim CEO, the trial court created an inherent
conflict Doing so put Special Master Holman under control of both the trial court and E.
Excel's Board of Directors. By allowing a judicial officer to become aligned with E. Excel and
Mrs. Chen, the adversarial process completely broke down. Under E. Excel's control, Special
Master Holman sought, and the trial court allowed, him to become an active party litigant and
to bring claims against Mrs. Stewart and her family. After becoming a party to the action,
Special Master Holman dominated the litigation. When Mrs. Stewart moved to disqualify Mr.
Holman, the trial court deferred any action on that Motion.
The impact of the improper authority the trial court granted to Special Master Holman
is clear and pervasive. After becoming a party litigant, Special Master Holman began steamrolling through the litigation, and the trial court granted every single significant motion its
subordinate judicial officer brought and also adopted his proposed Findings of Fact and

Conclusions of Law virtually verbatim. After the trial court turned Special Master Holman loose
on the litigation, Mrs. Stewart found herself in default, with her pleadings stricken twice and her
complaint dismissed, in both civil and criminal contempt of court and subject to a worldwide,
temporally unlimited, preliminary injunction. A subordinate judicial officer, whose proper role
is one of neutrality, orchestrated all of this.
Because the appointment of Special Master Holman to be E. Excel's Interim CEO
destroyed the adversarial process, the appointment must be vacated, and the trial court's orders
resulting from Special Master Holman's improper actions must be set aside.
Mrs. Stewart did not, and in any event could not, stipulate to the grant of non-judicial
powers to Special Master Holman, or to his joining the litigation as an active party litigant Mrs.
Stewart did consent to allow ex parte communications, but never stipulated to having claims
brought against her virtuaUy by the trial court itself.
After resigning as a corporate officer and director, Mrs. Stewart shed any obligation she
had not to compete with E. Excel. Competition from a former corporate officer is not
irreparable harm that justifies a preliminary injunction. Even if a preliminary injunction is
warranted, it is far more broad then is necessary to protect Excel International's interests.
Instead, it is unlimited in scope temporally, geographically and purports to bar Mrs. Stewart from
participating in an entire segment of industry.
tailored to prevent irreparable harm.
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A preliminary injunction should be narrowly

ARGUMENT

POINT I
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN CONFERRING NONJUDICIAL POWERS UPON SPECIAL MASTER
HOLMANTHAT INHERENTLY CONFLICTED WITH HIS
ROLE AS A SPECIAL MASTER AND ULTIMATELY
CULMINATED IN A JUDICIAL OFFICER BECOMING A
PARTY LITIGANT
A,

By Conferring Non-Judicial Powers upon Special Master Holman, The
Trial Court Violated Rule 53

By empowering Special Master Holman with non-judicial powers, the trial court exceeded
the limits of power that a court may properly confer upon a special master under U.R.C.P. 53.14
In doing so, the trial court created an inherent conflict, concluding with Special Master Holman
acting simultaneously as both a neutral judicial officer and 2x1 admitted "partisan" litigant
The rules governing the appointment, empowerment and obligations of a Rule 53 special
master are longstanding and uncontradicted. Specifically, the Rules of Judicial Conduct bind a
special master as a subordinate judicial officer who may be given only limited powers no greater
than the powers of a trial court.15 The United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit
described the limited nature of a special master's power as follows:
[t]he master operates as an arm of the court. Surely he has no
wider scope of activity than the court itself. If the court is
limited in its judicial duties to deciding the issues presented
14

In Plumb v. State, 809 P.2d 743 (Utah 1990), this Court recognized that Fed. R. Civ. P.
53 is "nearly identical" to U.R.C.P. 53 and held that Utah courts may "look freely" to federal
case law in applying U.R.C.P. 53. Plumb, 809 P.2d at 740 n.9.
15

Plumb v. State, 809 P.2d 734,742-43 (Utah 1990) ("[A] special master has cthe duties
and obligations of a judicial officer/" (quoting In re Gilbert, 276 U.S. 6, 9 (1928) (emphasis
added)); see also Deland v. CM.K & Co., 824 A.2d 185,186-87 tN.J. Super. Ct App. Div. 2003)
("[S]pecial master is subject to substantially the same conflict of interest rules as a judge.").

in the litigation before it, the master's function can go no
further than to aid the court's discharge of its duties.
Webster Eisenlohrv. Kaladner, 145 F.2d 316, 319 (3 rd Or. 1944) {emphasis added).
The use of a special master originates from common law rules of equity which
authorized the use of masters in courts of chancery.16 Historically, courts have used masters for
the purpose of aiding the "chancellor" in "ministerial functions such as: recording testimony,
disposing of property..., presiding over evidentiary hearings, tabulating damages, and auditing
accounts/' Id. Utah courts have used special masters since the nineteenth century in territorial
courts. See Nephilrr. Co. v. Jenkins, 8 Utah 369,31 P. 986, 987 (1893) ("If the court is in doubt
concerning the facts, it may direct a feigned issue, or an action at law, or a reference to a master,
to aid it in determining the same.'" (citation omitted)). Since then, however, there has been no
case allowing the appointment of a special master as a party litigant.
'The use of [a special] master... is 'to aid judges in the performance of specific judicial
duties, as they may arise in the progress of a cause,' and not to displace the court." ha Buy v.
Howes Leather Co., 352 U.S. 249,256 (1956) (quoting Ex Parte Peterson, 253 U.S. 300,312 (1920)).
Further, as a subordinate judicial officer, a special master only may exercise his powers under
the direction, supervision and approval of the appointing judge.17
Consistent with this subordinate role, a special master is bound by the same duties and

16

See De Clements v. De Clements, 662 So.2d 1276, 1279 (Fla. Ct. App. 1995) {analyzing
Rule 53 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure as relating to Florida's special master rule).
17

See Utah R. Civ. P. 53(a), (b); Plumb, 809 P.2d at 742-743; see also Utah R. Prof. Cond.
1.12, cmt ('The term 'adjudicative officer'includes such officials as judges pro tempore, referees,
special masters, hearing officers and other parajudicial officers . . . . " ) . The appointment and
activities of a special master "are only for the purpose of assisting the court to get at the facts
and arrive at a correct result in a complicated piece of litigation pending before the court"
WebsterEisenlohr, 145 F.2d at 319; see also Nephilrr. Co., 31 P. at 987.
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obligations applicable to the presiding judge.18 Thus, by accepting the trial courts' appointment,
Special Master Holman became bound to the same duties and obligations as the trial court under
the Code of Judicial Conduct
In clear violation of the rules limiting the power that a trial court may grant to a special
master, however, the trial court also permitted Special Master Holman to exercise non-judicial
powers in the course of ongoing litigation. Specifically, the Order entered March 13, 2001,
appointed Mr. Holman as Special Master and CEO of E. Excel. (R. 702-04). To further his
role as judicial officer and Interim CEO, the trial court also entered an Order on May 11,2001,
allowing Special Master Holman to exercise his "complete executive authority" regarding the
business of E. Excel without the necessity of the trial court's control or review. (R. 762). By
virtue of the March 13, 2001 and May 11, 2001 Orders (Combined Orders), Special Master
Holman's activities in exercising "executive authority" as interim CEO over E. Excel was
controlled by the Board of Directors of E. Excel which, by mid-June 2001, was comprised solely
of party litigants Mrs. Chen and Mr. Zhang.
A corporation is a product of, and may only act through, those persons who exercise its
authority.19 As a result of the Combined Orders, Special Master Holman unlawfully was vested
with non-judicial powers to determine and represent the interests of E. Excel and conduct its
business. Only Mrs. Chen and Mr. Zhang, as directors of E. Excel, with whom he clearly was

18

Plumb, 809 P.2d at 742-43 {"'[A] special master has the 'duties and obligations of a
judicial officer/" (quoting In re Gilbert, 276 U.S. at 9)); see also 9 Moore's Federal Practice §
53.11 [5] [a] (3rd ed.) ("The Code of Judicial Conduct for the United States Judges is applicable
to special masters/7).
19

See Diversified Holdings, L.C v. Turner, 2002 UT 129,^36,63 P.3d 686 (recognmng that
"corporations ordinarily act only through their agents'7).

aligned, controlled Special Master Holman's non-judicial powers. Parties in opposition to Mrs.
Chen, Mr. Zhang and E. Excel, therefore, were at odds with the Special Master Holman,
representing both the court as a judicial officer and E. Excel, as Interim CEO.
The fundamental conflict the granting of non-judicial roles to Special Master Holman
created is apparent Under the direct control of Mrs. Chen and Mr. Zhang, this conflict
completely undermined the adversarial process and destroyed any possibility that Special Master
Holman would or could perform his role in a nonpartisan fashion.20 The trial court erred in
creating such a clear conflict of interest 21 As Interim CEO of E. Excel, and exercising the full
executive authority of that office, Special Master Holman was conferred with powers direcdy
contrary to the lawful judicial powers and neutral role of a judicial officer.

Id. He also

simultaneous donned a third conflicting role: Brisbane's Receiver.
Finally, despite Special Counsel Hoog's express acknowledgment that Special Master
Holman was bound to follow the Code of Judicial Conduct (R. 14236:71), Special Master
Holman violated numerous Canons of the Code ofJudicial Conduct Special Master Holman's
role under U.R.CP. 53 as CEO of E. Excel created an untenable conflict; namely, being both
an independent and impartial part of the judiciary while at the same time advocating for E. Excel
as its Interim CEO under direct and exclusive control of its Board of Directors. The appearance
of impropriety inherent in these actions alone represents a gross violation of the Utah Code of

20

See Webster Eisenlohr, 145 F.2d at 319 (determining that a special masters "activities are
only for the purpose of assisting the court to get at the facts and arrive at a correct result'5).
21

See U.S. v. O'Connor, 291 F.2d 520,526 (D. Cal. 1961) (determining that to appoint the
same person as receiver and as special master cr-eates a conflict because "{although in theory the
receiver may have no interest in whether any claims are established, in fact he certainly does:
such an interest, as well as his duties to the claimants and the taxpayer, disqualify him from
performing the judicial duties [as a special master]").
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Judicial Conduct, Canons 2.B ("A judge shall avoid impropriety and the appearance of
impropriety in all activities/5) and 3.B(1),(5), (7) and (8) ("A judge shall perform the duties of
the office impartially and diligently."). Moreover, the improper conflict the trial court created
did not stop with Special Master Holman merely taking on into these competing roles; it became
the dominant force driving the outcome of the litigation.
B.

The Trial Court Erred by Empowering and Permitting Special Master
Holman to Act as CEO of E . Excel and as a Party litigant.

Beyond the Rule 53 violations inherent in Special Master Holman's appointment, the trial
court also permitted Special Master Holman to participate as an active party litigant The trial
court's Order entered May 11, 2001 (May 11, 2001 Order) authorized the Special Master to
"direct and control, initiate, dismiss, settle, or otherwise determine [E. Excel's] interests in all
business relationships, assets, dispute or lawsuits" without further control of the trial court (R.
762). The May 11, 2001 Order effectively modified the Interim Order of February 21, 2001
(Interim Order), to allow Special Master Holman to exercise full executive authority as C E O of
E. Excel, and most improperly, to become an active litigant
Allowing Special Master Holman to act as a party-litigant is unprecedented, directly
violates the powers Rule 53 authomes and cannot comport with the neutral judicial role
required of a proper special master. The role of the judiciary is "'to hear and determine
controversies between adverse parties and questions in litigation/" Timpanogos Planning & Water
Mgmt. Agency v. Central Utah Water Conservancy Dist., 690 P.2d 532, 569 (Utah 1984) (quoting
Citizens Club v. Welling, 83 Utah 81,27 P.2d 23,26 (1933)). Because of Special Master Holman's
duties as a judicial officer, it was clearly inappropriate for the trial court to also appoint him "to

fulfill an adversary role."22
Just as no judge can retain counsel to act on his behalf in an action pending before him,
a special master cannot retain and be represented by counsel, much less rely upon the services
of counsel representing a party to the action/3 Shortly after his appointment as Special Master
and Interim CEO, Mr. Holman retained the services of Special Counsel Patrick Hoog and later
the law firm of Jones Waldo.
As the litigation progressed from May 11, 2001, through the completion of the
Preliminary Injunction proceedings, Special Master Holman and E. Excel eclipsed Mrs. Chen
as the dominant party-litigant Special Master Holman's determination that E. Excel should file
a Cross-Claim and Third-Party Complaint against Mrs. Stewart and a host of Third-Party
Defendants, including Mrs. Stewart's mother, husband, sister and sister-in-law, particularly
illustrates this point. (R. 4171-4214). In late October 2001, Jones Waldo as "Attorneys for the
Special Master Larry C. Holman and Defendant E. Excel," filed a Cross-Claim/Third-Party
Complaint seeking approximately $200 million in damages. (R. 4167-70). Paragraph 3 of the
Cross-Claim and Third-Party Complaint shows the extent of Special Master Holman's
participation as a party-litigant

22

See Plumb r. State, 809 P.2d 734, 743-44 (Utah 1990) (finding in complicated class
action that it is more appropriate to insist a party hire special counsel rather than insist a special
master fulfil both roles); see also Deland v. CM.K <& Co., 824 A.2d 185,186-87 (N.J. Super. Ct.
App. Div. 2003) (concluding that strict conflict of interest rules must apply to special master
because the "master's recommendations may be highly influential").
23

See, e.g., Loader v. AllStarMills, Inc., 309 S.E.2d 193,199-200 (N.C. 1983) (determining
that counsel for plaintiff could not also serve as counsel for a receiver). It cannot go without
mention that the trial court entered a Judgment against Mrs. Stewart awarding attorneys' fees for
Jones Waldo's as well as Special Counsel Hoog's work. This Judgment exceeded $900,000. (R.
8167).
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After commencing an investigation of [E. ExcePs] finances and operations,
Special Master Holman has determined that E . Excel should initiate
litigation against the cross-defendant Jau Hwa Stewart* and the third party
defendants, in order to preserve the assets of E. Excel, to protect E. Excel from
tortious and on-going harm, and to render E. Excel a viable business going
forward.
(R. 4205)(emphasis added). Because the role of a Special Master is one of a "judicial officer,"
see Plumb, 809 P. 2d at 724, paragraph 3 of the Cross-Claim essentially reads as follows:
After commencing and investigation of [E. ExcePs] finances and operations, [the
trial court] has determined that E. Excel should initiate litigation against
the cross-defendant Jau Hwa Stewart* and the third party defendants, in
order to preserve the assets of E. Excel, to protect E. Excel from tortious and ongoing harm, and to render E. Excel a viable business going forward.
Obviously, such determination of the trial court directly would be improper and contrary to any
understanding of an independent and neutral judiciary. Allowing Special Master Holman, as
a subordinate judicial officer, to do the same is no less objectionable.
As a party-litigant, Special Master Holman obtained both a Preliminary Injunction against
Mrs. Stewart and the Third-Party Defendants, as well as an order of default against Mrs. Stewart
as a sanction for 'litigation abuses." (R. 8110-13). This is further evidence of the impropriety
of Special Master Holman's conflicting appointments. By virtue of his default order, Special
Master Holman moved for, and obtained, an award of attorneys' fees in excess of $900,000. (R.
8167). Special Master Holman premised his award of attorneys' fees on the theory that E. Excel
had "prevailed" on its cause of action against Mrs. Stewart and the Third-Party Defendants
brought under Utah's Pattern Of Unlawful Activity Act. See Utah Code Ann. § 76-10-1601
through 1609.
Because the trial court's representative as an adverse party-litigant brought the Motion
for Preliminary Injunction and Motion for Sanctions Against Mrs. Stewart, it is impossible to

1A

believe that the trial court could impartially assess the veracity of the allegations, claims, and
testimony of Special Master Holman. The trial court placed itself in the intractable position of
assessing the credibility of private parties against that of the trial court's subordinate judicial
officer who was appointed by the very same judge acting as fact-finder. The Motions Special
Master Holman brought, exercising full executive authority of E. Excel, bore the imprimatur of
the trial court and were not considered in the same adversarial setting as those a private litigant
brought Further, Special Master Holman's obvious alignment with Mrs. Chen and Mr. Zhang
served to canonize the veracity of both their claims and testimony. All evidence of Mrs. Chen's
and Mr. Zhang's successful scheme to divert at least $75 million from E. Excel

(R.

14342:Ex.280), never saw the light of day.
Judges, and by extension special masters, do not have the power to decide the claims,
interests and rights of parties or persons-in-interest absent a pleaded case and controversy before
the court in which they preside.24 More specifically, special masters have no lawful power to
determine conflicting claims and interests by negotiating and entering settlement agreements,
much less pursue claims and interests that are outside the scope of the pleadings before the court
in which they are appointed.25 Id The Master Settlement Agreement is an example of such a

24

SeeTimpanogosPlanning&WaterMgmt Agency v. CentralUtab WaterConservancy Dist, 690
P.2d 532, 569 (Utah 1984) (stating role of judiciary is '"to hear and determine controversies
between adverse parries and questions in litigation'" (citations omitted)).
25

Other courts have limited the special master to purely advisory roles. Cf La Buy v.
Howes Leather Co., 352 U.S. 249 (1957) ("The use of masters is 'to aid' judges in the performance
of specific judicial duties . . . ."); Webster Eisenkhr, 145 F.2d at 319 ("[The] Special Master's
appointment and activities are only for the purpose of assisting the court to get at the facts and
arrive at a correct result in a complicated piece of litigation pending before this court.");
DeClementsv. DeCkments, 662So.2d 1276,1280 (Fla. Dist C t App. 1995) (statingvalue of masters
is in the "aiding, and making more efficient, the judicial process"); Lklandv. CM.K &Co.y 824
A.2d 185, 189 (NJ. Super. Ct. App. Div. 2003) (limiting the special masters powers to
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prohibited transaction.
As a graphic illustration of the breakdown of the adversarial process resulting from
Special Master Holman's conflicting appointments, the trial court fully granted every sanction
and plea for injunctive relief sought by the Special Master regardless of how broad or
overreaching. At the end of the Preliminary Injunction proceedings, the trial court adopted over
100 pages of Special Master Holman/E. ExcePs proposed Findings of Fact and Conclusions of
Law. (R. 14317). The trial court adopted these Findings and Conclusions with virtually no edits
or limitations. In contrast, the Findings and Conclusions do not include even one of the
Findings or Conclusions Mrs. Stewart submitted. The ultimate Preliminary Injunction Order
the trial court entered purports to enjoin Mrs. Stewart, and others, from all competition with E.
Excel, and the entire herbal remedy industry worldwide, for an undetermined period of time.
(R. 8110-13).
Special Master Holman's impact, however, was not limited to controlling the outcome
of litigation. By virtue of the Master Settlement Agreement, Special Master Holman released
Mrs. Chen, Mr. Zhang and the Territorial Owners of all claims brought by E. Excel, settled all
pending litigation in which E. Excel was a party, including the Hong Kong, and completely
restructured E. Excel, essentially turning over 90% of its international business to Mrs. Chen,
Mr. Zhang and the historic Territorial Owners.
In the last days of extensive Preliminary Injunction hearings, Special Master Holman
begrudgingly acknowledged that the Master Settlement Agreement had a "devastating impact"
in E. Excel as the transfer of manufacturing rights to Mrs. Chen and the Territorial Owner's

"rendering opinions, proposing findings, issuing recommendations, and assisting the court in
other similar ways as it may direct").

"substantially jeopardized" E. Excel. (R. 14270:27114324:3). Despite the admitted impact to
E. Excel, the trial court adopted the Master Settlement Agreement Special Master Holman
proposed and afforded him the deferential "business judgment" standard in negotiating and
presenting the Agreement to the Court (R. 14240:34). By way of the Agreement, "Special
Master Holman unlawfully determined the rights and claims of E. Excel Shareholders without
the benefit of trial and without regard to whether the individuals effected were party to the trial
court action in which he was appointed.
From June 1,2001 through October 4,2001, the trial court adopted five Special Master
Reports submitted by Special Master Holman.

(R. 14297; 14298; 14300; 14302; 14310).

Counsel for the Special Master later characterized the Special Master Reports as "clearly
partisan." (R. 14287:117:125). A special master generally is required to report to the court his
findings and recommendations based upon properly hearings and the compilation of evidence
taken from the parties. Utah R. Civ. P. 53(e)(1); Plumb, 809 P.2d at 741-42. Special masters are
not authorized to submit "partisan" reports and the Code ofJudicial Conduct requires them to
act in an unbiased manner. The "partisan" nature of the Special Master Reports is apparent
Special Master Report N o . 1 (Appointment to April 10,2001): Concludes with Special
Master Holman asking for numerous Orders to allow him to act with complete discretion
without Court supervision.
Special Master Report N o . 2 (April 10 through May 10, 2001): The tone begins to
deteriorate, and Special Master Holman requests control over E. ExcePs litigation:
It is asked that the Court enter its Order clarifying the Special Master's
understanding that he has full executive authority, subject to oversight by the
board of directors, which enables the Special Master to direct and control all
Company litigation. (R. 14298 P.2)(emphasis added).

Special Master Report N o . 3 (May 10, 2001 through May 25, 2001):

Shows the

evolution of Special Master Holman's role from the Interim Order (R. 14300 P.2) to the May
11,2001 Order:
[Special Master Holman] is granted and has full executive authority to direct and
control, initiate, dismiss, setde or otherwise determine the Company's interests
in all... disputes or lawsuits, subject to the approval of the Board of Directors,...
all without further order of this court.
Id.

Although the report opens by describing the status of E. ExcePs operations, e.g.,

construction projects, cash flow and the Zions line of Credit, it then spends eight pages
discussing the litigation, the Shannon River shipment and the lack of documents returned to E.
Excel that Special Master Holman believed to be in Mrs. Stewart's possession. The report also
makes an extensive argument for adopting the Master Settlement Agreement
Special Master Report N o . 4 (June 2, 2001 through July 6, 2001): Dedicates only a
paragraph each to discuss international operations, North American sales, plant operations and
inventory and only one and a half pages to the financial status of the company relating to the
Zion's Bank line of credit The rest of the report vilifies Mrs. Stewart, including a detailed list
of documents occupying seven pages Mr. Holman claims Mrs. Stewart removed from E. Excel.
Special Master Report No.5 (July 7, 2001 through August 7, 2001): From the first
sentence of the Introduction, "The theme of Report No. 5 is that the hoped for cooperation of
Mrs. Stewart has not been to any degree forthcoming," Report No. 5 takes up 24 pages of
argument and discussion of the misdeeds of Mrs. Stewart (R. 14309 P.l) Special Master Holman
also reveals his alignment ' T h e special master is the one charged with protecting the interests
of the [E. Excel]" (R. 14309 P.2)
There is no indication that Mr. Holman investigated Mr. Zhang's and Mrs. Chen's

misconduct regarding materially misstated inventory numbers, their competition with E. Excel
via the establishment of "contract manufacturers," or their long history of diverting funds from
E. Excel for the benefit of E. Excel, Ltd. Instead, Mr. Holman directed his efforts solely
toward an exhaustive investigation of the brief period in which Mrs. Stewart served as President
of E. Excel, taking action only against Mrs. Stewart and host of Third-Party Defendants. Mr.
Holman's myopic approach to his role as Special Master is clearly the product of bias and should
not be condoned by this Court
As a final unlawful and partisan act, Special Master Holman orchestrated a squeeze-out
merger of Mrs. Stewart's 25% interest in E. Excel. (R. 14320:Ex.l; 14324). The squeeze-out
merger was completed within months of the completion of the Preliminary Injunction hearings.
Reports commissioned by Special Master Holman placed die value of Mrs. Stewart's share in the
corporation at $75,000 and the overall value of the company at $300,000—the equivalent of
Special Master Holman's salary for one year. In exchange for a mere $75,000, which Mrs. Chen
has attached with a Writ of Garnishment, Mrs. Stewart was forced out of a corporation that she
had been instrumental in creating since its inception in the early 90's.

POINT II
MR. HOLMAN DID NOT ACT IMPARTIALLY WITH
REGARD TO THE ALL OF THE PARTIES INVOLVED IN
THIS MATTER
A,

Mr. Holman Served as Both Special Master of E. Excel and as Receiver of
Brisbane

Given that Mr. Holman served as both Special Master of E. Excel and as Receiver of
Brisbane, his ability to act impartially is extremely questionable. Despite sharing common
ownership, Brisbane and E. Excel have many interests that are adverse. These adverse interests

have given rise to separate litigation between the two entities and include disputes over unpaid
rent and the obligation to satisfy a mechanic's lien against the property where E. Excel conducts
business. Mr. Holman compromised the disputes between E. Excel and Brisbane, while serving
as Special Master and Interim C E O of E. Excel and as Receiver of Brisbane. Mr. Holman
demonstrated the inherent conflicts presented by this dual-appointment by proposing a
settlement between the two entities that fails to take into consideration the interests of Brisbane's
partners. Mr. Holman also expressed no interest in pursuing any further claims by E. Excel
against Brisbane outside of those presented in his proposed settlement This conflict of interest
clearly draws Mr. Holman's impartiality into question and should have resulted in his
disqualification as both Special Master and CEO of E. Excel and as Receiver of Brisbane.
B.

Mr. Holman Drove the Crusade Against Jau Hwa Stewart

Beyond the inherent conflict of interest presented by Mr. Holman's involvement with
both Brisbane and E. Excel, Mr. Holman's conduct demonstrated that he did not act impartially
with regard to all of the parties involved in this matter. Upon his appointment as Special Master
and Interim CEO of E. Excel, Mr. Holman embarked on a single-minded mission to vilify Mrs.
Stewart, using her as a scapegoat for all of the problems facing the corporation. All of the
Special Master's Reports filed by Mr. Holman are focused solely on Mrs. Stewart's alleged
misconduct with regard to E. Excel and do not include any investigation of the misconduct of
Mr. Zhang, Mrs. Chen or any of the agents working on their behalf.
C.

Mr. Holman Violated the Terms of the Interim Order by Failing to Act in
the Best Interests of E . Excel and its Shareholders

The Interim Order grants Mr. Holman the authority to act on behalf of E. Excel, conduct
business on its behalf and issue financial reports and reports pertaining to E. Excel's operations.

Implicit in this grant of authority is the requirement that Mr. Holman act in the best interests of
E. Excel and its shareholders. This implicit requirement is consistent with the fiduciary
relationship that exists between the board of directors and the management of a corporation on
one hand and stockholders on the other. See Hansen v. Granite Holding Co., 218 P.2d 274 (Utah
1950). Officers and directors of a corporation accept the fiduciary responsibility to serve the
interests of its shareholders which they must discharge with fidelity and which they should not
desert for their own gain. See Cox v. Berry, 431 P.2d 575 (Utah 1967).
Mr. Holman failed to act in the best interests of E. Excel and its shareholders, violating
the terms of the Interim Order and his fiduciary duties. Through the Master Settlement
Agreement, Mr. Holman forgave any debt owed to E. Excel by E. Excel, Ltd., without any
knowledge of the amount of the debt owed or the nature of E. Excel, Ltd./s obligation to E.
Excel. Mr. Holman also ratified the relationship between E. Excel and certain "contract
manufacturers" without investigating the ownership structures of the manufacturers, the
procedures they use to manufacture E. Excel products or, in some instances, even the location
of their manufacturing facilities. Mr. Holman's failure to conduct any investigation prior to
settling with E. Excel, Ltd., and the contract manufacturers direcdy violates his fiduciary
responsibilities to E. Excel and its shareholders as well as the responsibilities inherent in the
Interim Order.
Finally, as Special Master and Interim CEO of E. Excel, Mr. Holman submitted
materially misstated financial reports to this Court and to lending institutions associated with E.
Excel. Mr. Holman also signed E. Excel's federal income tax return for the year 2000, which
also materially misstated E. Excel's inventory. Mr. Holman is aware of the fact that E. ExcePs
inventory is understated by approximately $20 million, imposing on him the duty to correct and

disclose the problem in the interest of the corporation and its shareholders. Despite this duty,
Mr. Holman signed E. ExcePs 2000 federal tax return and submittedfinancialreports to Zion's
Bank without disclosing the extent of the corporation's misstatement
D.

The Trial Court Deferred Ruling on Stewart's Motion to Disqualify
Partisan Special Master Holman

On July 23,2002, the trial court's deferred ruling on Stewart's Motion to Disqualify Larry
Holman as Special Master and Interim CEO of E. Excel. Even when deferring ruling, the trial
court recognition that "these allegations and claims are large and serious and are subject to an
evidentiary hearing." (R. 14258;63-64). Special Master Holman's "large and serious"
conflicts of interest should have been resolved prior to relying extensively upon his
Special Master Reports and testimony in forming the basis for rulings against Mrs.
Stewart,
E.

The Trial Court Deferred Ruling on Stewart's Motion to Disqualify
Partisan Special Master Holman, and Then a Month Later, Based on His
Independent Judgment, Dismissed Mrs. Stewart's $18 million* Claims in
Her Second Amended Complaint

On July 23,2002, the trial court's deferred ruling on Stewart's Motion to Disqualify Larry
Holman as Special Master and Interim CEO of E. Excel, despite the 'large and serious" issue
the Motion raised. A litde over a month later, the trial court granted Mrs. Chen a Motion to
Dismiss Plaintiffs Second Amended Complaint (R. 14850) The trial court's dismissed Mrs.
Stewart's Second Amended Complaint containing her $18 million+ claim against Mrs. Chen and
Mr. Zhang, among others, ruling that Special Master Holman was a "court appointed
representative" and that he was
independent because of his appointment by the Court and the Court's
supervision over E. ExcePs business affairs. The Court also concludes that
Mr. Holman as an independent decision maker determined what was in

the best interest of E . Excel. This Court's approval and adoption of the
Master's Settlement Agreement that dismissed the Hong Kong lawsuit brought
by Plaintiff signified the Court's approval of that decision being in the best
interest of the company. Mr. Holman determined that lengthy and costly
litigation was not in the best interest of E. Excel. As such, Mr. Holman
determined to settle the litigation and dismiss Plaintiffs derivative actions relating
to the Company's alleged transfer of funds to E. Excel limited. Therefore, the
Court determines that the Special Master's decision was in the best interest of the
Company
Id. at 4 (emphasis added). This derivative action was dismissed solely because the trial court
considered Mr. Holman to be an independent party who was in a position to determine E.
Excel's best interest, i.ey not to pursue the litigation. The Court found that this decision was
within the Partisan Special Master's business judgment" Id. at 5. Finding Mr. Holman to be
independendy exercising his business judgment, and using that as a basis to clismiss the
derivative action against Mrs. Chen, was tantamount to having Mrs. Chen rule on her own
Motion.

POINT III
MRS. STEWART DID NOT STIPULATE TO SPECIAL
MASTER HOLMAN's APPOINTMENT TO INTERIM CEO
OR TO ALLOW SPECIAL MASTER HOLMAN TO
PARTICIPATE AS AN ACTIVE PARTY LITIGANT
Mrs. Stewart did not, and could not, stipulate to Special Master Holman's appointment
as interim CEO. The trial court's March 13,2001 and May 11,2001 Orders, appointing Special
Master Holman and empowering him to act as a party-litigant were not the product of a
stipulation. (R. 702-04, 762). The trial court's ruling appointing Mr. Holman as Special Master
was entered upon the suggestion of Mrs. Chen's counsel and was entered without the benefit
of notice, briefing or a finding of exigent circumstances warranting the appointment of a special
master.

At the hearing on March 26, 2001, Mrs. Chen and Mrs. Stewart stipulated to Special
Master Holman's ex parte communications, but Mrs. Stewart reserved the right to discontinue
those communications.

(R. 14236:74-75).

Mrs., Stewart's limited stipulation to ex parte

communications represents the only stipulation with regard to the appointment of Special
Master Holman. Mrs. Stewart did not stipulate to Special Master Holman's appointment as
Interim CEO and did not stipulate to the trial court's empowerment of Special Master Holman
to participate as a party-litigant
Even if Mrs. Stewart had stipulated to the Special Master Holman's appointment as
Interim CEO and ultimately as a party litigant, it is powerless to confer non-judicial powers upon
Special Master Holman under Rule 53. As such, the parties could not consent either to the
unlawful empowerment of Special Master Holman or to his subsequent exercise of those
unlawful, non-judicial powers.26 Just as parties may not consent to the appointment of a receiver
where the appointment is not authorized by law, parties may not consent to an unlawful
reference of power to a special master under Rule 53. See Wilver, 387 F.2d 66, 69 (10th Cir.
1967).
In WiJver, the Tenth Circuit stated:
We are unaware of any decisions which approve the appointment of a Master to
supervise the answers to interrogatories. Here the Master was given the power
to restate the questions and to recommend the answers. The fact that the
parties agreed to such anomalous procedure does not make it permissible

26

See Wilverv. Fisher, 387 F.2d 66, 69 (10th Cir. 1967) (stating even where parties agreed
to broaden powers of master does not make it permissible). Parties cannot consent to the
exercise of jurisdiction where none exists. SeeAJ. Mackay Co. v. OklandConst. Co., 817 P.2d 323,
325 (Utah 1991) (stating, "acquiescence of the parties is insufficient to confer jurisdiction on the
court, and a lack of jurisdiction can be raised by the court or either party at any time").

The order of the reference here borders on an abdication of the judicial
function and is not justified by the record.
Id. at 69 (emphasis added); see also Cademartori v. Marine Midland Trust Co., 18 F.R.D. 277,278-79
(S.D. N.Y. 1955) (determining parties cannot stipulate to the court being committed to the
decision of the master). In this case, Special Master Holman's actions go much further; as a
party litigant, Special Master Holman completely abdicated his judicial functions and became an
adversarial party. Thus, even if the parties stipulated to the trial court's appointment of Special
Master Holman as Interim CEO and to his exercise of non-judicial powers, the stipulation
would have no effect

POINT IV
THE TRIAL COURT'S "SPECIAL MASTER ORDERS,"
GRANTING SPECIAL MASTER HOLMAN WITH EXTRAJUDICIAL AUTHORITY TO PARTICIPATE IN THE
ACTION AS A PARTY-LITIGANT AND ORDERS
RESULTING FROM SPECIAL MASTER HOLMAN'S
EXERCISE OF EXTRA-JUDICIAL POWERS MUST BE
VACATED AND SET ASIDE
Because the court did not have the power to grant Special Master Holman with ultra vires,
non-judicial powers, which he then exercised, the Orders are void and they must be vacated.27
The Special Master Orders also must be vacated because they encouraged Special Master
Holman to act in violation of the Utah Code of Judicial Conduct because he was unable to act
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SeeAndrus v. Bla^ard, 23 Utah 233, 63 P. 888, 894 (1901) ("It is elementary that a
judgment or order of a court made without authority is void, and confers no rights on, and
affords no protection to, persons acting in pursuance thereof/'); see also Cru^v. Hauck, 515 F.2d
327,327 (5th Cir. 1975) (noting, "[a]n order without power is void"). See generally Plumb v. State,
809 P.2d 734, 742 (Utah 1990) (stating a special master has the "duties and obligations of a
judicial officer" (emphasis added){citations omitted)); Webster Eisenlobr v. Kaladner, 145 F.2d 316,
319 (3rd Cir. 1944) (noting that a special masters special duties can be no wider "than the scope
of activity of the court itself).

as the role of a subordinate judicial officer without the appearance of impropriety or
impartiality.28
Using these principles, the following orders should be vacated: First, the March 13 and
May 11,2001 Orders appointing Special Master Holman and empowering him with ultra vires,
non-judicial powers. (R. 703, 762). These Orders form the cornerstone for Special Master
Holman's improper participation as a party litigant

The role of Special Master must be

expunged, and the case returned to its status prior to his appointment on March 13, 2001.
Second, the Preliminary Injunction Order is a direct result of Special Master Holman's exercise
of unlawful, non-judicial powers. (R. 8110-13). Third, the June 1, 2001 Order approving the
Master Settlement Agreement resulted from Special Master Holman's exercise of his unlawful,
non-judicial powers as a subordinate judicial officer. (R. 2032). Fourth, the April 12, 2002
Orders modifying the Interim Order and allowing the freeze-out merger to occur without any
trial court (R. 7950-54). Fifth, the August 26, 2002, Order sanctioning Mrs. Stewart and
entering default against her is the direct result of Special Master Holman's actions as a
subordinate judicial officer. (R. 8167). Each of these Orders is void because they are the direct
result of Special Master Holman's improper participation in the litigation by a judicial officer
and, therefore, must be vacated.
Additionally, the June 1, 2001 and October 4, 2001 Rulings regarding the entry of the
Special Master Reports must be vacated and set aside because the reports are clearly partisan in
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See Utah R. Jud. Conduct Cannon 1-3; see also Regional Sales Agency, Inc. v. Reicbert, 830
P.2d 252,258 (Utah 1992) (decision was automaticaUy set aside due to a violation of the Code
ofJudicial Conduct); Anderson v. Industrial Comm'n, 696 P.2d 1219,1221 (Utah 1985). Violations
of the code of judicial conduct must be set aside regardless of the merit of the decision or the
influence of the misconduct Id. (vacating order was proper remedy even without showing of
prejudice).

violation of Rule 53. (R. 2032). Special Master Holman's counsel admitted that the Reports are
partisan {R. 14287:117,125) and that they formed the basis of the trial court's Findings of Fact,
Conclusions of Law and Order which were adopted by the trial court nearly verbatim. (R.
14317). The trial court relied almost exclusively upon Special Master Holman's testimony and
on his partisan Special Master Reports in forming the Preliminary Injunction Order. This Court,
therefore, should vacate the Findings, Conclusions and Order as it was a violation of Mrs.
Stewart's due process rights. (R. 14317, R. 8110-13).
Because the trial court possessed neither the authority nor the discretion to confer nonjudicial powers upon Special Master Holman, this Court should vacate the Special Master
Orders, including the Preliminary Injunction and Sanctioning Order against Mrs. Stewart
(Orders). Further, this Court should remand this case to the trial court with the instructions
that the case be returned to its status prior to the appointment of Special Master Holman.

POINT V
THE TRIAL COURT ABUSED ITS DISCRETION IN
ENTERING A PRELIMINARY INJUNCTION BARRING
MRS. STEWART FROM COMPETING WITH E. EXCEL
AND FROM PARTICIPATING IN THE ENTIRE HEALTH
FOOD SUPPLEMENT INDUSTRY FOR AN UNLIMITED
PERIOD OF TIME WORLDWIDE
Because the Preliminary Injunction bars Mrs. Stewart from participating in the entire
herbal, dietary supplement, cosmetic and personal-care product industry worldwide for an
indeterminate period of time, the Preliminary Injunction is invalid. The scope of the trial court's
prohibition on Mrs. Stewart's right to compete is unprecedented and grossly exceeds the harm
alleged by E. Excel. Generally, a defendant may be preliminary enjoined from competition with
a plaintiff if the defendant has a continuing duty not to compete under a valid non-competition

agreement or underlying fiduciary duty/*
Absent a duty not to compete, a defendant's efforts to do so is not irreparable harm and
cannot satisfy this prerequisite for obtaining a preliminary injunction.30 It is undisputed that Mrs.
Stewart did not enter into a noncompetition agreement with E. Excel. Further, any duty not to
compete flowing from Mrs. Stewart's role as a corporatefiduciaryended at the time Mrs. Stewart
resigned as an officer and director of E. Excel in June 2001.31 In late December 2002, Special
Master Holman and Mrs. Chen eliminated Mrs. Stewart's minority share of E. Excel stock. (R.
7950-54). As such, Mrs. Stewart currently has no relationship with E. Excel as a fiduciary,
employee or shareholder.
Absent a duty not to compete, the purpose of the trial court's Preliminary Injunction is
simply to punish Mrs. Stewart rather than protect E. Excel. A preliminary injunction may not
be granted to sanction or punish wrongful conduct, regardless of how egregious that conduct
may be.32 Without irreparable harm, the trial court's Preliminary Injunction cannot bar Mrs.
Stewart from competing with an entire industry on a global scale.
If there was proper basis for a preliminary injunction in this case, there is no proper basis
for barring Mrs. Stewart form an entire industry worldwide forever. The trial court's Preliminary
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See MicrvbiologicalResearch Corp. v. Muna, 625 P.2d 690,697 (Utah 1981); E. W. Bliss Co.
v. Strutbers-Dunn, Inc., 408 F.2d 1108,1113 (8th Cir. 1969); United Aircraft Co. v. Boreen, 413 F.2d
694,699 (3rd Cir. 1969); Resolution Trust Corp. v. Sealetty, 810 F. Supp. 1505,1513 (D. Kan. 1992).
30

See Utah R. Civ. P. 65A(e); Robbins v. Finley, 645 P.2d 623,627 (Utah 1982); Nestk Food
Co. v. Miller, 836 F. Supp. 69, 75 n.19 (D. R.1.1983).
31

Microbiological Research Corp., 625 P.2d at 695 ('"When a corporate officer ceases to act
as such . . . thefiduciaryrelationship ceases.").
32

See, e.g., Standard Brands, Inc. v. U.S. Partition & Packaging Corp., 199 F. Supp. 161,175
(E.D. Wis. 1961).

Injunction violates principles of free enterprise and individual liberties.33
Finally, it is essential that an injunction be narrowly tailored to accomplish a simple goal:
to preserve the status quo pending the outcome of the case.34 E. Excel did not, and could not,
establish irreparable harm sufficient to warrant an injunction that completely bars a competitor
from an entire industry worldwide indefinitely.
Special Master Holman's unfair competition and racketeeringdaims under Utah's Pattern
of Unlawful Activity Act ('TJPUAA") fail to serve as a predicate for barring Mrs. Stewart from
all competition with E. Excel, much less the entire dietary supplement industry. These claims
only serve as a predicate for an injunction limited in scope to prevent any continuing unfair
competition or UPUAA violations, i.e., the underlying irreparable harm. 3S Because there is no
underlying support or purpose for the Preliminary Injunction, it must be reversed.
CONCLUSION
By appointing a Special Master Holman to act as Interim CEO and ultimately allowing
him to become a party litigant and adverse receiver, the trial court greatly exceeded its power of
reference under Rule 53. After improperly granting these powers, the trial courts' Special
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See Crane v. Dahle, 576 P.2d 870, 872-73 (Utah 1978) ("Under our system of free
enterprise and individual liberties, there is no serfdom."); Restatement (Third) of Unfair
Competition, cmt. 2 (1995) ("The freedom to engage in business and to compete for the
patronage of prospective customers is a fundamental premise of the free enterprise system/5).
34

Bowman v. Dixon Theatre Renovation, Inc., 581 N.E.2d 804, 808 QSL Ct. App. 1991);
Hughes Network System, Inc. v. Interdigital Communication, Corp., 17 F.3d 691, 694 i^ Cir. 1994);
Hoxworth v. Blinder, Robinson & Co., Inc., 903 F.2d 186,198 (3rd Cir. 1990); Citizen Band Potawatomi
Indian Tribe of Oklahoma v. the Oklahoma Tax Comm\ 969 F.2d 943, 948 (10th Cir. 1992) ("Pike
trial court order follows the well-settled principle that an injunction must be narrowly tailored
to remedy the harm shown[.]") (R. 14291:105 & 175; 71S8).
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See, e.g., Envirvtech Corp. v. Callahan,872P.2d487,496n.8(UtahCt.
App. 1994)(finding
defendant not barred by a fiduciary duty from competing but barred from using confidential
information); E.W. Bliss Co.v. Struthers-Dunn, Inc., 408 F.2d 1108,1112-13 (8 th Cir. 1969).

Master, not surprisingly, dominated the litigation and destroyed any semblance of an adversarial
process. Because Special Master Holman's dominance taints all of the subsequent orders and
proceedings below, all of these orders and the improper appointment should be vacated.
The preliminary injunction entered against Mrs. Stewart lacks an adequate basis. Once
Mrs. Stewart ceased to be an officer and director, she no longer owed E. Excel and Mrs. Chen
anyfiduciaryobligations. Because of this, Mrs. Stewart should be free to compete with E. Excel.
Even if the preliminary injunction has adequate foundation, its scope is overly broad both
temporally, geographically and in the scope of business from which Mrs. Stewart is now
excluded. A preliminary injunction must be narrowly tailored and limited in scope. The
injunction entered against Mrs. Stewart, however, far exceeds what is necessary to protect any
legitimate interest of E. Excel, and instead is punitive in nature. The preliminary injunction
should be vacated, and this Court should remand to the trial court the question of whether a
more narrowly tailored injunction is appropriate at all given Mrs. Stewart lack of contractual or
fiduciary obligations to E. Excel.
Dated: September 17, 2003.
LARSEN & GRUBER

. Larsen
David S. Hill
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Stacy J. McNeill
Attorneys for Appellant Jau Hwa Stewart
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ADDENDUM

Utah Rule of Civil Procedure 53

S2

Page 1
WEST'S UTAH RULES OF COURT
UTAH RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE
PART VL TRIALS
Copr. © West Group 2003. All rights reserved.
Current with amendments received through 7-1-2003.
RULE 53. MASTERS
(a) Appointment and Compensation. Any or all of the issues in an action may be referred by the court to a master
upon the written consent of the parties, or the court may appoint a master in an action, in accordance with the provisions
of Subdivision (b) of this rule. As used in these rules the word "master" includes a referee, an auditor, and an examiner.
The compensation to be allowed to a master shall be fixed by the court, and shall be charged upon such of the parties
or paid out of any fund or subject matter of the action, which is in the custody and control of the court as the court may
direct. The master shall not retain his report as security for his compensation; but when the party ordered to pay the
compensation allowed by the court does not pay it after notice and within the time prescribed by the court, the master
is entitled to a writ of execution against the delinquent party.
(b) Reference. A reference to a master shall be the exception and not the rule. In actions to be tried by a jury, a
reference shall be made only when the issues are complicated; in actions to be tried without a jury, save in matters of
account, a reference shall, in the absence of the written consent of the parties, be made only upon a showing that some
exceptional condition requires it.
(c) Powers. The order of reference to the master may specify or limit his powers and may direct him to report only
upon particular issues or to do or perform particular acts or to receive and report evidence only and may fix the time and
place for beginning and closing the hearings and for the filing of the master's report. Subject to the specifications and
limitations stated in the order, the master has and shall exercise the power to regulate all proceedings in every hearing
before him and to do all acts and take all measures necessary or proper for the efficient performance of his duties under
the order. He may require the production before him of evidence upon all matters embraced in the reference, including
the production of all books, papers, vouchers, documents, and writings applicable thereto. He may rule upon the
admissibility of evidence unless otherwise directed by the order of reference and has the authority to put witnesses on
oath and may himself examine them and may call the parties to the action and examine them upon oath. When a party
so requests, the master shall make a record of the evidence offered and excluded in the same manner and subject to the
same limitations as provided in the Utah Rules of Evidence for a court sitting without a jury.
(d) Proceedings.
(1) Meetings. When a reference is made, the clerk shall forthwith furnish the master with a copy of the order of
reference. Upon receipt thereof unless the order of reference otherwise provides, the master shall forthwith set a time
and place for the first meeting of the parties or their attorneys to be held within 20 days after the date of the order of
reference and shall notify the parties or their attorneys. It is the duty of the master to proceed with all reasonable
diligence. Either party, on notice to the parties and master, may apply to the court for an order requiring the master to
speed the proceedings and to make his report. If a party fails to appear at the time and place appointed, the master may
proceed ex parte or, in his discretion, adjourn the proceedings to a future day, giving notice to the absent party of the
adjournment.
(2) Witnesses. The parties may procure the attendance of witnesses before the master by the issuance and service of
subpoenas as provided in Rule 45. If without adequate excuse a witness fails to appear or give evidence, he may be
punished as for a contempt and be subjected to the consequences, penalties, and remedies provided in Rules 37 and 45.
(3) Statement of Accounts. When matters of accounting are in issue before the master, he may prescribe the form in
which the accounts shall be submitted and in any proper case may require or receive in evidence a statement by a certified
public accountant who is called as a witness. Upon objection of a party to any of the items thus submitted or upon a
showing that the form of statement is insufficient, the master may require a different form of statement to be furnished,
Copr. © West 2003 No Claim to Orig. U.S. Govt. Works
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or the accounts or specific items thereof to be proved by oral examination of the accounting parties or upon written
interrogatories or in such other manner as he directs.

(e) Report
(1) Contents and Filing. The master shall prepare a report upon the matters submitted to him by the order of reference
and, if required to make findings of fact and conclusions of law, he shall set them forth in the report. He shall file the
report with the clerk of the court and in an action to be tried without a jury, unless otherwise directed by the order of
reference, shall file with it a transcript of the proceedings and of the evidence and the original exhibits. The clerk shall
forthwith mail to all parties notice of the filing.
(2) In Non-jury Actions. In an action to be tried without a jury the court shall accept the master's findings of fact unless
clearly erroneous. Within 10 days after being served with notice of the filing of the report any party may serve written
objections thereto upon the other parties. Application to the court for action upon the report and upon objections thereto
shall be by motion and upon notice as prescribed in Rule 6(d). The court after hearing may adopt the report or may
modify it or may reject it in whole or in part or may receive further evidence or may recommit it with instructions.
(3) In Jury Actions. In an action to be tried by a jury the master shall not be directed to report the evidence. His
findings upon the issues submitted to him are admissible as evidence of the matters found and may be read to the jury,
subject to the ruling of the court upon any objections in point of law which may be made to the report
(4) Stipulation as to Findings. The effect of a master's report is the same whether or not the parties have consented to
the reference; but, when the parties stipulate that a master's findings of fact shall be final, only questions of law arising
upon the report shall thereafter be considered.
(5) Draft Report. Before filing his report a master may submit a draft thereof to counsel for all parties for the purpose
of receiving their suggestions.
(f) Objections to Appointment of Master. A party may object to the appointment of any person as a master on the
same grounds as a party may challenge for cause any prospective trial juror in the trial of a civil action. Such objections
must be heard and disposed of by the court in the same manner as a motion.
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ix

APPELLATE JURISDICTION
This consolidated appeal arises from this Court's grant of two sets of petitions for
interlocutory appeal under Utah Rule of Appellate Procedure 5. On January 13, 2003, this
Court granted appellant Hwan Lan Chen's petition in Case No. 20020927-SC for
interlocutory appeal of a Preliminary Injunction entered against her below, which consisted
of an October 16, 2002 Order of Preliminary Injunction based on August 20, 2002
Preliminary Injunction findings. [See accompanying Addendum, Tab V.] On April 2,2003,
the Court granted appellant's petition in Case No. 20030115-SC, along with three other
petitions (Case Nos. 20030116-SC, 20030117-SC and 20030118-SC), for interlocutory
appeal of the January 24,2003 Ruling entered in the same action below denying appellant's
Motion to Vacate and Set Aside the trial court's orders relating to the pendente lite
appointment, empowerment, and actions of a Rule 53 special master. [See Addendum, Tab
WJ
This Court's April 2, 2003 Order further ordered that: (1) all of the appeals of the
January 24,2003 Ruling were consolidated with each other and with Case No. 20020927-SC,
with all pleadings to befiledunder Case No. 20020927-SC, and (2) all further proceedings
in the action below and all related actions were stayed pending the issuance of a decision on
this consolidated appeal. [Id.]
An August 20,2002 Contempt Ruling entered in the action below is the subject of a
separate appeal, Case No. 2002077-SC, pursuant to defendant Jau-Hwa Stewart's and
appellant Hwan Lan Chen's Notices of Appeal. The present appeal, Case No. 2002097-SC,

1

and the Contempt Ruling appeal, Case No. 20020777-SC, both involve the same record on
appeal, but raise different issues.
The Utah Supreme Court has jurisdiction over this appeal pursuant to Utah Code Ann.
§§ 78-2-2(3)(j), 78-2a-3 and this Court's Orders pursuant to Utah Rule of Appellate
Procedure 5.
ISSUES PRESENTED
A.

The Trial Court's January 24, 2003 Ruling

The issues relating to the trial court's January 24, 2003 Ruling denying Hwan Lan
Chen's Motion to Vacate and Set Aside the trial court's orders with respect to the Special
Master's appointment, empowerment, and actions [R. 9238; 12770] are:
1.

Whether the trial court's orders conferring non-judicial powers on a Rule 53

special master pendente lite and the actions of the Special Master pursuant to those powers
were wholly beyond and in direct conflict with the judicial powers authorized by Rule 53?
2.

Whether, under Rule 53, a special master can be empowered,pendente lite, to:

(1) serve as a corporate CEO; (2) participate as an active party litigant in the action in which
he was appointed as special master, with the power to investigate, initiate, and prosecute
claims; (3) pursue and obtain the preliminary injunctive relief that is the subject of this
appeal; (4) negotiate and consummate a master settlement agreement that restructures a
corporate enterprise, E. Excel International, Inc. ("E. Excel"), releases claims of that
corporation, including claims against the plaintiff below and her husband, and settles
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litigation beyond the case below; and (5) orchestrate a freeze-out merger against the
defendant below with regard to the same corporation.
3.

Whether the trial court's justification of its orders with respect to the

empowerment and actions of the Special Master in its January 24,2003 Ruling based on the
doctrine of waiver is contrary to law and the record in that:
a.

The waiver doctrine cannot be used to shield the fundamental unlawfulness of
a trial court's empowerment of a Rule 53 special master to exercise nonjudicial powers pendente lite, including the power to act as an active party
litigant, any more than the waiver doctrine could shield a trial court's own
exercise of such blatantly non-judicial powers;

b.

The trial court's determination that there was a stipulation or agreement to the
empowerment of the Rule 53 Special Master with non-judicial powers ten
months before appellant Hwan Lan Chen was made a party to the case is
categorically untrue and without support in the record; and

c.

Hwan Lan Chen never stipulated or agreed at any time to any of the trial
court's orders pertaining to the Special Master and timely moved to have the
orders vacated and set aside within ten days of the entry of the Preliminary
Injunction against her?

4.

Whether the trial court's justification of its orders with respect to the

empowerment and actions of the Special Master in its January 24,2003 Ruling based on the
harmless error doctrine and the standing doctrine, including the trial court's claim that it
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already had adjudicated against Hwan Lan Chen a claim by her to ownership of E. Excel, is
contrary to law and the record in that:
a.

But for the Special Master's unlawful empowerment and actions, Hwan Lan
Chen would not have been a party to the action below, would not have been
the subject of a preliminary injunction below, and would not be the subject of
a pending motion for contempt below that seeks her total default on her
defense to claims that assert damages of approximately $17 million; and

b.

No claim of any type (whether claim, counterclaim, cross claim or third-party
claim) to which Hwan Lan Chen was a party and which involved her
ownership of E. Excel, was ever made, pled or adjudicated in the action
below?

The issues regarding the Special Master's empowerment and actions are questions of
law that are reviewed for correctness. Plumb v. State, 809 P.2d 734, 741-43 (Utah 1990);
State v. Pena, 869 P.2d 932, 936 (Utah 1994). The issues raised by the trial court's January
24, 2003 Ruling are questions of law that are reviewed for correctness. Pena, 869 P.2d at
936.
B.

The Preliminary Injunction

The issues relating to the trial court's August 20,2002 Preliminary Injunction findings
and October 16,2002 Order of Preliminary Injunction against appellant Hwan Lan Chen [R.
7141; 8578; 9238; 14276 at 4-17] are:
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1.

Whether the Preliminary Injunction against Hwan Lan Chen must be vacated

and set aside on the ground that it was based solely on the third-party claims and motion of
a Rule 53 special master unlawfully exercising the power of a party litigant in the case,
beyond and contrary to the judicial powers that can be conferred under Rule 53?
2.

Whether Hwan Lan Chen was fundamentally denied her right to due process

under the United States and Utah Constitutions when the trial court granted the Preliminary
Injunction against her based on 18 days of evidentiary hearings conducted before she was
joined as a party in the case below?
3.

Whether the Preliminary Injunction is facially invalid in scope in that it

wrongfully enjoins Hwan Lan Chen from all competition with E. Excel and all competition
in several entire industries worldwide during the pendency of the case, when Hwan Lan Chen
is not and never has been a party to a non-compete agreement with E. Excel, and was only
a director of E. Excel between September 1, 2000 and February 21, 2001?
4.

Whether the evidence fails to establish a prima facie case on the key predicate

findings against Hwan Lan Chen that she is a crook, conspirator, and corporate wrongdoer,
which underlie the Preliminary Injunction, when there is no evidence that Hwan Lan Chen,
a 76-year old, non-English speaking, Chinese widow who never testified in the action below,
ever agreed to any wrongful agreement, or ever engaged in or had knowledge of any of the
wrongful or criminal predicate acts?
The Special Master issue with regard to the Preliminary Injunction is a subset of the
general issues presented above regarding the Special Master's unlawful empowerment and
5

actions, and is a question of law that is reviewed for correctness. Plumb, 809 P.2d at 741-43.
The due process issue is a question of law and is reviewed for correctness. State v. Hubbard,
2002 UT 45,1| 22, 48 P.3d 953, 962; In re J.B., 2002 UT App. 268, H 7, 53 P.3d 968, 970.
The lawfulness of the scope of the Preliminary Injunction is a question of law that is
reviewed for correctness. F.D.I.C. v. Faulkner, 991 F.2d 262,267 (5th Cir. 1993). Whether
appellee failed to establish a prima facie case on the predicate findings of the Preliminary
Injunction, as required, is a question of law that is reviewed for correctness. Water & Energy
Sys. Tech, Inc. v. Keil, 1999 UT 16, If8, 974 P.2d 821, 822 ("To meet the requirements of
subsection four [of Rule 65 A(e)], an applicant [for a preliminary injunction] must, at the very
least, make a prima facie showing that the elements of its underlying claim can be proved.");
Handy v. Union P. R.R. Co., 841 P.2d 1210, 1215 (Utah Ct. App. 1992).
CONTROLLING RULE
Utah Rule of Civil Procedure 53 is of central importance to this appeal and is set out
verbatim in Tab A of the accompanying Addendum.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
I.

NATURE OF THE CASE,
DISPOSITION BELOW

COURSE

OF

PROCEEDINGS,

AND

This case involves a Rule 53 special master who, by law, is a judicial officer limited
to exercising judicial power to assist a court, but who, pendente lite, was empowered by the
trial court to exercise the powers of the chief executive officer ("CEO") of E. Excel, an
active party litigant, and a master claims settler. In exercise of these blatantly non-judicial
powers, the Special Master: (1) initiated and prosecuted claims against Hwan Lan Chen; (2)
6

sought and obtained the Preliminary Injunction against Hwan Lan Chen; (3) entered into a
"Master Settlement Agreement" that settled litigation beyond this case, released the plaintiff
and her allies from all of E. Excel's claims, and divested E. Excel of over 90% of its
business; (4) orchestrated a freeze-out merger that eliminated the defendant as an E. Excel
shareholder for the benefit of the plaintiff and her allies; and (5) submitted admittedly
"partisan" special master reports under Rule 53 that became part of the record and were used
against Hwan Lan Chen. The Special Master continues to exercise his unlawful non-judicial
powers, including his participation and direction in this appeal.
The corporate subject of this case is E. Excel, a multi-level marketer of herbal, dietary
supplement, and personal care products. [R. 14318 at 4fl[1).] Historically, over 90% of E.
Excel's revenue came from sales in several Asian countries. [R. 14342, Ex. 280 at 4.] E.
Excel's distribution in these Asian countries historically consisted of sales to foreign
distributors, called "Territorial Owners," which, in turn, distributed E. Excel products to
individual distributors on a multi-level marketing basis. [R. 14317 at 8 (^j 10); 14318 at 4 (Tj
1).] E. Excel reported sales of over $20 million to the Territorial Owners in the first eight
months of 2000. [R. 14265 at 179-80; 14300 at 8.]
E. Excel is a closely-held family business of the Chen family, a traditional Chinese
family. [R. 14230 at 12-14; 14317 at 5-6flffl1, 5)]. As the trial court found:
[The Chen family is a] Chinese family that adheres to traditional deferring to
decision making authority of the elder member of the family
Part of the
Chinese tradition observed by [the] family was to respect the wishes of and to
take instruction from elders. Another Chinese tradition was to share profits in
business between and among family members . . . .
7

[R. 14317 at 5-6 fl[ 1).] Appellant Hwan Lan Chen, a third-party defendant below, is the 76year old matriarch of the Chen family, who claims by affidavit and answers to interrogatories
in the case below to be the principal owner of E. Excel. [R. 9254; 14332, Reply Memo, at
Ex. B (Interr. No. 5).] The plaintiff, her daughter, testified in reference to E. Excel:
In the operation of a business, many times in big decisions we will always go
to the elder, the parents of the family and ask them. Okay. And also it don't
matter whether the elder is a shareholder or not. In profit sharing the elder
would have the say.
[R. 14230 at 14.]
Plaintiff Jau-Fei Chen, the President of E. Excel prior to September 1, 2000,
commenced the action below in the Fourth Judicial District Court on January 9,2001 against
her sister, defendant Jau-Hwa Stewart, the then-acting President of E. Excel. [R. 24.] The
action was brought as a derivative action and, therefore, the plaintiff joined E. Excel as a
putative defendant. [R. 97.]
Plaintiff Jau-Fei Chen asserted derivative claims for breach of fiduciary duties,
corporate waste, and corporate wrongdoing regarding her sister's attempt to assert
shareholder control over E. Excel and take over the management of E. Excel. [R. 24.]
Defendant Jau-Hwa Stewart, purporting to vote 100% of the outstanding shares of E. Excel,
had acted on September 1,2000 to remove the plaintiff and the plaintiff s husband, Rui-Kang
Zhang, from the E. Excel Board of Directors and replace them with her mother, Hwan Lan
Chen, and her husband, Taig Stewart.1 [R. 14338, Ex. 22.] The new Board had removed the

1

Ms. Stewart owned 25% of the outstanding shares and voted the remaining 75% of
(continued...)
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plaintiff and Mr. Zhang as E. Excel officers and installed defendant Jau-Hwa Stewart as E.
Excel's President. [R. 14338, Ex. 23.]
Plaintiff Jau-Fei Chen has never asserted any claim against her mother, Hwan Lan
Chen, or been a party to a claim in the case to which her mother was a party. [R. 24.]
The case was assigned to the Honorable Fred D. Howard. Judge Howard commenced
a proceeding on plaintiff Jau-Fei Chen's motion for preliminary injunction against defendant
Jau-Hwa Stewart and held ten days of evidentiary hearings on the motion between January
19,2001 and February 20, 2001. [R. 14221-23, 14226; 14228; 14230-35; 14293-94.]
On February 21, 2001, Judge Howard entered a stipulated "Interim Order" in
connection with the pending preliminary injunction proceeding. [R. 632 (see Addendum,
Tab Q).] The Interim Order provided that an "independent, neutral" interim CEO of E. Excel
would be appointed, who would be selected by plaintiff Jau-Fei Chen and defendant Jau-Hwa
Stewart, or, if they could not agree, by Judge Howard. [R. 631-32 at ^ 1.] The Interim Order
did not provide for the appointment of a special master. It said nothing about a special
master. [R. 626-32.] The Interim Order proscribed the intended interim CEO from
participating in the case below as an active party litigant by expressly limiting E. Excel to a
putative defendant role in a derivative action. [R. 628 at % 9.] The Interim Order removed

l

(...continued)
the outstanding shares, which were owned by plaintiff Jau-Fei Chen's children, on the claim
that the children's shares were held in a trust controlled by Ms. Stewart. [R. 14338, Ex. 22.]
The trial court ultimately ruled that, although there was evidence of the trust, the children's
shares had not been transferred to the trust, such that the trust was dry and Ms. Stewart's vote
of their shares was "void ab initio." [R. 7956-57.]
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defendant Jau-Hwa Stewart as an officer and employee of E. Excel and changed the E. Excel
Board back to plaintiff Jau-Fei Chen, her husband, and Ms. Stewart. [R. 630-31 at <|ffl 2, 3.]
Pursuant to plaintiff Jau-Fei Chen's request, Judge Howard appointed Larry Holman
as Special Master and interim CEO of E. Excel by Order dated March 13,2001. [R. 704 (see
Addendum, Tab D); 14274 at 7.] The plaintiff first requested that Mr. Holman serve as
Special Master at a March 5, 2001 hearing. [R. 14274 at 7, 21 (see Addendum, Tab C).]
Plaintiff Jau-Fei Chen made that request and obtained the Special Master's appointment
without the stipulation or agreement of defendant Jau-Hwa Stewart, the only party adverse
to the plaintiff at that time. [Id; R. 704.]
On May 11,2001, at the Special Master's request and over objection, Judge Howard
entered an Order that authorized the Special Master to exercise the powers of a party litigant
and master claims settler. [R. 762 (see Addendum, Tab G); 14298 at 2.] He explicitly
authorized the Special Master to "direct and control" E. Excel as an active party litigant and
conferred on the Special Master the power to settle all of E. Excel's litigation, all without
further order of the court. [R. 762.]
On June 1, 2001, at the Special Master's request and over objection, Judge Howard
approved the Special Master's decision to enter a "Master Settlement Agreement" with
plaintiff Jau-Fei Chen, her husband, and their allies, and authorized the Special Master to
execute that Agreement. [R. 2033-32 atffi[3,4 (see Addendum, Tab I); 14239 at 19-23,7582; 14300 at 25 (see Addendum, Tab H).] The Master Settlement Agreement settled all
litigation between E. Excel and the plaintiff, her husband, and their allies, released them from
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all of E. Excel's claims, and restructured E. Excel by divesting its Asian sales - over 90%
of its business - to the exclusive benefit of the plaintiff, her husband, and their allies. [R.
14344, Ex. 534 atffif3.1, 4.1; 14342, Ex. 280 at 4.]
In June and August 2001, plaintiff Jau-Fei Chen made two motions for civil and
criminal contempt against defendant Jau-Hwa Stewart, and Judge Howard commenced a
proceeding on the two contempt motions in October 2001. [R. 2074; 14306.]
At the outset of the contempt proceeding, the Special Master, exercising the power
of a party litigant, authorized and directed E. Excel to file an Amended Cross-Claim/Third
Party Complaint and Motion for Preliminary Injunction against defendant Jau-Hwa Stewart,
Hwan Lan Chen, and the other third-party defendants. [R. 3721; 4214 (see Addendum, Tabs
J, K).] Paragraph 3 of the Amended Third Party Complaint specifically alleges that its filing
was at the direction of the Special Master. Paragraph 3 states:
After commencing an investigation of [E. Excel's] finances and operations,
Special Master Holman has determined that E. Excel should initiate litigation
against the cross-defendant, Jau-Hwa Stewart, and the third party defendants
[including Hwan Lan Chen] . . . .
[R. 4205 at H 3.]
Hwan Lan Chen wasfirstand only named as a party to the case by the Amended Third
Party Complaint. [R. 4204 at <| 9.] The Amended Third Party Complaint asserted, inter alia,
claims for breach of fiduciary duty, unfair competition, usurpation of corporate opportunity,
waste, civil conspiracy, conversion, and violation of Utah's Pattern of Unlawful Activity Act
("UPUAA") against Hwan Lan Chen, based on her status as a director of E. Excel between
September 1, 2000 and February 21, 2001 and her funding of Apogee, Inc., a company
11

formed in May 2001 that was intended to compete with E. Excel. [R. 4171-206; 14250 at
39.] The Special Master/E. Excel has told this Court that it seeks approximately $17 million
in damages against Hwan Lan Chen.2 [5/21/03 Mtn. to Modify Stay and Require a Bond at
18n.ll.]
On October 31, 2001, Judge Howard, without notice to Hwan Lan Chen, combined
the contempt proceeding with the proceeding on the Special Master/E. Excel's Motion for
Preliminary Injunction.

[R. 14243 at 64.] Judge Howard also incorporated the ten

evidentiary hearings that had been held on January 19,23 and 24, and February 1,2, 7, 8, 9,
13 and 20, 2001 in connection with plaintiff Jau-Fei Chen's original motion for preliminary
injunction, by taking "judicial notice" of those hearings. [R. 14317 at 4 (see Addendum, Tab
O).] Judge Howard also incorporated the evidentiary hearings that were held on October 25
and 26, 2001 in connection with the plaintiffs contempt motion before he combined the
contempt proceeding with the Preliminary Injunction proceeding. [Id] In summary, the
evidentiary record ended up consisting of 34 days of evidentiary hearings held on January
19, 23 and 24, 2001, February 1, 2, 7, 8, 9, 13 and 20, 2001, October 25 and 26, 2001,
November 27 and 28, 2001, December 10, 11, 12, and 13,2001, February 21 and 22, 2002,
March 13, 15, 18 and 19, 2002, April 17,2002, May 7, 8,10 and 31, 2002, and June 4, 5, 7,

2

After March 13, 2001, E. Excel was under the direction of the Special Master. [R.
704.] Accordingly, appellee is referred to as "the Special Master/E. Excel," which reflects
the express representation of its counsel, Jones Waldo Holbrook & McDonough, in the case
below. See, e.g., the Amended Third Party Complaint. [R. 4214 (see Addendum, Tab K).]
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25 and 26,2002. [Id.] This was the evidentiary record that Judge Howard expressly adopted
and cited to in granting the Preliminary Injunction. [Id]
Counsel first appeared in the action below for Hwan Lan Chen on December 17,2001,
after having told Judge Howard on December 12 that he would be appearing for Hwan Lan
Chen. [R. 5000; 14248 at 182.] After counsel stated he would be appearing for Hwan Lan
Chen but before he actually appeared, the Special Master's counsel told Judge Howard on
December 13, 2001 that the Special Master/E. Excel was not seeking "injunctive relief
against Hwan Lan Chen at that time. [R. 14249 at 180-81 (see Addendum, Tab L).]
On August 20,2002, Judge Howard granted the Special Master/E. Excel's Motion for
Preliminary Injunction against Hwan Lan Chen based on 110 pages of Preliminary Injunction
findings that were adopted virtually verbatim from the Special Master/E. Excel's proposed
findings. [R. 14316; 14318.] On the same date, Judge Howard also granted plaintiff Jau-Fei
Chen's two contempt motions against defendant Jau-Hwa Stewart and ordered Ms. Stewart's
total default on the plaintiffs claims by adopting virtually verbatim 127 pages of Contempt
findings proposed by the plaintiff. [R. 14315; 14317.] As requested by the Special Master/E.
Excel, the Preliminary Injunction findings entered by Judge Howard adopted and
incorporated by reference all of the Contempt findings. [R. 14316 at 90 fl[ 258); 14318 at
89 fl[ 258) (see Addendum, Tab N).]
Judge Howard entered the Preliminary Injunction findings against Hwan Lan Chen
based on 18 days of evidentiary hearings that were held before she was joined as a part}' to
the case. [R. 5000; 14317 at 4.] Over 50% of the evidence cited in the Preliminary
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Injunction and Contempt findings was received during the 18 days of evidentiary hearing that
were conducted in the absence of Hwan Lan Chen. [See Addendum, Tab U.]
In July and August 2002, the Special Master orchestrated a freeze-out merger
eliminating defendant Jau-Hwa Stewart as a shareholder of E. Excel, over her objection. [R.
14320, Mtn. and Memo, at Ex. 1.] The Special Master proposed the freeze-out merger to E.
Excel's Board - which by then was only the plaintiff and her husband - and signed the
merger agreement on behalf of both E. Excel and the acquisition company. [R. 14320,
Memo, at Ex. 1.]
On October 16,2002, Judge Howard entered an Order of Preliminary Injunction based
on the August 20,2002 Preliminary Injunction findings. [R. 9145 (see Addendum, Tab P).]
The Preliminary Injunction, inter alia, enjoined Hwan Lan Chen from all competition with
E. Excel and from all competition in the entire dietary supplement, herbal, personal care,
cosmetic, and hygiene products industries worldwide. [R. 9140 at f 13.]
On October 24,2002, within ten days of the entry of the Preliminary Injunction Order,
Hwan Lan Chen filed her Motion to Vacate and Set Aside Judge Howard's orders relating
to the Special Master's appointment, empowerment, and actions. [R. 9238.] The action
below had been re-assigned in July 2002 to the Honorable Lynn W. Davis of the Fourth
Judicial District Court pursuant to that District's normal rotation rules regarding case
assignments. On reference from Judge Davis, Judge Howard heard and ruled on the Motion
to Vacate and Set Aside. [R. 12049; 14287.] Judge Howard denied the Motion in a written
ruling entered on January 24, 2003. [R. 12770 (see Addendum, Tab B).]
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II.

STATEMENT OF FACTS
This Statement of Facts is divided into five sections. The first section relates to the

unlawful empowerment and actions of the Special Master. The second section relates to the
grant of the Preliminary Injunction against Hwan Lan Chen based on 18 days of evidentiary
hearings held when she was not a party to the case in fundamental violation of her due
process rights. The third section relates to Judge Howard's attempt to justify the Special
Master's unlawful empowerment and actions in his January 24, 2003 Ruling. The fourth
section relates to the facially invalid scope of the Preliminary Injunction, which enjoins
Hwan Lan Chen from all competition with E. Excel and in several entire industries
worldwide. The fifth section relates to the Special Master/E. Excel's failure to establish a
prima facie case on the key predicate findings against Hwan Lan Chen underlying the
Preliminary Injunction - findings that she was a crook, conspirator, and corporate wrongdoer.
A.

The Special Master Was Unlawfully Empowered With, Exercised, And
Continues to Exercise, Pendente Lite, Non-Judicial Powers Beyond and
in Direct Conflict With the Judicial Power Authorized by Rule 53

Judge Howard empowered the Special Master pendente lite with the unprecedented,
non-judicial powers of a corporate CEO, active party litigant, and master claims settler, and
the Special Master has exercised and continues to exercise these blatantly unlawful powers.
1.

Judge Howard Appointed Mr. Holman As Special Master And
CEO Of E. Excel And Empowered Him To Exercise The
"Complete Executive Authority95 Of E. Excel As Special Master

On March 13, 2001, Judge Howard appointed Larry Holman by written order as
Special Master and CEO of E. Excel. [R. 703 {see Addendum, Tab D).] The March 13,
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2001 Order provided that Mr. Holman was appointed as the "interim [CEO] of [E. Excel],
and as special master for and on behalf of the Court," and was empowered with "complete
executive authority in his role as chief executive officer and special master." [Id. at ^| 3.]
There was absolutely no stipulation or agreement between the only parties to the
action at that time - plaintiff Jau-Fei Chen, defendant Jau-Hwa Stewart, and E. Excel as a
putative defendant in the derivative action - for the appointment of a special master or the
appointment of a special master and CEO. The first request for and reference to a special
master was at the March 5, 2001 hearing. [R. 14274 at 7.] At that hearing, Judge Howard
ruled, at the request of the plaintiffs counsel, that Mr. Holman would have "master status."
[Id at 7, 20-21 (see Addendum, Tab C).]
2.

Judge Howard Expanded The Special Master's Powers By
Order Dated May 11,2001 And Authorized Him To Act As
An Active Party Litigant and the Special Master Proceeded
To Act As An Active Party Litigant And Be Represented By
Counsel

In May 2001, Judge Howard expanded the powers of the Special Master and
authorized him to act as an active party litigant. By order dated May 11,2001, at the request
of the Special Master and over objection, Judge Howard authorized the Special Master as
special master and CEO to "direct and control, initiate, dismiss, settle or otherwise
determine [E. ExcePs] . . . disputes or lawsuits . . . all without further Order of this
Court." [R. 762 (see Addendum, Tab G) (emphasis added); 14298 at 2.]
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The Special Master requested the May 11, 2001 Order because E. Excel had been
limited to a passive, putative party role in the derivative litigation under the February 21,
2001 Interim Order. [R. 14298 at 2.] Paragraph 9 of the Interim Order provided:
The Company shall not be required to pursue or pay for the pursuit of claims
against the Parties or other persons that are of a shareholder derivative nature,
and the Parties may pursue such derivative claims in their own names. Neither
the Company's board of directors nor the interim CEO/President shall cause
to be dismissed, settled, or otherwise compromised, any lawsuit pending
purportedly on behalf of or against the Company . . . .
[R. 628 at 1f 9 (see Addendum, Tab Q).]
The Special Master, having been given the new power to act as an active party litigant,
proceeded to participate as an active party litigant in the action below. The Special Master
retained litigation counsel, Jones, Waldo, Holbrook & McDonough, with Judge Howard's
approval.3 [R. 14298 at 2.] Jones Waldo filed a notice of appearance for the Special Master
- the notice stated that Jones Waldo "hereby makes [its] appearance as counsel of record for
Special Master Larry C. Holman" - and proceeded to represent him as an active party litigant
in the action. [R. 751 (see Addendum, Tab F.] Of the first 160 filings by Jones Waldo in
the action below, 131 expressly identify Jones Waldo as counsel for the Special Master.
[See Addendum, Tab S.] Jones Waldo expressly appeared for the Special Master in the
combined Preliminary Injunction/Contempt proceeding. [R. 14244 at 5.] Jones Waldo is
listed as appearing for both the Special Master and E. Excel in 21 of the 23 transcripts

3

Judge Howard approved of the Special Master's retention of litigation counsel by
adopting the Special Master's "Report No. 2 of Special Master," where the Special Master
had reported his retention of Jones Waldo. [R. 2033 at f 2; 14298 at 2.]
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prepared from the evidentiary hearings held in that proceeding after the Special Master's
appointment. [See Addendum, Tab T.] In addition, the Special Master's "Special Counsel,"
Patrick Hoog, represents the Special Master as an active party litigant and supervises for the
Special Master all of Jones Waldo's work in the case. [R. 751, 8673 at ^f 6.]
3.

The Special Master Entered Into A Master Settlement Agreement
Pursuant To The Powers Granted By Judge Howard, And Judge
Howard Approved The Agreement At The Special Master's
Request

In April and May 2001, pursuant to the powers granted by Judge Howard, the Special
Master negotiated and entered into a comprehensive "Master Settlement Agreement" with
plaintiff Jau-Fei Chen, her husband, and their allies with respect to all claims and litigation
between them and E. Excel. [R. 14300 at 2-3 (see Addendum, Tab H); 14344, Ex. 534.] The
Special Master used the same counsel as did the plaintiff and her husband to negotiate and
draft the agreement. [R. 9379; 14344, Ex. 534.]
The Master Settlement Agreement released plaintiff Jau-Fei Chen, her husband, and
their allies of all conceivable claims that E. Excel had against them. [R. 14344, Ex. 534 at
Tf 4.1(a).] It settled with prejudice all of E. Excel's litigation other than the action below,
including a Hong Kong derivative action against the plaintiff, her husband, and their allies
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regarding their embezzlement of approximately $75 million of E. Excel revenue.4 [Id. at %
4.1.]
The Master Settlement Agreement also restructured E. Excel by giving almost all its
business to plaintiff Jau-Fei Chen, her husband, and their allies. [Id. at ^ 3.1, 3.2.] Under
the Master Settlement Agreement, the Territorial Owners (which are affiliated with the
plaintiff and her husband) have the right to manufacture and obtain E. Excel products using
their own manufacturer, Extra Excellence (or its contract manufacturers). [Id. at Sch. 5 fl|
3); Sch. 8 fl| 4.1); R. 14222 at 99-102, 141, 164; 14235 at 42-44, 48.] By giving the
Territorial Owners the right to obtain E. Excel product from their own manufacturer, the
Special Master divested E. Excel of its sales to the historic Territorial Owners, the historic
source of over 90% of its revenues.5 [R. 14265 at 174-76; 14318 at 54 fl[ 159); 14342, Ex.
280 at 4.]

4

The embezzlement was by means of a double invoicing scheme that involved E.
Excel Limited, a Hong Kong company controlled by the plaintiff, her husband, and her
husband's family. [R. 1255-1866.] When Territorial Owners ordered E. Excel products, E.
Excel employees created two invoices. [Id.] The lower invoice, which was on E. Excel
letterhead, was used for shipping and customs purposes. [Id.] The higher invoice, which
was typically 2-3 times higher and on E. Excel Limited letterhead, was submitted to the
Territorial Owners for payment to E. Excel Limited. [Id.] E. Excel Limited only paid to E.
Excel the amount of the lower invoice. [Id.] A different variation of this scheme was used
in Taiwan. [Id.]
5

In return, the Special Master agreed that E. Excel would receive a mere 1.5% royalty
on the historic Territorial Owners' sales, with a minimum annual royalty of $500,000, plus
a $2.5 million minimum annual purchase commitment of E. Excel products made by E.
Excel. [R. 14344, Ex. 534 at Sch. 8 (ffif 5.2, 5.4, 5.5).] This guaranteed amount equaled a
mere 5-10% of E. ExceFs historical Asian revenues. [R. 14265 at 174-76; 14267 at 44.]
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As acknowledged by Judge Howard and the Special Master, the Master Settlement
Agreement could not have been approved by E. Excel. [R. 14844 (see Addendum, Tab R).]
Plaintiff Jau-Fei Chen and her husband - who comprised 2/3 of the E. Excel Board and
controlled 3/4 of its outstanding stock at the time - were parties to and the direct
beneficiaries of the Agreement. [R. 14344, Ex. 534.] There was no disinterested board or
shareholder constituency available to approve the Agreement. [R. 630-31 at ^ 3; 7957.]
Moreover, by the Special Master's own admissions, the Agreement would have a
"devastating impact" on and "severely damage" E. Excel. [R. 14270 at 31; 14324, Holman
Aff. at 3 ffl 3-4).]
Consequently, the Special Master, relying on his position as a special master,
recommended and requested that Judge Howard approve the Master Settlement Agreement
as an exercise of the Special Master's "best business judgment." [R. 14300 at 25 (see
Addendum, Tab H).] The Special Master's recommendation and request was made in "his
capacity as Special Master" under Rule 53(e)(2), and was set forth in his "Report No. 3 of
Special Master" to Judge Howard, which stated:
The Special Master has concluded in his best business judgment that the only
logical course to [restore value to E. Excel] is through the Master Settlement
Agreement, and recommends its approval by the Court.
[Id.;R. 1885; 2033 at 1f 1; 2721.]
At the Special Master's request and over objection, Judge Howard approved the
Master Settlement Agreement by a June 1, 2001 "Order on Motion by Special Master." [R.
2032-33 atffl[3-4(see Addendum, Tab I); 14239 at 19-23,75-82.] Judge Howard approved
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the Master Settlement Agreement as an exercise of the Special Master's business judgment,
stating in the June 1, 2001 Order that "this Court accepts the conclusion of the business
judgment made by the Special Master

" [R. 2033 at ^ 3 (emphasis added).] The June

1, 2001 Order authorized the Special Master to enter into and effectuate the Master
Settlement Agreement terms. [R. 2032 at ^ 4.]
4.

The Special Master Orchestrated A Freeze-Out Merger That
Eliminated Defendant Jau-Hwa Stewart As An E. Excel
Shareholder

In July and August 2002, the Special Master orchestrated a freeze-out merger that
eliminated defendant Jau-Hwa Stewart as an E. Excel shareholder for the benefit of plaintiff
Jau-Fei Chen, her husband, and their allies.6 [R. 14320, Memo., Ex. 1; 14324, HolmanAff.]
The Special Master presented the proposal for the freeze-out merger to the E. Excel
Board (which by then consisted of only the plaintiff and her husband), which approved the
proposal. [R. 14320, Memo., Ex. 1 at 014-020.] The Special Master signed the merger
agreement, dated August 13, 2002, for both E. Excel and the acquisition company. [Id. at
010-012.] The Special Master signed and issued the August 14,2002 notice for the E. Excel
shareholders' meeting that was required to approve the merger. [Id. at 02-03.] The Special
Master placed the value of Ms. Stewart's eliminated 25% outstanding shareholder interest
in E. Excel at a mere $75,000, even though E. Excel's revenues in the first eight months of

6

Pursuant to the freeze-out merger, E. Excel was merged into an acquisition company
with plaintiff Jau-Fei Chen and her children owning 100% of the outstanding shares of the
acquisition company, which then changed its named to E. Excel. [R. 14320, Memo., Ex. 1
at 010 (HI 2(a), 2(c)).]
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2000 were $20 million, reflecting the negative impact of the Master Settlement Agreement.
[Id at 06 (12(a)(ii)).]
Coordinating with the Special Master, plaintiff Jau-Fei Chen obtained an order from
Judge Howard, dated August 12, 2002, that repealed the Interim Order's ban of E. Excel
shareholders' meetings. [R. 630 at ^J 4; 7954.] The repeal allowed the plaintiff to vote the
E. Excel shares she controlled - 75% of the outstanding shares - in favor of the freeze-out
merger. [R. 7957.] On August 26,2002, Judge Davis denied defendant Jau-Hwa Stewart's
motion for a TRO to stop the shareholders' meeting at which the plaintiff voted for the
freeze-out merger. [R. 14270 at 50-51; 14320, Mtn.] The Special Master supported the
plaintiffs opposition to Ms. Stewart's motion for a TRO with an affidavit, in which the
Special Master stated that the freeze-out merger was at the Territorial Owners' insistence.
[R. 14324, HolmanAff]
5.

The Special Master Unquestionably Participated As An Active
Party Litigant In The Action Below As A Special Master And
Continues To Participate As An Active Party Litigant. Including
In This Appeal

Filing after filing, appearance after appearance, and order after order graphically
demonstrate that the Special Master was empowered to exercise the powers of an active party
litigant, participated as an active party litigant in the action below, and continues to
participate as an active party litigant.

Judge Howard and the Special Master have

consistently and uniformly recognized that the Special Master was and is acting as a Rule 53
special master:
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•

Jones Waldo filed a notice of appearance for the Special Master, expressly

appeared for the Special Master at the Rule 26(f) Attorney's Planning Meeting, and expressly
appeared as counsel for the Special Master in 82% of its first 160 filings in the case. [R. 751;
2162-63; see Addendum, Tabs F, S.] The Special Master participates as an active party
litigant both directly and through E. Excel. [E.g., R. 1886; 2139; 2177; 2199; 2253; 2576;
2631; 5991; 14314.]
•

The Special Master directed and authorized E. Excel to file the Amended Third

Party Complaint against defendant Jau-Hwa Stewart, Hwan Lan Chen, and the other thirdparty defendants. [R. 4205 at ^| 3 (see Addendum, Tab K).] Paragraph 3 of the Special
Master/E. Excel5s Amended Third Party Complaint expressly alleges the Special Master's
participation as a party litigant:
After commencing an investigation of [E. Excel's] finances and operations,
Special Master Holman has determined that E. Excel should initiate
litigation against the cross-defendant, Jau-Hwa Stewart, and the third
party defendants [including Hwan Lan Chen]
[Id. (emphasis added).] Jones Waldo filed the Amended Third Party Complaint expressly
as counsel for the Special Master and E. Excel. [R. 4172; 4214.]
•

Jones Waldo issued and filed summonses expressly as counsel for the Special

Master and E. Excel. [E.g., R. 2746-58; 4345-48; 4493.] Jones Waldo served and filed
innumerable discovery requests expressly as counsel for the Special Master and E. Excel.
[Eg., R. 4250-53; 4305-11; 4427-31; 4451-80.] Jones Waldo issued trial subpoenas in
connection with the combined Preliminary Injunction/Contempt proceeding expressly as
counsel for the Special Master and E. Excel. [E.g., R. 4796; 4801.]
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•

The Special Master expressly acknowledged to Judge Howard that he is a

judicial officer. At a March 26, 2001 hearing, Mr. Hoog on behalf of the Special Master
raised the issue of the Special Master's intent to engage in ex parte communications with
regard to the negotiation of the Master Settlement Agreement. [R. 14236 at 70-71 (see
Addendum, Tab E).] Mr. Hoog stated:
Your Honor, it's an ethical [issue] . .. [Mr. Holman] is the Special Master
. . . [H]e is bound by the [Rules of] Judicial Conduct as a Special Master.
And as the Special Master he has to follow the duties of the Judge... And
one such duty, he is prohibited from having ex parte communication[s] . . .
[Mr. Holman] wants to make it clear for every one t h a t . . . in fact he has met,
and the parties by their participation, he is meeting with every one on an ex
parte basis and separately to conduct his business. At the same time, as a
Special Master he has contemplated that he is free to have open
communication with the Court, without the participation of the parties, because
he is, in effect, is a Judge and is the Judge's representative.
[Id. (emphasis added).] Counsel for the plaintiff responded that "Mr. Holman is a Special
Master and we acknowledge his authority and his capacity with the Court." [Id. at 73.]
Although defendant Jau-Hwa Stewart did not object to the Special Master's intent to have ex
parte communications, she expressly reserved the right to object in the future and have the
communications stopped. [Id. at 72.]
•

The Special Master testified as a special master in the combined proceeding

against Hwan Lan Chen. [R. 14256 at 77-143.] During the Special Master's testimony, his
counsel acknowledged that "the basis for [the Special Master's] power came from the
Court's order empowering him as the special master." [R. 14267 at 17.]

24

•

Jones Waldo sought a partial protective order with respect to the Special

Master's deposition on the ground that, as a judicial officer, his mental processes were
protected from discovery. [R. 2721.]
•

Judge Howard, referring to the Master Settlement Agreement as the "Master's

Settlement Agreement," dismissed derivative claims against the plaintiff, her husband, and
their allies on the basis that the Special Master, in entering into his "Master's Settlement
Agreement," had acted as an "independent decision maker" under Utah Code § 16-10a-740
- a role no CEO can occupy - and had determined that the claims were not in E. Excel's best
interest. [R. 14846-47 (see Addendum, Tab R).]
•

The Special Master was admittedly "PARTISAN" and submitted "CLEARLY

PARTISAN" Reports under Rule 53, which were used against Hwan Lan Chen. The Special
Master submitted five Reports to Judge Howard pertaining to the litigation, which Judge
Howard adopted or "received" verbatim to make them part of the record and which were
subsequently cited in findings that supported the grant of the Preliminary Injunction. [R.
2033 at^j2; 2043; 2294; 2953; 14297; 14298; 14300; 14302; 14309-10; 14317 at 47-48 ffl
71-72), 109-117 (IHf 187-90, 192-93); 14318 at 89 (If 258).] The Reports were submitted by
the Special Master in "his capacity as Special Master" under Rule 53 and made
recommendations under Rule 53(e)(2), including the Special Master's request for the May
11, 2001 Order and for approval of the Master Settlement Agreement. [R. 1885; 2033 at ^
1; 2721; 14298 at 2; 14300 at 25.] Even though the Reports were submitted by a special
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master, the Special Master/E. Excel's counsel told Judge Howard during the January 10,
2003 hearing that:
[T]he Special Master's reports . . . were clearly partisan reports by Mr.
Holman
I just want to be clear for the record. To the extent that I said
Mr. Holman was partisan, I stand by that.
[R. 14287 at 117, 125 (emphasis added).]
•

In September 2002 and onward, the Special Master was identifying himself to

the world on E. Excel's website as the trial court's "independent Special Master" who
allegedly had been appointed "[a]s a result of the wrongful conduct of Mrs. Jau-Hwa
Stewart." [R. 11380.]
•

In September 2002, the Special Master/E. Excel moved for contempt against

Hwan Lan Chen and the other third-party defendants - seeking Hwan Lan Chen's default on
the Special Master/E. Excel's claims allegedly worth $17 million - on the assertion that they
should be subject to the same sanction as was defendant Jau-Hwa Stewart under the
Contempt Ruling. [R. 8943.] The Special Master/E. Excel asserted that its claims against
Hwan Lan Chen should proceed directly to damages based on the Preliminary Injunction and
Contempt findings, rather than allow her a trial on the issue of her liability. [Id] The
contempt motion remains pending, subject to this Court's stay of all proceedings below.
•

Judge Howard never denied any-not o n e - of the Special Master's significant

motions, requests, or recommendations. [E.g., R. 762; 2034; 8167; 9145.]
•

The Special Master has neither resigned his appointment as a special master

nor ceded any of his powers. Jones Waldo has never filed a withdrawal of appearance for
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the Special Master. In late August 2002, the Special Master submitted an affidavit as a party
litigant in which he stated that he "continue[s] to serve" as both Special Master and CEO of
E. Excel. [R. 14324, Holman Aff. at ^ 1.] The Special Master still directs and controls E.
Excel's participation in this case. [Id.; R. 8673 at ^| 6.]
6.

The Special Master Obtained The Preliminary Injunction As An
Active Party Litigant In The Action Below

Judge Howard granted the Preliminary Injunction against Hwan Lan Chen based on
the Special Master's participation as an active party litigant in the action.
The Preliminary Injunction was entered on the Special Master/E. Excel's October 25,
2001 Motion for Preliminary Injunction and was based on the Special Master/E. Excel's
claims asserted in the Amended Third Party Complaint. [R. 3721; 4214 {see Addendum,
Tabs J, K).] The Motion for Preliminary Injunction was filed by Jones Waldo expressly as
counsel for the Special Master and E. Excel. [R. 3721; 3719.] Jones Waldo expressly
appeared on behalf of the Special Master in the combined Preliminary Injunction/Contempt
proceeding. [R. 14244 at 5; see Addendum, Tab T.] The Special Master testified in the
combined proceeding against Hwan Lan Chen. [R. 14256 at 77-143.]
The Preliminary Injunction was based, in part, on the testimony and Reports of the
Special Master. Ten of the Preliminary Injunction findings are based on the testimony of the
Special Master, which typically was cited as the determinative evidence. [R. 14318 at 52-56
flflj 153-54, 156-61), 68 fl| 205), 79 (1236).] Eight of the Contempt findings (which were
incorporated by reference into the Preliminary Injunction findings) are based on the Special
Master's Reports, which had been submitted in "his capacity as Special Master." [R. 2721;
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14317 at 47-48 flflf 71-72), 109-117 flffl 187-90, 192-93); 14318 at 89 fl[ 258).] The
Contempt findings quote, verbatim and at length, from the Special Master's Reports Nos. 3
and 4. [R. 14317 at 109-17 ffl 187, 190, 193).]
B.

The Preliminary Injunction Ruling Violated Hwan Lan Chen's
Constitutional Right To Due Process Of Law

In addition to being the product of the Special Master's unlawful exercise of the
powers of an active party litigant, the Preliminary Injunction was granted without due process
to Hwan Lan Chen.
The Preliminary Injunction was granted against Hwan Lan Chen based on 18 days of
evidentiary hearings that were conducted before she was made a party to the action and
without notice to her. [R. 3718; 5000; 5333; 14317 at 4.] The January 19, 23 and 24,
February 1, 2, 7, 8, 9, 13 and 20, October 25 and 26, November 27 and 28, and December
10, 11, 12 and 13, 2001 evidentiary hearings on which the Preliminary Injunction and
Contempt findings were based were held before Hwan Lan Chen was made a party and
without notice to her.7 [R. 14221-223; 14226; 14228; 14230-235; 14244-250; 14252; 1429395; 14317 at 4.] Ten of those evidentiary hearings -the January and February 2001 hearings
- were held almost a year before Hwan Lan Chen was even named as a party. [R. 4214.]
During the 18 days of evidentiary hearings that were conducted without Hwan Lan
Chen, 50% of the total testimony and 42% of the total exhibits cited in the Preliminary

7

Hwan Lan Chen first made an appearance in the case on December 17, 2001, after
counsel stated on December 12, 2001 that he would be appearing for her. [R. 5000; 14284
at 182.] She was not served summons until January 15, 2002, when her counsel accepted
service on her behalf. [R. 5333.]
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Injunction findings were admitted into evidence, [See Addendum, Tab U.] During those
18 days of evidentiary hearings, 80% of the testimony and 72% of the exhibits cited in the
Contempt findings (which were incorporated by reference into the Preliminary Injunction
findings) were admitted into evidence. [Id.]
The Preliminary Injunction was granted against Hwan Lan Chen even though,
between the time counsel stated he would be appearing for Hwan Lan Chen and the time he
actually made that appearance, the Special Master/E. Excel's counsel told Judge Howard at
the December 13,2001 evidentiary hearing that he was not "seeking injunctive relief against
[Hwan Lan] Chen" at that time, claiming "we would like to do some more discovery with
respect to her." [R. 14249 at 180-81 (see Addendum, Tab L).] The Special Master/E. Excel
did not serve its Motion for Preliminary Injunction on Hwan Lan Chen, and Judge Howard
ordered that the Motion would be heard with the pending Contempt motions without notice
to Hwan Lan Chen. [R. 3718; 14243 at 64.] In fact, as late as May 8, 2002, Judge Howard
did not have an understanding that the Special Master/E. Excel was seeking injunctive relief
against Hwan Lan Chen. [R. 14264 at 96.]
C.

Judge Howard's January 24, 2003 Ruling Merely Attempted to Justify
The Special Master's Unlawful Empowerment and Actions

Judge Howard, in his January 24,2003 Ruling on Hwan Lan Chen's Motion to Vacate
and Set Aside, attempted to justify the Special Master's unlawful empowerment and actions
by accepting virtually every argument made by the Special Master/E. Excel.
On October 24,2002, within ten days of the entry of the Preliminary Injunction, Hwan
Lan Chen filed her Motion to Vacate and Set Aside Judge Howard's orders relating to the
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Special Master's appointment, empowerment, and actions. [R. 9238.] Judge Howard denied
the Motion to Vacate and Set Aside in his January 24,2003 Ruling {see Addendum, Tab B)
on multiple grounds that were contrary to the record:
1.

Judge Howard Erroneously Ruled That Rule 53 Does Not Limit A Special

Master To Judicial Powers. Judge Howard ruled that the Special Master had not exceeded
"the parameters of Rule 53(c)." [R. 12765.] Judge Howard ruled that Rule 53 does not limit
a special master to judicial powers, and made no attempt to analyze whether the Special
Master's empowerment and exercise of the powers of a CEO, party litigant, and master
claims settler were lawful. [R. 12764-65.]
2.

Judge Howard Ruled, Contrary To The Record, That Hwan Lan Chen Was

Bound BY An Alleged Stipulation to the Special Master's Appointment. Judge Howard ruled
that Hwan Lan Chen was bound by the alleged "lawful and binding" stipulation between the
plaintiff, the defendant, and E. Excel that "Mr. Holman would act as CEO/President of E.
Excel and as special master." [R. 12764.]
He so ruled even though Hwan Lan Chen never entered into any such stipulation. She
was not even a party to the action when the Special Master was appointed and empowered.
[R. 704; 4214.] In fact, no party ever stipulated or agreed to the Special Master's
appointment. There was absolutely no stipulation or agreement to the appointment of a
special master or Mr. Holman's appointment as Special Master and CEO. Judge Howard's
March 5, 2001 ruling that Mr. Holman would have "master status" - the first reference to a
special master by Judge Howard - was not the result of a stipulation, but was solely based
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on a request by plaintiff Jau-Fei Chen's counsel. [R. 14274 at 7,20-21 (see Addendum, Tab
C).] The March 13, 2001 Order appointing the Special Master was not a stipulated order.
[R. 704.] The Interim Order did not even mention a "special master," much less constitute
an agreement to the appointment of the Special Master. [R. 626-32.] Instead, the Interim
Order provided for the appointment of only an "independent, neutral" interim CEO, who
would be limited to maintaining E. Excel as a putative party defendant. [Id. atffl]1, 9.]
3.

Judge Howard Ruled, Contrary To The Record, That Hwan Lan Chen's

Challenge Was Waivable And Had Been Waived. Judge Howard ruled that Hwan Lan
Chen's challenge to the Special Master's unlawful empowerment and actions was "barred
by the doctrine of waiver." [R. 12761.]
He so ruled even though Hwan Lan Chen challenged the Special Master's
empowerment and actions as being in excess of Judge Howard's and the Special Master's
jurisdiction. She did not challenge the Special Master's empowerment and actions on any
claim that he was erroneously empowered with or exercised judicial power. [R. 9238.]
Judge Howard ruled that Hwan Lan Chen had waived her challenge even though she
was not a party when the Special Master was appointed and took most of his actions, once
she became a party she timely filed her Motion to Vacate and Set Aside within the ten-day
time period allowed by Utah Rule of Civil Procedure 52(b) for challenging findings, and the
Special Master continues to exercise non-judicial powers as a special master. [R. 704; 4214;
9145; 9238; 14324, Holman Aff. at ^ 1.]
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4.

Judge Howard Ruled, Contrary To The Record, That Hwan Lan Chen Lacked

Standing On The Basis That She Allegedly Is Not An Owner Of E. Excel. Judge Howard
ruled that Hwan Lan Chen lacked standing to challenge the Special Master's unlawful
empowerment and actions. [R. 12756-57.] Judge Howard never considered Hwan Lan
Chen's standing as a party litigant, even though the Special Master conceded her standing
as a party litigant. [R. 14287 at 109.] Instead, he ruled that she lacked standing on the basis
that Hwan Lan Chen allegedly is not an owner of E. Excel. [R. 12757.] Judge Howard
asserted that he had already "determined the ownership interests of E. Excel" with his August
12, 2002 Ruling on plaintiff Jau-Fei Chen's "Motion for Partial Summary Judgment
Regarding Stock Ownership" and that his determination did "not include any ownership
interest by" Hwan Lan Chen.8 [Id]
Judge Howard ruled that Hwan Lan Chen lacked standing even though Hwan Lan
Chen has been substantially aggrieved as a party litigant as a direct result of the Special
Master's unlawful empowerment and action. The Special Master's empowerment and
actions as an active party litigant are the foundation of Hwan Lan Chen's joinder as a party
to the litigation and the Preliminary Injunction against her, and is the basis for the Special
Master's pending efforts to hold her in contempt and strike her pleadings. [R. 3721; 4205
at ^ 3; 8943; 9145.] The Special Master alleges this in his Amended Third Party Complaint:

8

Judge Howard also asserted that Hwan Lan Chen had "failed to file compulsory or
affirmative claims to assert her ownership in E. Excel." [R. 12756.] He so ruled even
though plaintiff Jau-Fei Chen has never asserted any claims against Hwan Lan Chen, as
necessary for Hwan Lan Chen to have any compulsion to file any counterclaim. [R. 24.]
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"Special Master Holman has determined that E. Excel should initiate litigation against. ..
the third party defendants . . . . " [R. 4205 at H 3.]
Judge Howard ruled that Hwan Lan Chen lacked standing on the basis that she
allegedly is not an E. Excel owner even though Hwan Lan Chen alleges and has sworn in
interrogatory answers that she is the principal owner of E. Excel and standing is based on
allegations alone. [R. 9256; 14287 at 89, 92; 14332, Reply Memo, at Ex. B (Interr. No. 5)
(see Addendum, Tab M).] Without Judge Howard's orders with respect to the Special
Master's empowerment and actions, Hwan Lan Chen's principal ownership interest in E.
Excel would not have been impacted by the Master Settlement Agreement, the cost of the
Special Master acting as an active party litigant, or the freeze-out merger. [R. 2032-33 at fflj
3-4; 8674; 8770; 14300 at 2-3, 25; 14318 at 54-55flffl159-60); 14320 Memo, at Ex. 1.]
Judge Howard rejected Hwan Lan Chen's claim to principal ownership of E. Excel
on the basis that he already had adjudicated the stock ownership of E. Excel with his August
12,2002 Ruling, even though no claim to which she is a party and which was directed at her
claim of principal ownership of E. Excel (neither a claim, counterclaim, cross-claim, nor
third-party claim) has been asserted by pleading in the case. [R. 24; 4214.] Instead, Hwan
Lan Chen has asserted by pleading her claim to principal ownership of E. Excel against her
daughters Jau-Fei Chen and Jau-Hwa Stewart in a separate case, Civil No. 020405767,
currently pending in the Fourth Judicial District Court. [R. 14287 at 89,92.] Judge Howard
was provided a copy of Hwan Lan Chen's complaint in that separate case, but still asserted
that Hwan Lan Chen had failed to assert her claim. [Id; R. 12756.]
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Hwan Lan Chen's claim to principal ownership is not based on the issued stock of E.
Excel, but - as recognized by Judge Howard - is primarily an equitable, beneficial claim of
ownership. [R. 12756.] Such ownership arrangements are common with traditional Chinese
families such as the Chen family and are supported by law. See, e.g., Teemu Ruskola,
Conceptualizing Corporations and Kinship: Comparative Law and Development Theory in
a Chinese Perspective, 52 Stan. L. Rev. 1599 (2000). Plaintiff Jau-Fei Chen testified that
E. Excel profits were shared without regard to issued stock, with deference to the family
elders. [R. 14230 at 13-14.] Judge Howard found that E. Excel was a family business as to
which profits were shared by family members, with deference to senior family members. [R.
14317 at 5-6 fl[ 1).]
Judge Howard rejected Hwan Lan Chen's claim to principal ownership of E. Excel
on the basis of his August 12, 2002 Order, even though that Order was entered on plaintiff
Jau-Fei Chen's motion for summary judgment on her fourth claim for relief against only
defendant Jau-Hwa Stewart. [R. 6449; 7959.] The plaintiffs fourth claim for relief alleged
only that her children's E. Excel shares were not held in trust and that "any purported voting
or action taken with respect to such shares by Jau-Hwa Stewart as a purported trustee is
void." [R. 6448.] Reflecting the limited nature of the plaintiffs motion, the August 12,2002
Order was limited to stating the ownership of the outstanding shares of E. Excel and deciding
that trust issue.9 [R. 7959.]

9

Judge Howard also expressly noted the limited nature of his ruling on the partial
summary judgment motion at the June 26, 2002 hearing on the motion. [R. 14276 at 123-24
(continued...)
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Moreover, the August 12,2002 Order was entered after the parties and Judge Howard
had notice of Hwan Lan Chen's ownership claim, but never mentions her claim. Judge
Howard had expressly preserved Hwan Lan Chen's claim of an interest in E. Excel in the
Interim Order. [R. 628-29 at ^ 8 ("Hwan Lan Chen claims to have advanced 3 million dollars
to the Company . . . The Parties reserve all rights with respect to this issue.").] Well prior
to the August 12,2002 Order, Hwan Lan Chen had identified in interrogatory responses her
claim to "beneficial" ownership of E. Excel, and Judge Howard had heard the plaintiffs
testimony regarding the Chen elders' prerogative as to E. Excel's profits. [R. 14230 at 1314; 14332, Reply Memo, at Ex. B (Interr. No. 5) (see Addendum, Tab M).]
5.

Judge Howard Ruled, Contrary To The Record, That Any Error Was Harmless

Error. Judge Howard ruled that, even if the Special Master's empowerment and actions were
error, it was harmless error on the claimed basis that the Preliminary Injunction was based
only in small part on the participation of the Special Master. [R. 12760.]
Judge Howard attempted to bolster his harmless error ruling by altering the record
regarding his reliance upon the Special Master's "clearly partisan" Reports. [Id.] The
Contempt findings cited to and quoted extensively from the Special Master's Reports, and
had been expressly incorporated by reference into the Preliminary Injunction findings. [R.
14317 at 47-48 (fflf 71-72), 109-117 flffl 187-90, 192-93); 14318 at 89 tf| 258).] At the

9

(...continued)
("For that reason, the motion for partial summary judgment is granted as to the status of the
stock and as to Ms. Stewart's conduct thereafter in an attempt to reissue the stock shares.
But only to that extent.").]
35

January 10, 2003 hearing, the Special Master/E. Excel asked Judge Howard to undo that
express incorporation, even though it was the Special Master/E. Excel who had requested the
incorporation. [R. 14287 at 74; 14316 at 90(^258).] In his January 24,2003 Ruling, Judge
Howard acceded to the Special Master/E. Excel's request, and ruled, "as a matter of
clarification," that the Contempt and Preliminary Injunction findings "stand independent of
each other" and that the Preliminary Injunction findings' express incorporation by reference
of the Contempt findings "was not essential." [R. 12760.]
Judge Howard ruled that any error was harmless error even though the Special Master
alone joined Hwan Lan Chen and sought and obtained relief against her and remains an
adverse active party litigant. [R. 3721; 4205 at H 3; 9145.] The Special Master restructured
E. Excel's business, released its valuable claims, and settled its litigation. [R. 14344, Ex.
534.] The Special Master attempted to cede complete ownership of E. Excel's outstanding
stock to plaintiff Jau-Fei Chen and her children. [R. 14320, Memo, at Ex. 1.] He submitted
"clearly partisan" reports that became part of the record and were used to support findings
that supported the Preliminary Injunction. [R. 14287 at 117, 125; 14318 at 89 fl[ 258).]
Judge Howard ruled that the Special Master's unlawful empowerment and actions were
harmless error even though he never denied any significant order, power, or finding that the
Special Master put forth. [E.g., R. 762; 2034; 8167; 9145; 14316.]
In sum, in his January 24, 2003 Ruling, Judge Howard, contrary to the record,
summarily adopted the Special Master/E. Excel's opposition arguments to the Motion to
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Vacate and Set Aside in an attempt to justify the Special Master's unlawful empowerment
and actions.
D,

The Scope Of The Preliminary Injunction Is Facially Invalid Because It
Enjoins Hwan Lan Chen From All Competition With E. Excel And All
Competition In Several Entire Industries Worldwide

The scope of the Preliminary Injunction is facially unlawful. It invalidly enjoins
Hwan Lan Chen from all competition with E. Excel and all competition in the entire herbal,
dietary, hygiene, cosmetic, and personal care product industries worldwide.
The Special Master/E. Excel moved for a preliminary injunction to prevent
competition with E. Excel indefinitely rather than to enforce any non-compete agreement.
The Special Master/E. Excel moved to enjoin Hwan Lan Chen, Jau-Hwa Stewart, and the
other third-party defendants from "competing with E. Excel in any manner until such time
as E. Excel has completely rebuilt its business

" [R. 3720 (see Addendum, Tab J).]

The Preliminary Injunction not only completely enjoins Hwan Lan Chen from all
competition with E. Excel, it also enjoins her from all competition in several entire industries
worldwide. In its main prohibitive provision, the Preliminary Injunction provides:
Jau-Hwa Stewart, [Hwan Lan Chen, and the other] Third-Party Defendants .
. . are hereby enjoined from competing, or preparing to compete with E.
Excel or otherwise engaging or preparing to engage in the worldwide
manufacture or marketing of herbal and dietary consumer products, and
personal care, cosmetic, or hygiene products.
[R. 9140 at t 13 (emphasis added) (see Addendum, Tab P).] The Order of Preliminary
Injunction limits the duration of the Preliminary Injunction as to Hwan Lan Chen to the
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duration of the action below, but expressly leaves open the possibility of its being extended
indefinitely. [R. 9138 at Tf 19.]
Judge Howard so enjoined Hwan Lan Chen even though she had no continuing duty
not to compete with E. Excel. There is no evidence that Hwan Lan Chen was ever a party
to a non-compete agreement with E. Excel. Hwan Lan Chen was never an officer or
employee of E. Excel and was never at E. Excel's facilities during the relevant time period.
Moreover, even though Hwan Lan Chen was a director of E. Excel, her directorship ended
on February 21, 2001. [R. 630-31 at H 3.]
Judge Howard so enjoined Hwan Lan Chen even though he made no finding of any
continuing irreparable harm, E. Excel does not compete worldwide or in the entire dietary,
herbal, cosmetic, hygiene, or personal care product industries, and there is no basis for the
duration of the Preliminary Injunction.10 [R. 14317 at 8fl[10); 14318 at 108-09flflj75-79).]
An entire year passed between the Special Master/E. Excel's Motion for Preliminary
Injunction and Judge Howard's entry of the Preliminary Injunction, almost a year has passed
since the entry of the Preliminary Injunction, and, unless vacated, the Preliminary Injunction
will be in place for well over an additional year as the case proceeds. [R. 3721; 9138 at
Tf 19.] The Preliminary Injunction has such duration even though E. Excel's standard non-

10

The Preliminary Injunction findings determined only that there was past irreparable
harm. [R. 14318 at 108 fl| 75) (see Addendum, Tab N) ("E. Excel has been irreparably
harmed by the conduct of Jau-Hwa Stewart and the Third-Party Defendants.") (emphasis
added).]
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compete agreement with its employees is limited to one-year's duration. [R. 14341, Ex. 238
(Ex. A, 1 5.3), Ex. 246 (Ex. C, 1 5.3); 14344, Ex. 505 (1 5.3), Ex. 506 (1 5.3).]
E.

The Special Master/E. Excel Never Established A Prima Facie Case On
The Key Predicate Findings Against Hwan Lan Chen, In Support Of The
The Preliminary Injunction, That She Was A Crook. Conspirator. And
Corporate Wrongdoer

E. Excel failed to establish a prima facie case, as required, on the key predicate
findings that Hwan Lan Chen was a crook, conspirator, and corporate wrongdoer which serve
as the basis for the Preliminary Injunction.
1.

The Key Predicate Findings Against Hwan Lan Chen. The Preliminary

Injunction was granted on the key predicate findings that Hwan Lan Chen is a crook,
conspirator, and corporate wrongdoer {see Addendum, Tab N):
(1)

The Preliminary Injunction findings determined that: (a) Hwan Lan Chen was

associated with a criminal "enterprise" under UPUAA; (b) the "enterprise" consisted of an
association of Hwan Lan Chen, Jau-Hwa Stewart and the other third-party defendants, and
included activities with respect to Apogee, Inc.; and (c) the association engaged in a "pattern
of unlawful activity" under UPUAA." [R. 14318 at 102-03 ffl 50-52).] There are no
findings that Hwan Lan Chen (or any other defendant) funded, acquired, or controlled an

1

' The Preliminary Injunction findings determined that the association engaged in the
"unlawful" or predicate acts of: (1) theft of E. Excel's products, files and other assets, (2)
receiving of stolen property consisting of the same property, (3) unlawful dealing of the same
property by a fiduciary, (4) making false or inconsistent statements, (5) making false written
statements, and (6) dealing in trademarked goods with intent to defraud. [R. 14318 at 103-06
(11 53-65).]
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"enterprise" through a pattern of unlawful activity so as to have committed a substantive
UPUAA violation.
(2)

The Preliminary Injunction findings determined that: (a) the association that

was a criminal "enterprise" under UPUAA also was a civil conspiracy among the association
members, including Hwan Lan Chen; (b) the conspiracy members "have been working
toward the object of unlawfully disabling E. Excel in order to enhance their own competitive
prospects"; and (c) in furtherance of the conspiracy, the conspirators committed several
unlawful overt acts against E. Excel. [R. 14318 at 106-07 fl[ 68).]
(3)

The Preliminary Injunction findings determined that Hwan Lan Chen had

breached fiduciary duties owed to E. Excel as an E. Excel director by: (a) "cutting off [E.
Excel's] highly successful relationships with its territorial distributors"; (b) causing E. Excel
to take other, unspecified actions "that were not done for legitimate business purposes"; (c)
seeking to destroy E. Excel; (d) establishing Apogee, Inc. and soliciting E. Excel employees
while serving as an E. Excel director; and (e) "crippling E. Excel's operations at the time of
[her] departure." [R. 14318 at 97, 99 flflj 30, 36).] The Preliminary Injunction findings
determined that Hwan Lan Chen had pursued, for her own benefit, unspecified opportunities
which should have been E. Excel's. [R. 14318 at 100 fl[ 40).]
(4)

The Preliminary Injunction findings determined that Hwan Lan Chen had

engaged in acts of unfair competition consisting of stealing E. Excel's "product, files, and
other items," and "using those items to compete unfairly with E. Excel." [R. 14318 at 101
(1 43).] The Preliminary Injunction findings also determined that the unfair competition
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included distributors in Asia passing off E. Excel product under the Apogee name. [R. 14318
at 68-69, 77 ffl 204, 206, 207, 231).]
2.

The Evidence on Which the Preliminary Injunction was Granted Against Hwan

Lan Chen. Hwan Lan Chen recognizes her obligation to marshal the evidence upon which
the key predicate findings against her were based. That marshaling shows that the Special
Master/E. Excel failed to make a prima facie case against Hwan Lan Chen on those findings.
Critically, Hwan Lan Chen is her own person, whose liability must be judged based
on her actions and knowledge. Her prima facie liability cannot be established based on the
actions and knowledge of others or guilt by association. The wrongful conduct, if any, of
defendant Jau-Hwa Stewart or others is not the conduct of Hwan Lan Chen.
It is undisputed that Hwan Lan Chen is a 76-year old widow. She does not read, speak
or write English. [R. 9254 at ^j 1.] It is undisputed that Hwan Lan Chen was never an
employee or officer of E. Excel, was never at E. Excel's offices or facilities during the
relevant time period, and was never involved in E. Excel's daily management or operations.
[R. 14252 at 63.] She never signed a non-compete agreement with E. Excel or participated
in E. Excel's business operations, other than serving as a director of E. Excel from September
1, 2000 until February 21, 2001. [R. 631 at ^ 3.]
There is no evidence of any agreement by Hwan Lan Chen to act in violation of
UPUAA or to wrongfully impair E. Excel so as to enhance her ability to compete, or that she
ever had any knowledge of the claimed wrongful conduct of others. There is no evidence
that she ever funded, acquired, or controlled an "enterprise" through a "pattern of unlawful
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activities" in violation of UPUAA. There is no evidence that she committed any of the
alleged predicate acts of the alleged UPUAA "enterprise."
There is no evidence that Hwan Lan Chen ever acted to cripple E. Excel, stole any of
its assets, solicited any of its employees while she was an E. Excel director, or even had
knowledge of any such conduct. There is no evidence that she used stolen E. Excel products
to compete with E. Excel or had knowledge of any such activity. There is no evidence that
she in any manner directed, was involved in, or had knowledge of any distribution of E.
Excel products under the Apogee name.
A full marshaling of the evidence on which the Preliminary Injunction was granted
against Hwan Lan Chen shows that, sometime in the summer of 2000, Hwan Lan Chen
learned of her son-in-law's, Rui-Kang Zhang's, affair and his diversion of funds belonging
to E. Excel to his mistress. [R. 14230 at 7-9; 14245 at 123-24.] There is no question that Mr.
Zhang's mother-in-law strongly disapproved of his conduct. Hwan Lan Chen demanded that
her daughter, plaintiff Jau-Fei Chen, divorce Mr. Zhang and remove him from E. Excel so
that he no longer could control E. Excel funds. When the plaintiff resisted, Hwan Lan Chen
demanded that both she and Mr. Zhang remove themselves from E. Excel. [Id]

On

September 1,2000, defendant Jau-Hwa Stewart voted 100% of the shares of E. Excel stock
to remove the plaintiff and Mr. Zhang as E. Excel directors and install her mother and Ms.
Stewart's husband, Taig Stewart, in their place. [R. 14338, Ex. 23.]
The evidence shows that Hwan Lan Chen took four - and only four - actions as an
E. Excel director. [R. 14338, Exs. 23, 29, 32; R. 14343, Ex. 402).] She voted to remove
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plaintiff Jau-Fei Chen and Mr. Zhang as officers of E. Excel and install defendant Jau-Hwa
Stewart as the President, twice voted for the issuance of 3,200 new shares of E. Excel stock,
and voted to retain Hong Kong counsel for E. Excel to pursue claims there against E. Excel
Limited. [Id.] The 3,200 shares in fact were not issued. Hwan Lan Chen provided $3
million of her funds to E. Excel in January 2001. [R. 14247 at 46; 14256 at 134-35.] There
was no showing that the $3 million funding was in any way adverse to E. Excel. There were
no other director actions or meetings between September 1, 2000 and February 21, 2001.
The evidence establishes that defendant Jau-Hwa Stewart sent $2.3 million to Sam
Tzu and $400,000 to Richard Hu (who had defected from the Territorial Owners) in
November and December 2000 to help them set up new distributorships for E. Excel. [R.
14245 at 78-81; 14247 at 119-21; 14250 at 24.] Ms. Stewart intended that the new
distributorships would distribute E. Excel product on behalf of E. Excel in place of the
Territorial Owners. [R. 14245 at 24-25, 34-35, 78-81; 14250 at 174; 14293 at 107-08.] Ms.
Stewart had cut off the Territorial Owners, which had remained allied with plaintiff Jau-Fei
Chen, from obtaining E. Excel products sometime in the fall of 2000. [Id.]
There is no question that Hwan Lan Chen was the source of the funds that Ms. Stewart
sent to Messrs. Hu and Tsu in November and December 2000. [R. 14245 at 78-81; 14247
at 119-21; 14250 at 24.] However, there is no evidence that Hwan Lan Chen had any
involvement with the Territorial Owners being cut off from obtaining E. Excel products.
There is no evidence that Hwan Lan Chen was in any way responsible for or had
knowledge of any E. Excel files or product being taken from E. Excel in February 2001 or
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kept in the house where she lived along with defendant Jau-Hwa Stewart and Ms. Stewart's
husband. Indeed, the house was a very large home - the house has three levels and the
basement alone where the E. Excel files and products were kept was 7,000 square feet. [R.
14255 at 25-29.]
Hwan Lan Chen was removed as an E. Excel director on February 21,2001 pursuant
to the Interim Order. [R. 631 at ^j 3.] After February 21, 2001, she never held any position
with E. Excel.
The evidence shows that, after she was removed as an E. Excel director, Hwan Lan
Chen was involved in Apogee, Inc., which was formed in May 2001 and intended to compete
withE. Excel.12 [R. 14250 at 37-39; 14255 at 18-21, 111; 14262 at 8-12; 14295 at 36, 4445.] She funded the acquisition of a 12-acre parcel where Apogee's facility would be built,
the construction of that facility, the purchase of equipment for Apogee, and the purchase of
some raw materials for Apogee. [R. 14250 at 37-39, 67, 80-82; 14264 at 11-17, 64-65;
14295 at 36-38, 44-45.]
The evidence establishes that Ms. Stewart sent funds to Messrs. Hu and Tsu to help
them establish Apogee, Inc. distributorships. [R. 14247 at 158; 14264 at 11-17,64-65.] This
funding was separate from the funding that defendant Jau-Hwa Stewart sent to Messrs. Hu
and Tsu in November and December 2000 to help them establish E. Excel distributorships.

12

Judge Howard entered conflicting findings on whether the idea of forming Apogee,
Inc. and/or competing with E. Excel originated with defendant Jau-Hwa Stewart or Hwan
Lan Chen. The Contempt findings determined that Ms. Stewart was solely responsible for
Apogee, Inc. [R. 14317 at 65 fl[ 99), 99 fl[ 159).] The Preliminary Injunction findings
determined that Hwan Lan Chen and Ms. Stewart were responsible. [R. 14318 at 47 (<|[ 137).]
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The separate funding for Apogee, Inc. purposes occurred after February 21, 2001 - after
Hwan Lan Chen was removed as an E. Excel director. [See R. 14245 at 98-100.] There is
no question that Hwan Lan Chen was the source of the funds for Ms. Stewart's second
funding of Messrs. Hu and Tsu.13 [Id]
There is no showing that any of Hwan Lan Chen's actions with regard to Apogee, Inc.
were in any way wrongful. The actions all took place after she had been removed as an E.
Excel director and when she had no duty not to compete with E. Excel.
The Preliminary Injunction findings determined that Hwan Lan Chen instructed her
oldest daughter, Sheue Wen Smith, to lease space at the ATL warehouse for use to compete
with E. Excel on February 17,2001, five days before Hwan Lan Chen was removed as an E.
Excel director. [R. 14318 at 31-33 (ffi[ 81, 83).] This finding is not based on any evidence.
The uncontroverted evidence was that Hwan Lan Chen did not instruct Ms. Smith to lease
the ATL warehouse. [R. 14257 at 38, 49, 51.] The finding was based on Ms. Smith's
unverified Answer to the Amended Third Party Complaint. [R. 14318 at 32-33 ( ^ 83).]
Regardless, this is the only indication of any intent to compete by Hwan Lan Chen while she
was an E. Excel director. There is absolutely no evidence that Hwan Lan Chen was ever at
13

The evidence shows that Hwan Lan Chen used a nominee bank account as the
source of the funds that she supplied for Apogee, Inc. purposes, as well as the source of the
funds that Jau-Hwa Stewart supplied to Messrs. Hu and Tzu in November and December
2000 for E. Excel purposes and the $3 million that Hwan Lan Chen funded to E. Excel in
January 2001. [R. 14247 at 158; 14250 at 24-25; 14256 at 134-35; 14264 at 11-17, 64-65.]
However, Hwan Lan Chen readily acknowledged her investment in Apogee, Inc. in her
interrogatory responses in the case, her funding of $3 million to E. Excel was acknowledged
in the Interim Order, and there is no evidence that any of the funding was wrongful. [R. 62829 at % 8; 14332, Reply Memo, at Ex. B (Interr. No, 5).]
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the ATL warehouse space, much less involved in or had knowledge of any activities
occurring there.
In sum, there is no evidence that Hwan Lan Chen was a conspirator who agreed to
pursue an unlawful purpose, that she funded, acquired or controlled an "enterprise" through
a "pattern of unlawful conduct" in violation of UPUAA, that she committed any action
against E. Excel's interests while she was an E. Excel director in violation of her fiduciary
duties, or that she committed or ever had knowledge of any acts of unfair competition. The
marshaling shows only that Hwan Lan Chen acted to remove her daughter from the family
business after the daughter remained loyal to her husband despite his affair and diversion of
family money, she voted to retain Hong Kong counsel for E. Excel and for a stock issuance
that never occurred, she provided $3 million in funding to E. Excel, she funded new
distributorships for E. Excel, and she took actions to become a competitor of E. Excel after
she was removed as an E. Excel director when she had absolutely no duty not to compete.
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
The Special Master Was Unlawfully Empowered With and Exercised NonJudicial Powers. The integrity of the proceedings below has been compromised by a
dominating Rule 53 special master who was authorized by Judge Howard to act far beyond
and in direct conflict with his lawful judicial role under Rule 53, and who has and continues
to unlawfully exercise extensive non-judicial powers to the prejudice of Hwan Lan Chen.
A pendente lite special master is a judicial officer who can only be empowered with
and exercise judicial power. Utah R. Civ. P. 53; Webster Eisenlohr, Inc. v. Kalodner, 145
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F.2d 316, 319 (3d Cir. 1944); Plumb, 809 P.2d at 742-43. A simple but accurate statement
of the settled rule is that if a judge can't do it, a special master can't do it. Webster
Eisenlohr, 145 F.2d at 319. Because a special master is a judicial officer limited to judicial
power, a special master is bound by the Code of Judicial Conduct. Plumb, 809 P.2d at 743.
Orders relating to a special master's empowerment with and exercise of non-judicial powers
are entered without authority and must be vacated and set aside. Webster Eisenlohr, 145
F.2d at 320; Plumb, 809 P.2d at 744.
Under the settled rule regarding a special master's lawful power, Judge Howard's
orders relating to the Special Master's appointment, empowerment and actions must be
vacated and set aside - the entire pervasive participation of the Special Master in the case
must be terminated and reversed. The Special Master, pendente lite, was given the powers
of a CEO, party litigant, and master claims settler. The Special Master exercised those
powers as a special master to: (1) investigate and initiate claims, (2) join Hwan Lan Chen
as a party, (3) seek and obtain the Preliminary Injunction against her, (4) bring contempt
motions against her that seek her default on claims allegedly worth $17 million, (5)
restructure E. Excel by giving away to plaintiff Jau-Fei Chen, her husband, and their allies
90% of its business, (6) provide comprehensive releases to the plaintiff, her husband, and
their allies, (7) settle litigation beyond the case below, (8) eliminate defendant Jau-Hwa
Stewart as an E. Excel shareholder for the benefit of the plaintiff, her husband, and their
allies, and (9) submit admittedly "clearly partisan" special master reports which were used
against Hwan Lan Chen.
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Powers of a CEO, active party litigant, and master claims settler are not judicial
powers - they are the antithesis ofjudicial power. See Webster Eisenlohr, 145 F.2d at 320.
The Special Master could not have lawfully exercised the powers of E. Excel's CEO, active
party litigant, or master claims settler any more than Judge Howard lawfully could have. Id
As a result, all of Judge Howard's orders relating to the Special Master's appointment,
empowerment, and actions must be vacated and set aside, and the case below returned to its
status before the blatantly unlawful appointment, empowerment, and actions of the Special
Master.
Contrary to Judge Howard's January 24, 2003 Ruling, the Special Master's
empowerment with and exercise of patently unlawful non-judicial powers cannot be justified
or sheltered by the doctrine of waiver. The waiver doctrine does not allow a judicial officer
to cast off the limitations of his or her judicial office and exercise non-judicial powers.
Hwan Lan Chen's challenge to the Special Master's empowerment and actions is not subject
to waiver because his non-judicial empowerment and actions are fundamentally beyond and
in conflict with the lawful Rule 53 subject matter jurisdiction of a special master. They are
without lawful authority. See Cruz v. Hauck, 515 F.2d322,327 (5th Cir. 1975); Oldroydv.
McCrea, 235 P. 580,588 (Utah 1925). Hwan Lan Chen's challenge could not be waived any
more that Hwan Lan Chen could have consented to Judge Howard expanding his jurisdiction
to exercise the powers of E. Excel's CEO, a party litigant, and a master claims settler.
Hwan Lan Chen, moreover, did not waive her challenge to the Special Master's
unlawful empowerment and actions. See U.S. Realty 86Assocs. v. Security Inv. Ltd., 2002
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UT 14, U 16, 40 P.3d 586, 589. Hwan Lan Chen could not have expressly waived her
challenge because she was not even a party to the litigation when the Special Master was
appointed and empowered. Indeed, no party ever stipulated or agreed to the appointment of
a special master, much less to the Special Master's appointment as special master and CEO.
The March 13, 2001 Order was not stipulated or agreed to. The Interim Order did not even
mention, much less agree to the appointment of, a special master.
Once Hwan Lan Chen was joined as a party she did not explicitly or implicitly waive
her challenge. She made her Motion to Vacate and Set Aside within ten days of the entry of
the Preliminary Injunction, as required under Utah R. Civ. P. 52(b). Moreover, as a matter
of law, the Special Master, not Hwan Lan Chen, had a duty to raise the issue of his unlawful
empowerment and pendent conflicts of interest. See Regional Sales Agency, Inc. v. Reichert,
830 P.2d 252, 257 n.7 (Utah 1992). Finally, there could be no waiver because the Special
Master continues to pursue his unlawful powers. He is here now as a party litigant in this
appeal. He has never relinquished his office.
Judge Howard's justification of the Special Master's empowerment and actions in his
January 24, 2003 Ruling on the grounds of Hwan Lan Chen's lack of standing was pure
error. Judge Howard never considered Hwan Lan Chen's standing as a party litigant. She
manifestly has been aggrieved as a party litigant by the Special Master's participation as a
party litigant - indeed, the Special Master is solely responsible for her being a party. The
Special Master and the plaintiff conceded Hwan Lan Chen's standing as a party litigant.
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Judge Howard's ruling that Hwan Lan Chen lacked standing because she was not an
E. Excel owner was contrary to the rule that standing is based on allegations alone. See
Davis v. Passam, 442 U.S. 228, 239 n.18 (1979). This rule required Judge Howard to
assume Hwan Lan Chen's ownership to determine her standing, because she alleges and
swore in answers to interrogatories that she is an owner. Correctly assuming that she is the
principal owner of E. Excel, Hwan Lan Chen manifestly has been aggrieved by the Special
Master's unlawrful empowerment and actions.
Judge Howard's rejection of Hwan Lan Chen's ownership claim in his January 24,
2003 Ruling on the basis that he already adjudicated the ownership of E. Excel with his
August 12, 2002 Order violated the rule that a claim must be pleaded before it can be
adjudicated. See Combe v. Warren's Family Drive-Inns, Inc., 680 P.2d 733, 735-36 (Utah
1984). Hwan Lan Chen's ownership claim has never been presented by way of any pleading
in the action below. The August 12, 2002 Order was entered on and only decided the
plaintiffs claim against defendant Jau-Hwa Stewart that she had no authority to vote the
plaintiffs children's E. Excel shares under a trust.
Lastly, Judge Howard's justification of the Special Master's unlawful empowerment
and actions in his January 24,2003 Ruling on the grounds of harmless error is untenable. See
Plumb, 809 P.2d at 744. The pervasive adverse impact of the Special Master's unlawful
empowerment and actions was plainly harmful to Hwan Lan Chen. The Court need look no
further than paragraph 3 of the Amended Third Party Complaint to see that this is true.
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Hwan Lan Chen Was Fundamentally Denied Due Process Under The United
States and Utah Constitutions. The Preliminary Injunction was granted against Hwan Lan
Chen in fundamental denial of her constitutional right to due process of law. The
Preliminary Injunction was granted against Hwan Lan Chen based on 18 days of evidentiary
hearings held before she was made a party to the case and provided notice. During those 18
days of evidentiary hearings - when Hwan Lan Chen was unrepresented by counsel, had no
opportunity to cross-examine, and had not been served the Motion for Preliminary Injunction
- over 50% of the evidence cited in the Preliminary Injunction and Contempt findings was
received into evidence.
Hwan Lan Chen manifestly was not provided the notice or opportunity to be heard
required by the United States and Utah Constitutions. Hwan Lan Chen's constitutional right
to due process of law requires that the evidence used against her be taken after she had
notice and the opportunity to be heard, not before. She had a right to notice, participation
as a party, and the opportunity to be heard from the commencement of the proceeding on
which the Preliminary Injunction against her was based. See Plumb, 809 P.2d at 743; Salt
Lake County v. Murray City Redevelopment, 598 P.2d 1339,1345 n.12 (Utah 1979); Eakins
v. Reed, 710 F.2d 184, 187 (4th Cir. 1983).
The Scope Of The Preliminary Injunction Is Facially Invalid. The Preliminary
Injunction is facially invalid in scope because it enjoins Hwan Lan Chen from all competition
with E. Excel and from all competition in several entire industries worldwide. Judge Howard
could not lawfully enjoin Hwan Lan Chen from any competition with E. Excel because she
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had absolutely no continuing duty not to compete with E. Excel. See Microbiological
Research Corp, v. Mima, 625 P.2d 690, 700 (Utah 1981). She never had a non-compete
agreement.

She was only a director from September 1, 2000 to February 21, 2001.

Enjoining Hwan Lan Chen from all competition in several industries worldwide is
unprecedented in American jurisprudence, constitutes involuntary servitude, and in no
manner serves to protect any legitimate interest of E. Excel. See Allen v. Rose ParkPharm.,
237 P.2d 823, 826 (Utah 1951); Crane v. Dahle, 576 P.2d 870, 872-73 (Utah 1978).
Judge Howard's injunction against Hwan Lan Chen was simply an improper sanction
rather than preliminary relief to any legally protected interest of E. Excel. See American Bd.
of Psychiatry & Neurology, Inc. v. Johnson-Powell, 129 F.3d 1,4 (1st Cir. 1997); Hunsaker
v. Kersh, 1999 UT 106, H 8, 991 P.2d 67, 69.
The Special Master/E. Excel Never Established A Prima Facie Case That Hwan
Lan Chen Was A Crook, Conspirator, Or Corporate Wrongdoer.

The Special

Master/E. Excel did not even come close to establishing a prima facie case on the key
predicate findings against Hwan Lan Chen supporting the Preliminary Injunction.

At

minimum, a prima facie case is required. SeeKeil, 1999 UT 16 at^f 8, 974 P.2d at 822. Yet,
there simply is no basis in the evidence for the key predicate findings that Hwan Lan Chen
is a crook, conspirator, and corporate wrongdoer.
Hwan Lan Chen has marshaled the evidence on which the Preliminary Injunction was
granted against her, as required. That evidence only shows that Hwan Lan Chen acted as a
mother, exercised her prerogatives as a matriarch of the Chen family, took limited action as
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an E. Excel director, provided funds to E. Excel, and was a potential competitor after she
stopped being an E. Excel director. These actions do not make Hwan Lan Chen a crook,
conspirator, or corporate wrongdoer. There is no evidence that Hwan Lan Chen agreed to
a conspiracy, or committed or even knew about any predicate acts, any thefts, any acts to
cripple E. Excel, or any acts of unfair competition.
ARGUMENT
I.

JUDGE HOWARD'S ORDERS RELATING TO THE SPECIAL MASTER'S
APPOINTMENT, EMPOWERMENT, AND ACTIONS MUST BE VACATED
AND SET ASIDE BECAUSE THE SPECIAL MASTER WAS EMPOWERED
WITH AND EXERCISED NON-JUDICIAL POWERS THAT ARE BEYOND
AND IN DIRECT CONFLICT WITH THE JUDICIAL POWER
AUTHORIZED BY RULE 53
A.

Judge Howard's Orders Relating To The Special Master's Appointment
Empowerment and Actions Are Contrary To The Law, Exceed The
Power Of A Court And Special Master Under Rule 53, Violate And Are
Contrary To The Provisions And Purpose Of Rule 53 And, As A Matter
Of Law, Must Be Vacated And Set Aside

In compromise of the integrity of the proceedings below, the Special Master was
empowered with, exercised, and continues to exercise extensive non-judicial powers
unprecedented in the history of American jurisprudence. With pervasive impact and
prejudice, the Special Master was empowered with and exercises powers that are not only
far beyond the lawful judicial power of a special master authorized by Rule 53, but which are
antithetical to the purpose and exercise of judicial power. All of Judge Howard's unlawful
orders relating to the Special Master's appointment, empowerment, and actions must be
vacated and set aside under settled, controlling authority.
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The extensive unlawful

participation of the Special Master in the case must be terminated and the impact of that
participation reversed.
1.

A Special Master Is Limited To Judicial Powers Because Rule 53
Does Not Authorize A Judge To Empower A Special Master With
Powers That The Judge Does Not Have

Fundamentally, a pendente lite special master is a judicial officer whose lawful
authority is limited, the same as a judge's, to the exercise of judicial power. A special
master, like a judge, cannot be empowered to exercise the powers of a CEO, party litigant,
or master claims settler.
This Court clearly established the rule in Plumb. As this Court determined in Plumb:
[A] special master has "the duties and obligations of a judicial officer."
. . . . We think they are most analogous to commissioners when acting in the
performance of their duties. Therefore, they owe similar ethical obligations
to the court, the parties, and the public.... [W]e conclude that he or she is
. . . bound by the ethical obligations and restraints of a judicial officer.
809 P.2d at 742-43 (emphasis added) (citations omitted). Under Plumb, a special master is
a judicial officer who is limited to the exercise ofjudicial power and who has the obligations
of a judge.14 Id. Critically, as held in Plumb, a special master cannot be empowered to
"fulfill an adversary role." Id. at 743-44.

14

See also Utah R. Prof. Conduct 1.12 cmt. ("The term 'adjudicative officer' includes
such officials as judges pro tempore, referees, special masters, hearing officers and other
parajudicial officers . . ..") (emphasis added).
54

This is not only the rule in Utah, it is the accepted federal rule as well.15 LaBuy v.
Howe Leather Co., 352 U.S. 249, 256 (1957) ("The use of masters is 'to aid judges in the
performance of specific judicial duties, as they may arise in the progress of a cause,' and not
to displace the court." (citations omitted)); In re Gilbert, 276 U.S. 6, 9 (1928) ("When
respondent accepted the appointment as master he assumed the duties and obligations of a
judicial officer."); In re Bituminous Coal Operators' Ass % 949 F.2d 1165,1168 (D.C. Cir.
1981) ("Rule 53 .. . authorizes the appointment of special masters to assist^ not to replace,
the adjudicator . . . ."); Cruz, 515 F.2d at 327; 9 Moore's Federal Practice, § 53.11[5][a]
(Mathew Bender 3d ed.) ("The Code of Judicial Conduct for United States Judges is
applicable to special masters.").
The decision in Webster Eisenlohr, 145 F.2d at 318-20, illustrates the rule. In
Webster Eisenlohr, the Third Circuit Court of Appeals, on petition for a writ, directed the
trial court to vacate and set aside the appointment of a special master whom the trial court
had charged with investigating possible claims of corporate wrongdoing with respect to a
corporation that was the object of the action before it. Id. at 318-20. The court held that,
because a judge is limited to the exercise of judicial power - the power to "decide
controversies" presented by the parties - Rule 53 does not authorize a judge to empower a

15

This Court recognized in Plumb that Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 53 is "nearly
identical" to Utah Rule of Civil Procedure 53 and, therefore, held that Utah courts are to
"freely look" to federal case law in applying Utah Rule of Civil Procedure 53. 809 P.2d at
740 n.9.
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special master with "administrative or investigative" powers. Id. The court's analysis is on
point:
It is clear, we think, that a master is appointed only to help the court in a case
where the help is needed. His appointment and activities are only for the
purpose of assisting the court to get at the facts and arrive at a correct result in
a complicated piece of litigation pending before the court. The master
operates as an arm of the court. Surely he has no wider scope of activity
than the court itself. If the court is limited in its judicial duties, to deciding
the issues presented in the litigation before it, the master's function can go no
further than to aid in the court's discharge of its duties.
Id. at 319 (emphasis added).
As both Plumb and Webster Eisenlohr establish, the rule can be stated simply: a
special master can do no more than a judge can do; if a judge has no lawful power or
jurisdiction to do an act, then a special master cannot do it. Plumb, 809 P.2d at 743;
Webster Eisenlohr, 145 F.2d at 319-20.
Under the rule that a judge may not authorize a special master with powers that the
judge does not possess, a special master cannot be empowered to exercise the powers of a
CEO, party litigant, or master claims settler because a judge does not possess those powers.
The executive authority of a CEO is antithetical to judicial power and empowering a special
master to act as a CEO creates impossible conflicts of interest that no judge or special master
may have. Webster Eisenlohr, 145 F.2d at 320; United States v. O'Connor, 291 F.2d 520,
528 (2d Cir. 1961) (holding that special master cannot also have an interest in the lawsuit,
which is inimical to lawful neutral role of special master). The powers of a party litigant to investigate, initiate, and prosecute claims, and obtain judicial relief {i.e., to be an
adversary) - are strictly reserved to the parties, not a judge or special master. Plumb, 809

P.2d at 743 (stating that special master is "bound by the . . . restraints of a judicial officer"
and may not "fulfill an adversary role."); Webster Eisenlohr, 145 F.2d at 318, 320. The
powers of a master claims settler - to settle multiple actions and provide comprehensive
releases - cannot be a judge's or special master's because judges, with the assistance of
special masters, are limited to deciding claims presented by the parties and may not act on
claims that are not before them. See Case v. Murdoch, 528 N.W.2d 386, 389 (S.D. 1995)
("Even the trial court judge would not have the power to decide conflicting claims among
stockholders in the absence of a trial. . . . The trial court would not have had authority to
dictate the settlement of a case . . . ."); Webster Eisenlohr, 145 F.2d at 319-20. A special
master exercising the powers of a CEO, active party litigant, and master claims settler
necessarily acts in violation of most of the Canons of the Code of Judicial Conduct, because
such a special master is not impartial and unbiased, lacks propriety, and does not provide the
parties a fair opportunity to be heard. Utah Code of Judicial Conduct, Canons 2.B, 3.B(1),
(5), (7) and (8).
Under the rule of Plumb and Webster Eisenlohr, it is fundamentally beyond and
contrary to the subject matter jurisdiction of a special master under Rule 53 for him or her
to be empowered with or exercise non-judicial powers - such powers are ultra vires for a
special master. There is only one possible remedy for such empowerment or action - to
vacate and set aside all orders with respect to the special master's unlawful empowerment
and actions. Plumb, 809 P.2d at 744 (stating that based on the impermissible actions of a
special master, "[i]t would be appropriate to vacate."); Webster Eisenlohr, 145 F.2d at 320
(directing trial court to vacate unlawful appointment of special master); Van Der Stappen v.

VanDerStappen, 815P.2d 1335, 1337 (Utah Ct. App. 1991) ("[A] judgment is void when
entered by a court that lacks subject matter jurisdiction over the controversy, and must be set
aside . . . . " ) ; Oldroyd, 235 P. at 588 (holding that order entered in excess of jurisdiction is
void and can be attacked at any time); Atwoodv. Cox, 55 P.2d 377, 384, 386 (Utah 1936)
(same); Reichert, 830 P.2d at 257-58 (adopting "bright line proscription" of automatically
vacating and setting aside a decision or order involving judicial misconduct).
In sum, Judge Howard committed pure error by ruling in his January 24,2003 Ruling
that Rule 53 does not limit a special master to the exercise ofjudicial power. His ruling was
directly contrary to the Utah and federal rule that a special master is a judicial officer who
can only do what a judge can do. There is absolutely no authority to the contrary of this
rule. None.
2.

Judge Howard's Orders With Respect To The Special Master's
Appointment Empowerment And Actions Must Be Vacated And
Set Aside Because The Special Master Was Empowered With And
Exercised Unprecedented And Pervasive Non-Judicial Powers

Judge Howard's orders with respect to the Special Master's appointment
empowerment, and actions simply cannot stand because the Special Master was empowered
with, exercised, and continues to exercise unprecedented non-judicial powers that no judge
or other judicial officer could ever conceivably possess.
Judge Howard appointed the Special Master as special master and CEO of E. Excel.
He granted the Special Master the power to be an active party litigant and master claims
settler-to "direct and control, initiate, dismiss, settle, or otherwise determine [E. Excel's]
interests in a l l . . . disputes or lawsuits . . . all without further Order of this Court." [R. 762.]

The Special Master retained litigation counsel with the approval of Judge Howard.
Jones Waldo appeared and litigated under the direction and control of the Special Master.
Jones Waldo filed a notice of appearance for the Special Master and appeared expressly for
the Special Master in 82% of its first 160filingsin the action. The Special Master through
E. Excel was the only party to file claims against Hwan Lan Chen.
The Amended Third Party Complaint expressly alleges the Special Master's
participation as an active party litigant and responsibility for Hwan Lan Chen being a party
to the action and having the Preliminary Injunction granted against her. The Amended Third
Party Complaint alleges that "Special Master Holman has determined that E. Excel should
initiate litigation against [Hwan Lan Chen]

" [R. 4205 at ^ 3.]

The Special Master sought and obtained the Preliminary Injunction based on claims
that he directed be filed. He authorized and directed E. Excel to file the Motion for
Preliminary Injunction. The Motion was filed by Jones Waldo expressly as counsel for the
Special Master and E. Excel. Jones Waldo expressly appeared for the Special Master in the
combined Preliminary Injunction/Contempt proceeding. The Special Master testified in the
combined proceeding against Hwan Lan Chen. The Special Master's "Reports of Special
Master," which had been submitted under Rule 53(e) in "his capacity as Special Master," but
which were the "clearly partisan" reports of a "partisan" special master, were cited as support
for findings on which the Preliminary Injunction was based.
The Special Master's participation as an active party litigant dominates the action.
The Special Master considerably expanded the scope of the action as to both claims and
parties and replaced the plaintiff - under whose control he acts - as the dominant party

litigant. The Special Master caused E. Excel to bear over $1 million in litigation costs for
the plaintiffs benefit. [R. 8674; 8770.] Because the Special Master participates as an active
party litigant, Hwan Lan Chen, defendant Jau-Hwa Stewart, and the other third-party
defendants face the trial court's "representative" as a litigation adversary. [R. 14236 at 71.]
As a result, Judge Howard could not impartially assess the credibility and testimony of
adverse parties, but had to assess the credibility and testimony of private parties on one side
and his "representative" on the other side.
Taking advantage of his status as Judge Howard's "representative," the Special Master
has litigated, through E. Excel, by multiple sanction and contempt motions, rather than allow
the private parties a jury trial. [R. 8167; 8943; 14329, Mtn. and Memo.] Judge Howard has
never denied the Special Master any relief he sought. Before this Court's stay of
proceedings below, the Special Master/E. Excel was seeking Hwan Lan Chen's default on
claims allegedly worth $17 million based on the incredible assertion that her liability was
determined by the Preliminary Injunction and Contempt findings.
Judge Howard accommodated his "representative" by mechanically adopting virtually
verbatim 110 pages of findings proposed by the Special Master/E. Excel. When his
"representative" requested that Judge Howard incorporate by reference all of the Contempt
findings into the Preliminary Injunction findings, Judge Howard did so. When his
"representative" requested that Judge Howard "undo" that incorporation by reference to
bolster his harmless error ruling, Judge Howard did so.
Could Judge Howard ever have acted in a matter before him as has the Special
Master? Could any judicial officer ever have acted as has the Special Master consistent with

the Code of Judicial Conduct?

The answers are plainly "NO." Judge Howard's

empowerment of the Special Master to be CEO and an active party litigant, and the Special
Master's pervasive actions pursuant to those powers, were fundamentally far beyond and
directly contrary to the judicial power that can be exercised by a Rule 53 special master.
But there is more. In addition to dominating the action below as an active party
litigant, the Special Master negotiated and entered into his "Master's Settlement Agreement"
with plaintiff Jau-Fei Chen, her husband, and their allies, and orchestrated the freeze-out
merger on their behalf The Special Master restructured E. Excel's business by giving it to
the plaintiff, her husband, and her allies. He released them from all of E. Excel's claims,
including the claims that they had embezzled approximately $75 million of E. Excel revenue
and had produced counterfeit E. Excel products (which the Special Master reported to Judge
Howard was occurring). [R. 14300 at 9 {see Addendum, Tab H).] The Special Master
settled all of E. Excel's litigation. He did all of this while using the same counsel as the
plaintiff and her husband.
He did so only under the cloak of his judicial office because, absent his status as a
special master, his "Master's Settlement Agreement" was not worth the paper it was written
on. The "Master's Settlement Agreement" was beyond the lawful powers of a CEO, in
breach of a CEO's fiduciary duties, and had an admittedly "devastating" impact on E.
Excel.16 Judge Howard approved of his "representative's" actions with regard to the Master
16

The Master Settlement Agreement was beyond the lawful powers of a CEO
because the transaction was: (1) a "conflicting interest transaction" under the Utah Corporate
Code, because the plaintiff and her husband were corporate insiders as well as parties and
(continued...)

Settlement Agreement without jurisdiction.17 He unlawfully deferred to his Special Master's
"business judgment" to enter into the Master Settlement Agreement - treatment lawfully
reserved for corporate decision makers. Utah Code § 16-10a-840 (providing that corporate
officers and directors' actions are shielded by business judgment rule).
After giving the plaintiff, her husband, and their allies almost all of E. Excel's
business, the Special Master attempted to cede all of E. Excel's outstanding shares to the
plaintiff and her children by orchestrating the freeze-out merger. The Special Master
admitted his actions were at the behest of the plaintiff, her husband, and their allies. [R.
14324, Holman Aff] He not only attempted to manipulate E. Excel's ownership, but

16

(.. .continued)
direct beneficiaries of the agreement; (2) not approved, as required, by either a majority of
disinterested directors or shareholders; and (3) manifestly "unfair" to E. Excel, which is
emphasized by the Preliminary Injunction finding that the Master Settlement Agreement was
"suboptimal." See Utah Code Ann. §§ 16-10a-850 to 853; Pepper v. Litton, 308 U.S. 295,
306 (1939); Branch v. Western Factors, Inc., 502 P.2d 570, 571 (Utah 1972); Hansen v.
Granite Holding Co., 218 P.2d 274, 280 (Utah 1950); Weinberger v. UOP, Inc., 457 A.2d
701, 711 (Del. 1983); Coggins v. New England Patriots Football Club, Inc., 492 N.E.2d
1112, 1117-19 (Mass. 1986). Moreover, the transaction was a breach of a CEO's fiduciary
duties because the transaction manifestly favored the plaintiff over the principal owner,
Hwan Lan Chen, and another minority owner, Ms. Stewart, without their consent, and
sacrificed E. Excel's interests in favor of enhancing the plaintiffs personal interests. See
Montgomery v. Aetna Plywood, Inc., 39 F. Supp. 2d 915, 936 (N.D. 111. 1998) ("It thus has
long been the law that directors' actions t o . . . favor one shareholder unequally over another,
are illegal and invalid breaches of the fiduciary duties."); Nicholson v. Evans, 642 P.2d 727,
730 (Utah 1982).
17

Judge Howard had no jurisdiction to approve a settlement that restructured E. Excel
for the benefit of the plaintiff, her husband, and their allies, without trial, and which settled
litigation not before him. Case, 528 N.W.2d at 389 ("The trial court would not have had
authority to dictate the settlement of a case triable to a jury or factfinder under any
circumstances."); Webster Eisenlohr, 145 F.2d at 320 (observing that judicial power is
limited to deciding controversies presented by party litigants).

attempted to implement the plaintiffs litigation strategy by trying to eliminate defendant
Jau-Hwa Stewart's standing as an E. Excel shareholder.
Just as Judge Howard could not have lawfully, pendente lite, been a CEO of a
corporation before him and an active party litigant, investigated, initiated and prosecuted
claims, sought and obtained a preliminary injunction, submitted partisan reports, released the
plaintiff, her husband, and their allies of claims, divested E. Excel of most of its business to
the plaintiff, her husband, and her allies, and eliminated the defendant as a shareholder of E.
Excel for the benefit of the plaintiff and her allies - all clearly non-judicial powers and
actions - neither could have the Special Master. Utah R. Civ. P. 53; LaBuy, 352 U.S. at 256;
In re Gilbert, 276 U.S. at 9; Webster Eisenlohr, 145 F.2d at 319-20; O 'Connor, 291 F.2d at
528; Bituminous Coal, 949 F.2d at 1168; Plumb, 809 P.2d at 743. The Special Master's
appointment and empowerment must be vacated and set aside, and the entire unlawful role
of the Special Master terminated and reversed.
B.

Judge Howard Merely Whitewashed The Special Master's Blatantly
Unlawful Empowerment And Actions With His January 24,2003 Ruling

Upon the invitation of the Special Master/E. Excel, Judge Howard merely
whitewashed the blatantly unlawful empowerment and actions of the Special Master in his
January 24, 2003 Ruling under the doctrines of waiver, standing, and harmless error.
1.

Contrary To Judge Howard's January 24, 2003 Ruling, The
Special Master's Unlawful Empowerment And Actions Cannot Be
Sheltered Under The Waiver Doctrine

In his January 24, 2003 Ruling, Judge Howard ruled that Hwan Lan Chen had
impliedly waived her challenge to the Special Master's empowerment and actions and was

bound by an alleged stipulation between plaintiff Jau-Fei Chen, defendant Jau-Hwa Stewart,
and E. Excel to the Special Master's appointment as special master and CEO. This attempt
by Judge Howard to shield the Special Master's unlawful empowerment and actions under
the doctrine of waiver is pure error.
First, Hwan Lan Chen's challenge to the Special Master's empowerment and actions
is not subject to the claim of waiver. Her challenge does not raise error; it raises the issue
of subject matter jurisdiction. A challenge to subject matter jurisdiction cannot be waived
and can be raised at any time.
The settled rule that a judge is not authorized by Rule 53 to empower a special master
with non-judicial powers that the judge does not possess establishes that the Special Master's
appointment, empowerment, and actions far exceeded the lawful subject matter jurisdiction
of a judge or special master under Rule 53. Plumb, 809 P.2d at 722-23; Webster Eisenlohr,
145 F.2d at 319-20; Cruz, 515 F.2d at 327. Just like any challenge to subject matter
jurisdiction, a challenge to a special master's empowerment with and exercise of non-judicial
powers in excess of its and the judge's subject matter jurisdiction is not subject to waiver,
but can be raised at any time. See, e.g., Atwood, 55 P.2d at 384,386; Oldroyd, 235 P. at 588;
Cruz, 515 F.2d at 327 ("An order without power is void; a challenge, therefore, to subject
matter jurisdiction may be raised for the first time on appeal."); Barnard v. Wasserman, 855
P.2d 243, 248 (Utah 1983) ("This court has made clear that challenges to subject matter
jurisdiction can be raised at any time and cannot be waived by the parties."); 60 C.J.S.
Motions and Orders § 75 (2000) ("[A]n order entered by a court which lacks inherent power

to make or enter the particular order is void.... A void order is not made valid by lapse of
time . . . ; it cannot be enlivened by waiver... .").18
Hwan Lan Chen's challenge could no more be waived than she could have consented
to Judge Howard exercising the powers of E. Excel's CEO, an active party litigant, or a
master claims settler so as to create jurisdiction.19 Fundamentally, parties may not create
jurisdiction by consenting to a court or special master acting in excess of their subject matter
jurisdiction - such as a special master being empowered with and exercising non-judicial
powers. Wilver v. Fisher, 387 F.2d 66,69 (10th Cir. 1967) ("Here the Master was given the
power to restate [interrogatory] questions and to recommend the answers. The fact that the
parties agreed to such anomalous procedure does not make it permissible." (emphasis
added)); Hardy v. Meadows, 264 P. 968, 972 (Utah 1928) ("[S]ubject matter jurisdiction of
a cause may not be conferred by consent or waiver where the court or tribunal is without such
jurisdiction."). Jurisdiction cannot be created under the doctrine of waiver so as to permit

18

Atwood and Oldroyd explain the concept of a court acting in excess of its
jurisdiction by entering void interlocutory orders. Atwood, 55 P.2d at 384, 386 ("[E]xcess
of jurisdiction is lack of jurisdiction in regard to that judicial action which exceeds
jurisdiction. . . . [E]xcess of jurisdiction means a case in which the court has initially
proceeded properly within its jurisdiction but steps out of the jurisdiction in the making of
some [interlocutory] order."); Oldroyd, 235 P. at 588.
19

A challenge to actions of a court or a special master may be waived only where the
parties could have lawfully consented to the action. See, e.g., Commercial Ins. Co. v.
Burnquist, 105 F. Supp. 920, 938 (N.D. Iowa 1952) (stating that waiver "is consensual in
nature"); Schraft v. Leis, 686 P.2d 865, 873 (Kan. 1984) (same); 31 CJ.S. Estoppel and
Waiver § 74 at 450 (1996) (stating that waiver "necessarily assumes the existence of an
opportunity for choice between the relinquishment and enforcement of a right").

a judicial officer to cast off the limitations of its judicial office and exercise the powers of
a CEO, active party litigant, and master claims settler.
Second, Hwan Lan Chen never either expressly or implicitly waived her challenge.
See U.S. Realty 86 Assocs., 2002 UT 14, ^ 16, 40 P.3d at 589 ("Waiver is the intentional
relinquishment of a known right"; a waiver can be express or implied, but does not occur
"unless the totality of the circumstances demonstrates an unambiguous intent to waive.").
Hwan Lan Chen in no manner expressly waived her challenge. She was not even a party
when the Special Master was appointed and empowered so as to have been able to expressly
waive her challenge. See First of Denver Mortgage Investors v. C.N. Zundel& Assocs., 600
P.2d 521,527-28 (Utah 1979) (holding that non-parties to a stipulation "are in no way bound"
by it); Cockran v. Cal-Zona Corp., 373 S.W.2d 573, 575-76 (Tex. Civ. App. 1963) ("Not
being before the court, and not knowing of the defect, he could not waive it.").
Contrary to Judge Howard's January 24, 2003 Ruling, no party ever stipulated or
agreed to the appointment of a special master, much less to the Special Master's appointment
as special master and CEO. The Interim Order did not even mention a special master, much
less provide for the appointment of either a special master or the Special Master. The March
13, 2001 Order was not a stipulated order. Judge Howard's March 5, 2001 ruling that Mr.
Holman would have "master status" was not a stipulated ruling.
Hwan Lan Chen, moreover, never impliedly waived her challenge once she was joined
as a party. Hwan Lan Chen did not appear as a party in the case until 10 months after the
Special Master's appointment, after proceedings had commenced on the Special Master/E.
Excel's Motion for Preliminary Injunction, and after the Special Master/E. Excel announced

that it was not yet seeking injunctive relief against Hwan Lan Chen. Hwan Lan Chen filed
her Motion to Vacate and Set Aside within the 10 day period permitted under Rule 52 for
filing a motion to vacate or modify a judgment or injunction. Utah R.Civ.P. 52(b).
There was no implied waiver because the Special Master- not Hwan Lan Chen - had
the obligation to raise the unlawfulness of his empowerment and actions (which obligation
he acknowledged on March 26, 2001). See Reichert, 830 P.2d at 257 n.7 ("It was Judge
Billings' responsibility to identify her relationship with Fabian & Clendenin and take
appropriate measures to recuse herself....").
Lastly, Hwan Lan Chen did not impliedly waive her challenge because the Special
Master's exercise of patently unlawful powers is ongoing and, therefore, is not subject to
waiver. See, e.g., Smith v. McKnight, 240 S.W.2d 368, 371 (Tex. Civ. App. 1951) ("A
person cannot waive a right before he is in a position to assert it."). The Special Master has
neither resigned as the Special Master nor ceded any of his powers and, instead, continues
to exercise the powers of a CEO and active party litigant.
2.

Contrary To Judge Howard's January 24. 2003 Ruling. The
Special Master's Unlawful Empowerment And Actions Cannot Be
Shielded Under The Doctrine Of Standing

In his January 24, 2003 Ruling, Judge Howard ruled that Hwan Lan Chen lacked
standing to challenge the Special Master's unlawful empowerment and actions because she
was not an owner of E. Excel. This ruling was pure error.

a.

Hwan Lan Chen Has Standing as an Aggrieved Party
Litigant and an Aggrieved Principal Owner of E. Excel

Judge Howard's ruling that Hwan Lan Chen lacked standing is pure error in the first
instance because, although never considered by Judge Howard, she plainly has standing as
an aggrieved party litigant. See, e.g., Society of Prof'{Journalists v. Bullock, 743 P.2d 1166,
1170 (Utah 1987) (a party has standing who has suffered "some distinct and palpable injury
that gives him or her a personal stake in the outcome of the legal dispute." (internal quotation
marks omitted)).
The Special Master/E. Excel is the only party who has brought claims and obtained
relief against Hwan Lan Chen. But for the Special Master, Hwan Lan Chen would not have
even been joined as a party, would not have a Preliminary Injunction entered against her,
would not be litigating against the trial court's "representative," and would not have pending
motions for contempt against her that seek her total default on claims alleged to be worth $ 17
million. One need look no further than paragraph 3 of the Amended Third Party Complaint
to see that this is true: "Special Master Holman has determined that E. Excel should initiate
litigation against [Hwan Lan Chen]

" [R. 4205 at f 3.]

Indeed, the Special Master/E. Excel and the plaintiff conceded Hwan Lan Chen's
standing as a party litigant. At the January 10, 2003 hearing, the Special Master/E. Excel's
counsel conceded that Hwan Lan Chen has standing regarding "litigation matters in which
she's affected as a party." [R. 14287 at 109.] Similarly, the plaintiffs Motion to Strike
Claims that raised the standing issue merely raised Hwan Lan Chen's standing as the
principal owner of E. Excel, thereby conceding her standing as a party litigant. [R. 10275.]

Moreover, Judge Howard's standing ruling violated the rule that standing is
determined based on allegations alone. Davis, 442 U.S. at 239 n. 18; Kozera v. Spirito, 723
F.2d 1003,1006 n.2 (1st Cir. 1983); Mr. Furniture Warehouse, Inc. v. Barclays Am./Comm.
Inc., 919F.2d 1517, 1520 n.2 (11th Cir. 1990). Rather than reject her ownership claim and
then deny her standing because she was not an owner of E. Excel, this rule required Judge
Howard to assume that Hwan Lan Chen was the principal owner of E. Excel to determine her
standing because she alleges and swore in interrogatory answers and her affidavit that she
is the principal owner of E. Excel.
Correctly assuming that she is the principal owner of E. Excel, Hwan Lan Chen
plainly has standing to challenge the Special Master's empowerment and actions because the
Special Master's unlawful exercise of the powers of a CEO, party litigant, and master claims
settler manifestly aggrieved Hwan Lan Chen regarding her interest in E. Excel. But for the
Special Master's unlawful exercise of those non-judicial powers, E. Excel would not have
(1) been divested of over 90% of its business, (2) released the plaintiff, her husband, and
their allies of valuable claims, or (3) dismissed valuable litigation. Indeed, the Preliminary
Injunction Ruling lays out the harm to E. Excel's owners - it specifically finds that the
Special Master "caused" the Master Settlement Agreement and that the Agreement was
"suboptimal" and allowed the Territorial Owners to "take over" E. Excel's profits. [R. 14318
at 54-55 (TflJ 159-60).] Finally, but for the Special Master, there would have been no attempt
to cede all of E. Excel's outstanding stock ownership to the plaintiff and her children with
the freeze-out merger.

b.

Judge Howard's Rejection Of Hwan Lan Chen's
Ownership Claim Based On The August 12, 2002 Order Is
Pure Error

In his January 24, 2003 Ruling, Judge Howard rejected Hwan Lan Chen's claim to
ownership of E. Excel based on his August 12, 2002 Order entered on plaintiff Jau-Fei
Chen's motion for partial summary judgment. He ruled that he already had adjudicated the
stock ownership of E. Excel with the August 12, 2002 Order and that Hwan Lan Chen was
not found to be one of the stock owners. This ruling is pure error.
Judge Howard's ruling violated the simple rule that there can be no adjudication of
a claim absent the claim being asserted in a pleading in the case. See Combe, 680 P.2d at
736 ("[A] judgment must be responsive to the issues framed by the pleadings, and a trial
court has no authority to render a decision on issues not presented for determination."); In
re H.J., 1999 UT App. 238, ^ 38, 986 P.2d 115, 124 (stating that one element of claim
preclusion is assertion of claim by a pleading). No claim of any type has ever been asserted
by way of pleading in the action below that is directed at Hwan Lan Chen's claim to
ownership of E. Excel.
She has asserted her claim - which is not based on stock ownership - in pleading in
a separate action that has not been adjudicated.20 Well prior to the August 12, 2002 Order,

20

Contrary to Judge Howard's January 24, 2003 Ruling, Hwan Lan Chen, a thirdparty defendant below, had no obligation to file compulsory counterclaims because the
plaintiff, Jau-Fei Chen, never asserted any claims against her mother. Utah R. Civ. P. 13(a),
14(a); 3 Moore's Federal Procedure, § 14.26[1] ("Because no affirmative action is pending
between [the plaintiff] and [the third-party defendant], they are not 'opposingparties.' Thus,
there can be no counterclaims between the two."); Wright, Miller & Kane, Federal Practice
and Procedure: Civil 2d §§ 1458-50 (West 2d ed.).

Hwan Lan Chen swore to her ownership interest in interrogatory answers in the action below.
Judge Howard had notice of her claim, but never addressed it in the August 12,2002 Order.
Instead, that Order was limited to adjudicating plaintiff Jau-Fei Chen's fourth claim for relief
against defendant Jau-Hwa Stewart - and not any claim of ownership by Hwan Lan Chen because the Order was entered on the plaintiffs motion for summary judgment only on her
fourth claim for relief against defendant Jau-Hwa Stewart. See Timm v. Dewsnup, 851 P.2d
1178, 1182 (Utah 1993) (holding that partial summary judgment only grants relief on claim
referenced in the motion); H.J., 1999 UT App. 238, K 46, 986 P.2d at 126 ("[D]ue process
concerns are implicated when a hearing for one purpose serves a second purpose involving
different issues.").
3.

Contrary To The January 24, 2003 Ruling, The Special Master's
Unlawful Empowerment And Actions Cannot Be Shielded By The
Doctrine Of Harmless Error

Judge Howard ruled in his January 24,2003 Ruling that, even if the Special Master's
empowerment and actions were error, they were harmless error. Judge Howard focused on
his reliance upon the Special Master's evidence in granting the Preliminary Injunction. This
ruling is absolutely untenable as it ignores the pervasive adverse impact of the Special
Master's unlawful empowerment and actions.
The pervasive adverse impact of the Special Master was plainly harmful to Hwan Lan
Chen. He was and remains an adverse party litigant. He was the only party who sought
and obtained relief against her. He directed his lawyers, Jones Waldo, against Hwan Lan
Chen. The Special Master restructured, released, and dealt away claims of E. Excel against

the plaintiff, her husband, and their allies. He shared lawyers with the plaintiff and her
husband to negotiate his "Master's Settlement Agreement."
The Special Master attempted to cede total ownership in E. Excel to the plaintiff and
her children. He obtained approval from Judge Howard for his actions. He filed "clearly
partisan" Reports under Rule 53 that were approved and adopted by Judge Howard. The
Reports were made part of the record and used against Hwan Lan Chen. He testified at the
combined Preliminary Injunction/Contempt proceeding against Hwan Lan Chen. Judge
Howard never denied any order, power, relief, or finding requested by the Special Master.
The Special Master did all of this pendente lite, while the Preliminary Injunction was being
entered, and in the face of the Interim Order's preservation of Hwan Lan Chen's claim
regarding her $3 million investment into E. Excel and her interrogatory answer as to her
beneficial ownership of E. Excel. Lastly, he got Judge Howard to attempt to whitewash all
of these actions in the January 24,2003 Ruling. Judge Howard's assertion of harmless error
is simply untenable.
II.

THE PRELIMINARY INJUNCTION WAS GRANTED IN CLEAR
VIOLATION OF HWAN LAN CHEN'S DUE PROCESS RIGHTS BECAUSE
IT WAS BASED ON 18 DAYS OF EVIDENTIARY HEARINGS HELD
BEFORE SHE WAS JOINED AS A PARTY
The Preliminary Injunction must be vacated and set aside because it was granted in

fundamental denial of Hwan Lan Chen's constitutional right to due process of the law.
The right to due process under Article I, Section 7 of the Utah Constitution and
Amendment XIV of the United States Constitution requires that Hwan Lan Chen have been
joined as a party by service of process and served the Motion for Preliminary Injunction

before the commencement of the Preliminary Injunction proceeding against her. See
Murphy Bros., Inc. v. Michetti Pipe Stringing, Inc., 526 U.S. 344, 350 (1999) ("[Absent]
service of process . . . a court may not exercise power over a party [defendant]. . . .
Accordingly, one becomes a party officially, and is required to take action in that capacity,
only upon service of a summons

"); Murray City, 598 P.2d at 1345 n.12 (stating rule that

proper notice to a non-party requires satisfaction of formal requirements for notice); Plumb,
809 P.2d at 743; Nelson v. Jacobsen, 669 P.2d 1201, 1212 (Utah 1983); Cornish Town v.
Roller, 798 P.2d 753, 756 (Utah 1990).
Due process under the Utah and United States Constitutions requires that no evidence
against Hwan Lan Chen be received without her participation and that the entire
Preliminary Injunction proceeding be held while she had an opportunity to fully
participate. See Eakins, 710 F.2d at 187 (holding that late-joined party was denied due
process; "Although he appeared as a defense witness, he was not given the opportunity . . .
to make an opening statement... 5 to cross-examine the witnesses, and to have counsel then
representing his interests participate in the proceedings."); Plumb, 809 P.2d at 743.
The Preliminary Injunction, in direct contravention of Hwan Lan Chen's constitutional
right to due process of law, was granted based on 18 days of evidentiary hearings that were
conducted before she was joined as a party to the case. During those 18 days of evidentiary
hearings: (1) Hwan Lan Chen had not been served process, and had not appeared in the case;
(2) over 50% of the evidence cited in the Preliminary Injunction and Contempt findings was
received in evidence; (3) the Special Master/E. Excel5s counsel told Judge Howard that it
was not seeking "injunctive relief against Hwan Lan Chen; (4) Hwan Lan Chen was

unrepresented by counsel and had no opportunity to object to the admission of evidence or
cross-examine any witness; and (5) she was not served the Special Master/E. Excel's Motion
for Preliminary Injunction (she was never served the Motion), had no opportunity to make
opening arguments, and had no notice that the Motion was being heard along with the
Contempt motions.
Given that over half of the Preliminary Injunction proceeding was conducted before
she was joined as a party and without notice to her, Hwan Lan Chen plainly and
fundamentally was denied due process. The Preliminary Injunction must be vacated and set
aside for this reason alone. See, e.g., Nelson, 669 P.2d at 1214; Cornish, 798 P.2d at 756.
IIL

THE PRELIMINARY INJUNCTION IS FACIALLY INVALID IN SCOPE
BECAUSE IT UNLAWFULLY ENJOINS HWAN LAN CHEN FROM ALL
COMPETITION WITH E. EXCEL AND FROM ALL COMPETITION IN
SEVERAL ENTIRE INDUSTRIES WORLDWIDE
The scope of the Preliminary Injunction is facially invalid. It enjoins Hwan Lan Chen

from all competition with E. Excel and from all competition in the entire herbal, dietary,
cosmetic, hygiene, and personal care product industries worldwide without basis and, indeed,
without precedent in American jurisprudence.
The Preliminary Injunction is facially invalid because Judge Howard enjoined Hwan
Lan Chen from all competition with E. Excel even though she had no continuing duty not to
compete with E. Excel. Hwan Lan Chen was not a party to any non-compete agreement with
E. Excel and, after February 21, 2001, she was no longer obligated as an E. Excel director
not to compete. See Muna, 625 P.2d at 695 ("When a corporate officer ceases to act as such,
. . . the fiduciary relationship ceases."). A defendant cannot be lawfully enjoined from

competing with the plaintiff absent a valid continuing duty not to compete. See Mima, 625
P.2d at 700 ("In the absence of express agreement... courts .. . should not enjoin an exemployee from engaging in fair and open competition with his former employer."); E. W.
Bliss Co. v. Struthers-Dunn, Inc., 408 F.2d 1108,1113 (8th Cir. 1969) ("[A]n employer may
not restrict an employee's future employment except by an agreement embodying reasonable
terms."); United Aircraft Corp. v. Boreenf 413 F.2d 694, 699 (3d Cir. 1969) (holding that a
former director may compete absent a non-compete agreement); Resolution Trust Corp v.
Scaletty, 810 F. Supp. 1505, 1513 (D. Kan 1992) (same); Robbins v. Finlay, 645 P.2d 623,
627 (Utah 1982) (holding that injunction which "serve[s] no purpose other than restricting
an employee from competing with a former employer" is invalid). E. Excel had no legitimate
interest in having Hwan Lan Chen enjoined from any competition and there was no basis for
enjoining her from competition with E. Excel. Id.; Nestle Food Co. v. Miller, 836 F. Supp.
69, 75 n.19 (D. R.I. 1993) ("The desire to be free from competition, by itself, is not a
protectable interest.").
The Preliminary Injunction also is facially invalid because Judge Howard enjoined
Hwan Lan Chen from all competition in the entire herbal, dietary supplement, cosmetic,
hygiene, and personal care product industries worldwide. Under no circumstances can a
person be preliminarily enjoined from competition in entire multiple industries worldwide.
This scope of the Preliminary Injunction is unprecedented in American jurisprudence, clearly
against the principles of free enterprise and individual liberties, and does not protect any

legitimate interest of E. Excel, as required.21 See Crane, 576 P.2d at 872-73 ("Under our
system of free enterprise and individual freedoms, there is no serfdom."); Restatement
(Third) of Unfair Competition § 1 cmt. a (1995) ("The freedom to engage in business and to
compete for the patronage of prospective customers is a fundamental premise of the free
enterprise system."); Allen, 237 P.2d at 826 (holding that injunction against competition must
be limited to protecting legitimate interests of plaintiff).
Judge Howard plainly granted the Preliminary Injunction as a sanction rather than to
protect any legitimate interest of E. Excel. He granted the Preliminary Injunction even
though the Special Master had moved to enjoin all competition "until such time as E. Excel
has completely rebuilt its business," over a year passed between that Motion and its grant
(which eliminated any claim of imminent irreparable harm), E. Excel's legitimate interest in
being protected from competition from even its ex-employees who were bound by a noncompete was limited to one year, and Judge Howard made absolutely no finding of any
continuing irreparable harm and entered a Preliminary Injunction that was unprecedented and
facially invalid in scope. Under no circumstances may a preliminary injunction be granted
simply to sanction or punish a defendant. American Bd. of Psychiatry, 129 F.3d at 4 ("The
purpose of interlocutory injunctive relief is to preserve the status quo pending final relief and

21

E. Excel has no legitimate interest because E. Excel does not compete worldwide
and does not compete in the entire dietary, herbal, personal care, cosmetic or hygiene product
industries, and Hwan Lan Chen was not responsible for any of E. Excel's goodwill. See
Allen, 237 P.2d at 826 (holding that restraint on competition must be limited to where the
plaintiff competes); System Concepts, Inc. v. Dixon, 669 P.2d 421, 425-26 (Utah 1983)
(holding that restraint on competition must protect the legitimate interests of the plaintiff and
can be imposed on only a person who was responsible for the plaintiffs goodwill); Robbins,
645 P.2d at 627; Restatement (Second) of Contracts § 188(1) (1981).

to prevent irreparable injury to the plaintiff- not simply to punish past misdeeds or set an
example."); Hunsaker, 1999 UT 106, \ 8,991 P.2d at 69 (stating that preliminary injunction
"purpose is preventative in nature"); Wolff v. Wolff 490 N.E.2d 532, 533 (N.Y. 1986)
("[T]he purpose of an injunction [is] remedial and not punitive.").
The scope of the Preliminary Injunction is unprecedented and invalid.

The

Preliminary Injunction, therefore, must be reversed. See, e.g., E. W. Bliss Co., 408 F.2d at
1117 (setting aside preliminary injunction that was invalid in scope).
IV.

THE SPECIAL MASTER/E. EXCEL FAILED TO ESTABLISH A PRIMA
FACIE CASE ON THE KEY PREDICATE FINDINGS AGAINST HWAN
LAN CHEN ON WHICH THE PRELIMINARY INJUNCTION IS BASED
"[A]t the very least," the Special Master/E. Excel had to "make a prima facie showing

that the elements of its underlying claims can be proved" to obtain the Preliminary
Injunction. SeeKeil, 1999 UT 16,^8,974 P.2d at 822. The Special Master/E. Excel did not
come close to doing so. The evidence against Hwan Lan Chen shows only that she was a
mother, a matriarch of a Chinese family that defers to its elders, a director for a limited time,
and a potential competitor. This evidence simply is not evidence that she was a crook,
conspirator or corporate wrongdoer.
1.

UPUAA and Civil Conspiracy Claims. The Special Master/ E. Excel failed

to establish a prima facie case on the key predicate findings that Hwan Lan Chen was a
criminal who violated UPUAA or was part of a conspiracy against E. Excel.
First there is no evidence, or even a finding, that Hwan Lan Chen either funded,
acquired, or controlled an "enterprise" through a "pattern of unlawful activity" so as to have
committed a substantive violation of UPUAA. Utah Code Ann. §76-10-1603(1)-(3). There

is no substantive UPUAA claim to support the Preliminary Injunction because there is no
evidence or findings of a substantive violation of Section 76-10-1603 of UPUAA. Utah
Code § 76-10-1605 (providing that plaintiff on UPUAA claim must have been injured "by
a person engaged in conduct forbidden by any provision of Section 76-10-1603"). There is
no evidence that Hwan Lan Chen committed any of the alleged predicate acts under UPUAA.
Second, there is no evidence that Hwan Lan Chen conspired to violate UPUAA or
"unlawfully disabl[e] E. Excel." Fundamentally, the Special Master/E. Excel needed, but
failed, to prove that Hwan Lan Chen agreed to accomplish an unlawful purpose. See Alta
Indus. Ltd. v. Hurst, 846 P.2d 1282, 1290 n.17 (Utah 1993) (stating that agreement to
accomplish an unlawful objective is essential element of civil conspiracy); Israel Pagan
Estate v. Cannon, 746 P.2d 785, 790 (Utah Ct. App. 1987) (same); In re TMJ Implants
Prods. Liab. Litig., 113 F.3d 1484,1498 (8th Cir. 1997) (holding that civil conspiracy claim
fails "[w]ithout evidence of specific facts tending to show an agreement or a 'meeting of the
minds' and concerted action").
There is no direct evidence of any agreement by Hwan Lan Chen to violate UPUAA
or unlawfully act against E. Excel. There is not "substantial proof of circumstances from
which it reasonably follows, or at least may be reasonably inferred" that Hwan Lan Chen
agreed to violate UPUAA or unlawfully act against E. Excel. See Israel Pagan, 746 P.2d at
791 (quotations omitted). Indeed, any inference that Hwan Lan Chen made such an
agreement or committed any predicate act is belied by the facts that Hwan Lan Chen does not
speak, read or write English (whereas all but two of the other alleged conspirators only speak,
read and write English), is 76 years old, was never an E. Excel employee or officer, was

never at E. Excel's facilities during the relevant time period, was not involved in the daily
management or operation of E. Excel, and claims to be E. ExceFs principal owner.
The evidence shows only that Hwan Lan Chen (the Chen family matriarch) acted to
remove plaintiff Jau-Fei Chen (her daughter) from E. Excel (the family business). Hwan Lan
Chen served as an E. Excel director for five and a half months (during which time she only
took four director actions, two of which related to a transaction that did not occur). She
invested funds into E. Excel. After she was removed from E. Excel as a director, she funded
and was involved with Apogee, Inc., a potential competitor, when she was under no duty to
refrain from any competition.
Hwan Lan Chen's actions relating to E. Excel were lawful actions and, therefore, are
not evidence that she was a conspirator. See Israel Pagan, 764 P.2d at 792-93 (holding that
lawful participation in financing of otherwise lawful transaction is insufficient to support
conclusion that the defendant was a co-conspirator). Her Apogee, Inc. related activities after
she ceased to be a director likewise were lawful and are not evidence that she was a
conspirator. See id.; Crane Co., 576 P.2d at 872 (holding that there was no conspiracy to
violate plaintiffs rights and "pirate away its business" when defendants had no non-compete
agreement, even though defendants prepared to compete while still employees).
In addition to a complete absence of evidence, the Preliminary Injunction findings
regarding Hwan Lan Chen being a conspirator are directly contradicted by the Contempt
findings regarding the conspiracy, even though both sets of findings were entered on the
same day based on the same record, such that the Preliminary Injunction findings are
capricious and invalid. See Malstrom v. Consolidated Theatres, Inc., 290 P.2d 689, 690-91

(Utah 1955) ("[I]f, on the same evidence, the trial court should make findings of fact
necessarily contrary to each other, such action would be capricious and... such inconsistent
findings should not be permitted to stand."); / " re Lemire-Courville Assocs., 499 A.2d 1328,
1336 (N.H. 1985). The Contempt findings specifically determined who was a co-conspirator,
but do not include Hwan Lan Chen. [R. 14317 at 80-81 fl[ 115); 119 ffl2-4).] Moreover,
the Contempt Ruling findings determined that only defendant Jau-Hwa Stewart was the
central figure of the conspiracy, that Apogee, Inc. was defendant Jau-Hwa Stewart's idea
alone, and that third-party defendant Beverly Warner, who allegedly took key action to
enable the predicate acts, never had any business discussions with Hwan Lan Chen - all
directly contrary to the Preliminary Injunction findings that Hwan Lan Chen was part of the
conspiracy. [Id. at 20 fl[ 27), 26 fl[ 39), 65-66flffl99-100), 99 fl[ 159).]
2.

Breach of Fiduciary Duty and Usurpation of Corporate Opportunity

Claims. The Special Master/E. Excel failed to establish a prima facie case on the key
predicate findings that Hwan Lan Chen breached fiduciary duties or usurped any of E.
Excel5s corporate opportunities. There is no evidence that Hwan Lan Chen acted to cripple
E. Excel, stole any of its assets, solicited any of its employees while she was an E. Excel
director, or had any involvement with Jau-Hwa Stewart's cutting off the Territorial Owners
from obtaining E. Excel products..
Hwan Lan Chen's four actions as an E. Excel director - voting for the removal of
plaintiff Jau-Fei Chen as President, voting to retain Hong Kong counsel for E. Excel, and
twice voting for a new stock issuance - were not acts in breach of her fiduciary duties.
Acting to remove an officer regardless of reason is well within the authorized actions of a

corporate director. Utah Code § 16-10a-832(4) ("[Directors may remove any officer at any
time with or without cause."). Voting for a new stock issuance was inconsequential to E.
Excel's interests and became moot when the issuance did not occur. See Nicholson, 642 P.2d
at 730 (holding that action in breach of fiduciary duty must be against corporation's
interests). There is no evidence that Hwan Lan Chen's vote for E. Excel to retain Hong
Kong counsel to pursue claims there against E. Excel Limited was fraudulent or in bad faith
so as to fall outside the business judgment rule. Utah Code § 16-10a-840.
Hwan Lan Chen's non-director action taken with regard to E. Excel when she was an
E. Excel director - funding new distributorships for E. Excel in November and December
2000 - also was not a breach of her fiduciary duty. It is uncontroverted that those new
distributorships were intended to act for the benefit of E. Excel and, therefore, the funding
was not against E. Excel's interests.
Even accepting Judge Howard's finding that Hwan Lan Chen instructed her daughter
to lease the ATL warehousefivedays before she was removed as a director, it is not a breach
of fiduciary duty to prepare to compete while serving as a corporate director absent a noncompete agreement. See Crane Co., 576 P.2d at 872-73 ("[Individual liberties includes the
right to advise customers of the fact that he is going to quit; and that thereafter he will be
working for a competitor; even while he is still working for the employer."); United Aircraft
Corp, 413 F.2d at 700 ("Even before termination of the agency, [an agent] is entitled to make
arrangements to compete, except that he cannot properly use confidential information

"

(citing Restatement (Second) of Agency § 393 cmt. e)); Maryland Metals, Inc. v. Metzner,
382A.2d564,569(Md. 1978).

Hwan Lan Chen's directorship ceased on February 21,2001 and, therefore, she cannot
be liable for breach of fiduciary duty based on her involvement with Apogee, Inc. after
February 21, 2001. See Muna, 625 P.2d at 695; Crane Co., 576 P.2d at 872-73; United
Aircraft Corp., 413 F.2d at 700; Metzner, 283 A.2d at 569.
Moreover, there is no evidence that any of Hwan Lan Chen's actions that allegedly
were in breach of her fiduciary duties were continuing, as required to support the Preliminary
Injunction.

See Utah R. Civ. P. 65A(e)(l) (providing that applicant for preliminary

injunction must show it "will suffer irreparable harm") (emphasis added); American Bd. of
Psychiatry, 129 F.3d at 4 (holding there must be likelihood of further wrongful conduct to
support grant of preliminary injunction).
3.

Unfair Competition Claim. The Special Master/E. Excel failed to establish

a prima facie case on the key predicate findings that Hwan Lan Chen engaged in unfair
competition against E. Excel. There is no evidence that Hwan Lan Chen committed or had
any knowledge of any theft of E. Excel assets or their use to compete with E. Excel. Hwan
Lan Chen was never at E. Excel's facilities after September 1, 2000. There is no evidence
that Hwan Lan Chen was in any manner connected with, directed, or was otherwise
responsible for the Asian distributors' sales of E. Excel products under the name of Apogee.
The mere fact that Hwan Lan Chen was involved with Apogee Inc. does not make her
responsible for all actions taken by others under the name "Apogee" or on Apogee, Inc.'s
behalf. See e.g., Hagemeyer Chem. Co. v. lnsect-O-Lite Co., 291 F.2d 696,698-99 (6th Cir.
1961) (holding that investor may not be liable for acts of unfair competition committed by
the corporation unless the investor perpetrated or promoted such acts); Lobato v. Pay Less

Drug Stores, Inc., 261 F.2d 406, 409 (10th Cir. 1958) ("[M]erely being an officer or agent
of a corporation does not render one personally liable for a tortious act of the corporation.").
In sum, the Special Master/E. Excel wholly failed to establish a prima facie case on
any of the key predicate findings against Hwan Lan Chen - that she was a crook, conspirator,
or corporate wrongdoer - on which the Preliminary Injunction was based. The Preliminary
Injunction must be reversed on this ground alone.
CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, appellant Hwan Lan Chen respectfully submits that Judge
Howard's Orders relating to the Special Master's appointment, empowerment, and actions
must be vacated and set aside, the Preliminary Injunction findings and Order must be vacated
and set aside, and the case remanded with instructions that it be returned to its status before
the Special Master's unlawful appointment, empowerment, and actions.
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